URBAN PLANNING AS CULTURAL PROCESS: A STUDY OF ARMENIA, COLOMBIA

BY

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By

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An ethnographic study was made of the processes of urban planning and urban development in Armenia, Colombia—a city of intermediate size. It is posited that planning is a cultural process, one whereby people shape their living environments according to cultural patterns. Development is a broader, more organic process but also culturally patterned. The study consists of a sociocultural matrix sketch of the city, within which more strictly institutional elements are considered; four case studies illustrate development process. Social groups are considered peripherally, as the process of planning impinges upon them. The frame of reference is the viewpoint of upper-class planning professionals. Special focus is placed upon elite groups, the politics of planning, and the physical city as culturally patterned space.

Despite claims by some observers that there is no effective urban planning in Colombian medium-sized cities, there was found to be a planning process in Armenia. A large number of agencies was found to perform planning functions, both formally and de facto. But the wider concept of urban development was found to be more powerful since most of substantive planning is done informally—and since the planning office does not have an adequate field of real powers to plan.

The sociocultural matrix was found to contain traditional Antioqueño values of entrepreneurial vigor, regionalism, familism, and economic conservatism in those sectors tied to coffee agriculture. Because of the coffee economy with little diversification, money traditionally is invested in land and real estate, which makes urban land-use policy a matter of concern to the influential elites of Armenia, who use the political and planning structure to defend and promote their interests. A cacique, or political boss, was found to control the critical junctures of society and government in this centralist system, and a small power group dominates many of the city's socioeconomic institutions.

While a planning agency does indeed exist in Armenia, it does not have the power or the continuity to effectively channel the growth of the city. Given the present social and political conditions of the city—a wealthy and

entrenched upper class and an equally entrenched political boss—it does not seem likely that the prospects for "rational" planning will improve markedly. The informal process of urban development is not random or disorderly, but follows established cultural patterns useful to providing orderly growth. Since planning is not possible outside the cultural matrix which houses and informs it, planners in Armenia and other cities might well look to their cultural patterns for ideas and limitations on planning, and try to formalize such patterns as they affect urban development.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The somber figure of Simón Bolívar no longer stands in the Plaza de Bolívar in Armenia, Colombia. Now, stranded in a tiny scrap of park called the Park of the Aborigines,[1] the statue of Colombia's national hero goes almost unnoticed by truckers and motorists entering the city. Bolívar has been displaced from the downtown Plaza, the traditional prestige spot in any Latin American city, by the bold new "Monument to Effort."[2]

The new monument is a stylized male clad only in coffee branches, hoisting a winged female figure high above his head. Both defiantly face the central chain of the Andes which provides a green backdrop before which Armenia is growing rapidly as a coffee emporium and center of commerce, population, and administration. To those familiar with Colombia and its general conservative adherence to colonial values and reverence for revolutionary heroes, such a change in civic symbols would appear remarkable. But then to those who know the department (a state-like political unit) of Antioquia and the three new departments—Caldas, Quindío, and Risaralda—which were formed from the Antioqueño-populated Old Caldas, the change might not be so surprising.[3] The "defiant" couple in the new monument symbolizes the pioneer

spirit with which Armenians believe settlers wrested Armenia's tiny department of Quindío from dense, inhospitable jungle and turned it into one of Colombia's richest coffee-producing regions in less than half a century.[4]

The new monument symbolizes Armenia and its region better than Simón Bolívar. This is an area which both the Conquistadors and the Liberators generally avoided,[5] preferring easier routes for travel and more accessible areas both for colonizing and for doing battle. Armenia, along with its sister cities of Pereira and Manizales, is growing rapidly, following values different than those prevalent in much of more traditional Colombia. As a city, Armenia is prosperous. Physically, it is in constant change, metamorphosing from the traditional architecture of Old Caldas coffee towns into an architecturally stylish city. While maintaining strong ties with its coffee-producing hinterland—in fact, depending upon it totally for its prosperity—Armenia belongs to a new urban Colombia.

For Colombia is a nation of cities. Between 1951 and 1964, rapid urbanization tilted the rural-urban balance of population distribution, urban population growing from 39.6 to 52.8 percent of the total (Gilbert, 1975:245).[6] Since that watershed intercensal period, urban growth has continued apace: in 1973 the urban population was estimated at 13,261,748, or 76 percent of the total population (DANE, 1979: 33). This turnabout in residential patterns has been

commented upon in literature on Colombia (Gilbert, 1975; Fornaguera, 1970; Cardona, 1970).

Even after discounting smaller urban places—that is, those of 1,500 inhabitants up through about 20,000—there are dozens of cities. Gilbert (1975:248) lists forty-six cities which counted more than 25,000 inhabitants in the 1973 census. Twenty-eight are over 50,000, and fifteen over 100,000.[7] Of the cities I have arbitrarily called "intermediate sized" (100,000 to 500,000) for purposes of this study, there were twelve in 1973, and more by 1979, the year of the research for this study. This is a large number of substantial cities, cities the size of Orlando, or Sacramento, or Ottawa, or Freiburg, or Limoges—and whose names nevertheless seldom are heard beyond Colombia's borders. Cities with names like Bucaramanga, Pereira, Ibagué, and Armenia.

A principal reason for this proliferation of cities in Colombia—an exception to the general rule in Latin America, as will be mentioned below—is the nation's history as a series of isolated regions which developed in relative independence of each other. Colombia's topography is rugged; three parallel chains of the Andes run from southwest to northeast, creating many small regions and river-basins not easily accessible to each other. The Andean region traditionally is the most populated region, since the high altitudes offer cooler climates, relatively free from the tropical diseases which afflict low-lying coastal and plains regions.

One or two major urban centers have developed in each major habitable Andean region, attending to the administrative and economic needs of their hinterlands.

This flourishing of Colombian cities is remarkable in the Latin American context. Most countries have only a few cities of intermediate or large size, and suffer from an urban primacy wherein a single primate city, many times larger than any other, dominates the distribution of cities (Doughty, 1979; Gilbert, 1975). Colombia is one of the few exceptions (the others are Brazil, Ecuador, and Honduras—Gilbert, 1975:245; Doughty, 1979). Instead, Colombia approaches the ideal pattern called "rank-size distribution," wherein the "largest city is approximately twice the size of the second city, three times the size of the third, and n times the size of the nth largest" (Gilbert, 1975:245). Although that ideal distribution appears to have been weakening since 1951 (Gilbert, 1975:245), with Bogotá outstripping the other cities, the pattern still obtains among the latter. This healthy distribution of cities holds out long-range opportunities for Colombia to "rationalize" its internal development by creating a wide web of prosperous cities dispersed in decentralized regional hierarchies.

The present study of city development and planning in the intermediate-sized city of Armenia examines phenomena which will affect the future patterns of urban growth in

many cities: the native processes by which cities attempt to plan and regulate their growth.

Colombia also is a nation with many urban problems. As a result of rapid growth, Colombian cities are hard-pressed to handle their larger populations. Many cities have public service infrastructure systems dating from the 1940s and 1950s, designed to handle much smaller populations. Water supply and delivery are inadequate, and whole barrios (neighborhoods) go without sanitary services. Electricity distribution systems are antiquated, service often is sporadic, and new lines and transformers are costly. City commuters find public transportation expensive, uncomfortable, and sometimes insufficient; many neighborhoods lack paved streets. There are not enough schoolrooms, policemen, or jobs. There is little industry and often not much chance for substantial growth in the economy.

Small, once-compact cities have sprawled, growing in disorganized patterns outward from the former nuclei. Whole neighborhoods are built surreptitiously, or without following established guidelines. Developers and wealthy individuals speculate in urban real estate.

Such problems provoke questions as to the futures of these cities and the degree of control that may be exercized over them. How do Colombian cities develop? What is the nature of their urban planning? What agencies, institutions, and individuals "plan"? Who staffs them? What, exactly, do they

do? How are they oriented—what are the philosophical and technical guidelines which orient them? How does the larger community affect planning?

The present study is an ethnographic analysis of planning and development in the city of Armenia. Its major premise is that the actual practice of city development derives from broad cultural values held by the city's residents and which infuse a city's social and administrative structures. The process of city development and the practice of urban planning—which are not the same thing—are traced for the case of Armenia, Colombia.

Basic Definitions

Several basic terms recur throughout the text, and are defined below as used for purposes of this study.

1) Urban. Broadly, this adjective denotes "pertaining to, located in, or constituting a city . . . characteristic of the city or city life" (American Heritage, 1976). The key to "urban" thus lies in the definition of "city."

Although there is disagreement as to what constitutes a city, Wirth's classic 1938 definition gives a concise first approximation for most social science purposes: ". . . a relatively large, dense and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals" (1975:31). Arensberg suggests that "The city is a permanently massed, large concentration of people in a community having a nodal function, somehow providing for the lacing together (not necessarily the

subordination) of some hinterland of the other, perhaps lesser communities of a society" (1968:13). Definitions thus are not precise. According to Mumford, "it has taken more than five thousand years to arrive at even a partial understanding of the city's nature and drama" (1961:3).

Many social scientists agree that a city is better defined by its institutions and functions than by its demography. For example, Childe (1950), Harris (1971), and Doughty (1968) show that essential urban functions and traits may be found in tiny population centers. Many authorities show that urbanity is a matter of world-view and self-image in Latin America, and goes back to the very founding of Spanish new-world colonies (Willems, 1975; Olien, 1973; Foster, 1960; Hardoy, 1975; Smith, 1970).

For official purposes, DANE, the Colombian government's statistical bureau, has placed the official cutoff for urban centers at 1,500 and over (Aguirre, 1979:19).[8]

2) Urban development. Urban development is the sum of actions, decisions, theories, and transactions which result in a physical urban product.

3) Urban planning. (Variation, "city planning"). This is the conscious, purportedly rational and coordinated set of actions by agents authorized by a government or other social body, intended to provide an ordered urban environment. The element of consciousness of participation in these actions is of key importance in differentiating planning from

the more amorphous process of urban "development." City planning may follow a structured theoretical and philosophical orientation, or be ad hoc in nature. Bolan (1975) identifies five styles of city planning prominent in U.S. planning. I know of no authority on Colombian planning who has attempted to make a similar list for defining the Colombian planners' methodological "toolkit."

4) Elite. The upper segments of a social structure. Such groups often have institutionalized their positions, and enjoy special privileges and ritual respect from other social groups. Their power to defend themselves as a group from outsiders makes them difficult to study, since they can limit access to themselves and to the entire society.

Theoretical Approach

Three related ideas concerning urban planning in the Colombian city of Armenia oriented the research.

1) There is some form of urban planning taking place in intermediate Colombian cities, where informed observers like Rivera Ortiz (1976) say there is none. Such planning may or may not follow the international patterns of "rational" planning.

2) The system of city planning can be effectively discerned and described through ethnographic techniques.

3) If a planning system is found as expected, it will likely be a culturally patterned process, evolved over time in adaptation to social, cultural, economic, and political

realities peculiar to the city, and thus a part of the urban culture of a place like Armenia.

As such the case described is specific to Armenia insofar as Armenia is a discrete sociocultural system. Yet, although this cultural process will be confined to Armenia, it will be related to similar cultural and institutional processes at work in other medium-sized Colombian cities. It is thus hoped that this study may contribute to the development of a model of the urban planning process in Colombia.

One major revision in research design came early in the research process. What had been foreseen as a study of a planning organization in its sociocultural matrix became a system-wide search for the locus of "real" planning, when the city planning office showed itself to be a relative backwater in a city undergoing vigorous metamorphosis. In Armenia planning is a diffuse process.

A second revision followed from this: formal "city planning" does not control the physical growth and change which is taking place. Elements of "rationality" and purposeful, civic-oriented direction implied by the term "planning" were not found to be among the dominant forces in the arena of city development. Instead, the broader term "urban development" was added, and this has proven to be more useful. Use of the new term "urban development" does not signify that direction was not perceived in Armenia's growth. Forces of

objective reason are at work, trying to hedge an otherwise runaway growth style. And that runaway growth itself is in fact carefully orchestrated: as shall be shown, there is indeed method in the madness of the way Armenia grows.

Methodology

Philosophical Guidelines

Research for this study posed several problems. (1) One was scale: at what level might I focus an integrating statement about an entire city of 250,000 with any accuracy? (2) What would be the best approach to the elite and technocrats who plan and influence development? (3) Having selected my focus, how might I accommodate my social-cultural emphasis to a more physical world view inherent in the data oriented to maps, graphics, land-use patterns, physical layouts, and design esthetics given me by planner informants? These three points influenced the course of the research, and needed to be couched in a research philosophy.

1) The matter of scale. Since from the outset my interest was to look at city planning, that served as the vehicle for studying the city. No attempt was made to actually survey, census, or otherwise analyze the entire city. Rather, by tracing interactions occurring around issues provided in a series of case studies, groups at various positions on the social scale could be sketched around a linking issue, into a "purposive network." This avoids a microcosmic

view of any one sector, tending instead to integrate segments of various social classes.

2) Approach to elites and technocrats. In part due to an ambiguous social position as a foreigner, in part due to the social position enjoyed in Armenia by my wife's family, I was able to live and move among the upper social classes. Expecting them to be the dominant force in city development, I determined to use my position to learn directly how a city is developed and managed, rather than merely study the product, as many researchers must perforce do. Members of the upper classes are active in urban planning in Armenia while the lower classes generally are more passively involved. (See Chapter II for discussion of the importance of this focus on elites, and how this viewpoint was balanced with information on other social sectors.)

My approach to city authorities and planning officials was straightforward. During the research period from December 15, 1978, to December 25, 1979, I asked two successive mayors of Armenia for official permission to perform research on the city planning office. Twice this permission was granted despite some political risks taken by the accepting administrations. (Permission to work in the planning office was denied.) In an unofficial status I was permitted to visit municipal agencies to interview, observe, and discuss. Whenever possible, functionaries in planning-related agencies were used as informants about ongoing process and historic antecedent.

3) Physical and social views. Given the fact that physical features of Armenia were constantly brought to my attention, a way was needed to use physical data. This was provided in several manners. An abundance of city maps, compiled during the research, allowed a modified social-ecology orientation to parts of the research. Maps were mined for clues as to social and historical determinants of city growth, for example, and were constantly used to place social, political, and economic data into geographical context.

Beyond this, the physical city was used as a source of information. Constant movement through it, noting social and physical features, helped both to raise and answer questions of a social nature. Who lives here? When was it built? How did this become developed? From what period does this style derive? Such questions aided in eliciting social information from the physically-oriented planners. Rather than just a setting for social interaction, the city is shown as a manifestation of material culture.

Major Aspects of Research

A first step was to describe the formal organization of the institutional cosmos of Armenia. However, what was intended as a short phase of research continued throughout the research period, since some agencies were hard to contact, did not have specific organizational information on hand, or would not divulge it.

Key actors within the system were identified. Some were interviewed; others (like the Cacique, or political boss) were observed from a distance. Questions to key informants centered on their actions, social ties, and development philosophies.

Planning organizations were observed to determine how they operate, documenting significant actions each agency or individual took in the course of events.[9]

The social structure of the city was observed peripherally. I made the decision early in the research, in the interests of both focus and sanity, not to record all the stimuli I found in the urban setting. However, backgrounds of individuals and segments of the structure were noted and behavior in varying situations was observed.

Techniques of Field Research

Instead of participant observation, the ethnographer's usual favored technique, the best approach in this guarded atmosphere was the interview. Most interviews were held with key informants within the system (or who had worked in it at some time). Corrections for biased data in a politically-charged system were made by trying to interview informants from various political persuasions on any issue. Where two opposing informants coincided, that information was deemed tentatively factual; otherwise, various versions of an incident are presented.

Participant observation was possible in several areas. As a planner, access to the planning office was given me freely during one planning administration and was not formally denied during the other. While I was not allowed to participate in the planning per se I was allowed to join in informal planning-related discussions, attend planning functions, make rounds with inspectors, and interview personnel on office time.

Direct observation of many events was possible, although too much of the significant behavior in a city takes place out of sight, away from public scrutiny. The physical city was observed directly and intensively, as was that segment of city life which takes place in public areas. Private lives of some Armenians were also "visible" to me.

Mapping was important. Such items as urban land use, demolition patterns, projected and ongoing new building projects, location of services infrastructure, and lands affected by redevelopment schemes were mapped, and frequently referred to for clarification of historical, social, and cultural phenomena.

Newspapers and radio were used extensively during this research, since in a highly literate society much of the information, codes, and gossip which in more primitive settings would have to be painstakingly elicited from informants is printed or broadcast. In a society where news is disseminated electronically in minutes after an event, these were

the best means of keeping up with information which affects the entire political ambience within which planning is performed.

Finally, public and personal archives were used intensively, conjointly with the photocopy machine. A literate and legalistic society's incredible amounts of written charters, rules, regulations, laws, and correspondence are a gold mine of information about how it operates. Electronically copied documents eliminate problems of recall at a later date. Very possibly, I have in photocopy the most extensive private library anywhere of Armenia's planning-related documents.

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized into three basic parts. The first, consisting of Chapters I, II, and XI, acquaints the reader with the research problem, the theoretical and methodological orientation of the study, and conclusions derived from analysis of city development in Armenia. Part two, Chapters II through VI, provides a sociocultural matrix within which to consider the data presented in part three. Part three is the core of the study: data derived during field research on the processes and structures of city development in Armenia are presented in Chapters VII through X.

The present chapter, Chapter I, introduces the research problem with some background information, defines a few key terms, traces the development of the research design, and offers an overview of the methodology.

Chapter II situates the dissertation in relation to several major currents of anthropological interest. Similarly, the study is related to major directions in the literature of urban anthropology on Latin American cities and of urban research in many disciplines on Colombia.

Chapter III and the subsequent "matrix" chapters provide information which might not normally be provided in studies of city planning, but are brought to bear here through the anthropological frame of reference. It will be noted throughout the subsequent core chapters that matrix information constantly is relevant to the institutional and private interests which are shown in structure and interaction. Specifically, Chapter III provides introductory description of Armenia—ethos, geography, functions. Chapter IV reflects the city as a physical space given meaning by the social forces which structure it; this allows the reader to share, to a degree, the orientation I took to the physical city in employing it as a constant source of information and questions. Chapter V reviews highlights of Armenia's history which explain important contemporary idiosyncracies.

Chapter VI, "The People of Armenia," is essential to developing understanding of the city's specific nature, since it addresses issues of demographic growth, social structure, and the remarkable Antioqueño (regional) subculture which most Armenians share and which has imparted vigor and a certain conservatism to the way the city has developed.

Part three, the core of the dissertation, contains the findings of problem-oriented research on urban development in Armenia. Chapter VII investigates a major constraint on the way a city can grow: the centralized political system and its manipulation by local political bosses who come to hold undue power over the process of urbanization and people's options within an already limited development horizon. Chapter VIII is essentially a catalog of the agents involved in the development forum of Armenia—institutions, sectorial interests, and individuals. This is complemented by an assessment of who the "planners" really are, and archetypal profiles of several different planners. Chapter IX discusses the planning format, reviewing the charters and codes which nominally channel urban development in Armenia, and comparing them with the sorts of actions and interactions which in fact occur.

Chapter X integrates previously presented information through case studies of urban development. Interests discussed in the earlier chapters, operating within Armenia's cultural, historical, and physical frameworks, interact on issues of urban design, urban renewal, sports facilities, and popular housing. In such contexts, we may obtain a dynamic understanding of how cultural and culturally influenced factors are important in creating a city.

Chapter XI, "Conclusions and Analysis," examines the findings of the research and relates them to what is known

about similar items within the literatures on Latin American urbanism and urban anthropology. The findings are assessed for the meanings and applications they may have for planning in Armenia and other Colombian cities.

Notes

[1]This is a bitter irony in a country where the Indian population generally is looked down upon.

[2]This statement is accurate for the 1979 research period. In June, 1980, the statue of Bolívar was returned to the Plaza by an administration politically opposed to the one which had the "Monument to Effort" built. Bolívar now holds a secondary spot in front of the new Departmental Capitol building. However, the three story high "Monument to Effort" continues to dominate the plaza.

[3]Antioqueños are persons from Antioquia. This vigorous people and their distinctive subculture have given the Old Caldas area, including Armenia, a set of values and traditions which have been determinants in establishing the social and economic character of the region—as shall be discussed throughout this study.

[4]The main thrust of colonization and entry into substantial coffee production took place roughly between 1880 and 1930.

[5]Bolívar crossed the Quindío once, in 1830, after the revolution (Santos Forero, 1930:85).

[6]In 1979 the official definition of "urban" in Colombia was communities of 1,500 inhabitants or more (Aguirre, 1979: 19).

[7]Census data often are suspect, and the real figures exceed the official ones reported by DANE. Considerable cityward migration has occurred since 1973, and, together with normal vegetative growth of 2.74 percent per annum (Departmento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE, 1979:33), city populations may be accepted as considerably greater than figures in the 1973 census. For example, where DANE reports 2,870,594 as Bogotá's population in 1973, the figure commonly accepted by government agencies in Bogotá in 1979 was about five million.

[8]This, unfortunately, groups together such unequal places as Circasia, Quindío, with a 1979 estimated population of 7,566 (DANE, 1978:33), with Bogotá (about five million in 1979). Comparison of the two for anything but similar types of functions at an abstract level would be rather useless.

[9]A number of these planning organizations are listed and analyzed in some detail in Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ANTHROPOLOGY, URBAN RESEARCH, AND COLOMBIA

This study of culture and urban planning touches numerous currents of research interest within anthropology and outside. Within anthropology these currents include urban anthropology, study of elites, and political anthropology. The dissertation explores a generally overlooked common interest of anthropology and urban planning; it also complements existing literatures on urban topics of Latin America and Colombia. It is one of very few works of any sort on the city of Armenia.

Some of these many rubrics seldom are linked; examples are anthropology and city planning. Although intuitively one might recognize common interests like humanity and its conscious structuring of urban living environments, no study has yet taken an in-depth look at the cultural underpinnings of ideology and practice in a specific instance of urban planning.[1]

The dissertation's relation to these research traditions and literatures is given in this chapter.

Currents in Anthropology

This dissertation makes inquiry into several areas of concern to anthropology. It is (1) urban research focused on a Third-World city, falling within a broad tradition in

anthropology, but intended to respond to a need for new holistic ways of treating the city. It is (2) a study of an urban manifestation of a regional subculture to identify values, institutions, and practices which affect city planning, knowledge of which, by extension, might help orient city planners and planning theorists in the search for new planning techniques. These two areas were the heart of the research project as originally conceived.

Additional areas of inquiry early suggested themselves, and were addressed during the course of the research. One (3) was elites. Planning mechanisms were found to be largely in the hands of the upper classes, so the study became oriented to the elite groups active in urban development. This twist in the direction of the research had in fact been foreseen but not fully understood until early field data began to be analyzed. Elites constitute an important but seldom used focal point for ethnographical research.

Finally (4) the complex nature of the subject matter required incursions into other areas of anthropology and related disciplines. City planning in Colombia could not be studied adequately without analysis of political apparatus and process (political anthropology and political science). Analysis of maps and physical features of the city to understand social processes (cultural geography and social ecology), public administration, development theory, and planning theory are pertinent border areas not examined here for lack of

space. This ecumenism is healthy, and reflects an important truth about social phenomena: that disciplinary boundaries are arbitrary constructs.

Each of these areas is discussed in more detail to elucidate its bearing on the study.

(1) Anthropologists, by and large looking outward from their own metropolitan cultures, have done their most significant urban studies on cities of the Third World.[2] This broad tradition is marked by the works of Lewis (1952, 1959, 1961), Little (1974), Whiteford (1960, 1977), Gutkind (1965, 1966), Mitchell (1966), Leeds (1969, 1964), Kemper (1974), Doughty (1970), Mangin (1970), DuToit and Safa (1975), and numerous others. (For an extensive bibliography, see Southall, 1973.)

Although many anthropologists have not wanted to accept urban anthropology at all (Southall in Gutkind, 1974:208-209), a discipline-wide cognizance of the need for studying man in cities is forming. (Eddy, 1968; Friedl and Chrisman, 1975; Cornelius and Trueblood, 1974; and the formation of the journal Urban Anthropology in 1972 are evidence of moves in this direction.)

Many anthropologists have commented that the discipline lacks appropriate methodologies for studying cities as wholes and relies instead on methods brought over from study of smaller social aggregates (Fox, 1975; Friedl and Chrisman, 1975; Price, 1975; Arensberg, 1968; Hutchinson, 1968; Leeds,

1968). Yet the very complex studies of Yankee City done by the Warner team in the 1920s and 1930s (Warner, 1963) and the Lynd studies of Middletown (1929, 1937) show that a very good methodology based on analysis of social structure was available more than fifty years ago.[3]

A likely reason why ethnographies of very complex societies are rare is low budgets of time and money: a thorough study of a city may involve many researchers over several years' time—obviously a costly venture which nevertheless may not yield a fully holistic research product. Another reason is scale: research focused on a specific urban problem would make the bulk of a full urban ethnography superfluous. A continuing search goes on for ways of studying cities holistically within these limitations of budget and scale.

Network theory (Barnes, 1954; A. L. Epstein, 1961; Gutkind, 1965; Mitchell, 1969; Bott, 1975) offers one interesting way of reducing a large city to manageable proportions. The discovery that human beings in cities organize socially on affectual and utilitarian lines, without specific reference to propinquity or geographical points, has been a most useful mechanism for studying social organization in cities.

The guiding concept used in the present study is similar to the idea of social networks, but retains the city itself as a principal focus of the study. It is not a holistic description of the city of Armenia, much less an urban

ethnography.[4] Rather, what is attempted here is to take the theme of urban development and follow it into whatever social sectors of the city it leads, providing information about each of the groups or institutions insofar as it bears on urban development. Development process provides the connecting vehicle among elements of the society, linking components into what we might call a "purposive network," one which does not define a special social group, but rather shows how groups in the city arrange themselves around a series of related issues of mutual interest: the events of city development.

The social "feel" of Armenia hopefully is conveyed in this process. Specific social data given for groups and institutions allow a rough ethnographic sketch of several social sectors. Yet in the study the city takes precedence over social structure; it is treated both as an institution and as a physical manifestation of material culture. The study is intended to be holistic in the sense that it addresses the social, physical, and institutional complexities of the city.

My focus on a Third-World city derives from a personal predilection for Colombia which developed over years of contact and study. An equally interesting, equally revealing, study of urban planning process might have been performed on a European or North American city, doubtless with similar discoveries of quirks in supposedly rational processes. The

danger of exclusive focus on cities in developing countries is that a tendency might develop to suppose that only in these countries do culturally patterned social interactions override cold rationality in urban administration. We know better than this.

(2) Perhaps the most important of the four points of significance I suggest this research may have is the empirical scrutiny of planning process in reference to culture. City development and city planning are culturally patterned processes; they are ways in which the bearers of a culture go about structuring the environment in which they live. These processes can best be discussed for any case through understanding of the city, its people,and the ways they perceive and use urban space.[5]

Because planning codes often are borrowed whole from other cultures or are generated locally with inadequate reference to sociocultural realities, anthropologists can contribute to the design of city plans in several ways. (a) Social structure and existing urban lifeways can be analyzed. (b) Social and cultural values can be identified as they bear on city design. (c) Resources for rational planning may be found which exist within the society and which might be enhanced to play a more significant part in city planning. (d) The interface between local ideas of city development and imported planning ideas can be assessed. Anthropologists can find this information and interpret it

operationally, helping to make the planning process more responsive to culturally determined expectations of what an urban environment must be.

Urban planning is, in fact, a remarkable instance of directed culture change and should attract anthropologists of widely ranging interests. Yet very little attention has been given by anthropologists to the matter of planning or to specific cases where cultural patterns touch the process of planning; notable exceptions are Peattie (1968, 1972), Epstein (1973), and Rapoport (1977).

Where Epstein (1973) views urban planning in the case of Brasília as a process abstracted from local social reality and subject to international governmental and institutional forces, this dissertation studies the local agents and tools of planning more closely. They are juxtaposed with physical description of the city and an ethnographic sketch of the population. To my knowledge no similar planning-centered anthropological study has been performed to date, and this one may serve to explore, modestly, this new direction.

(3) Most anthropologists "study down" when doing their social research. This means that the majority of socio-cultural studies are of groups which are relatively unable to defend themselves and their cultures from the eyes of anthropologists who generally come to them as representatives of the higher-prestige, high-power sectors of their own national societies or the international community.

Generally such peoples do not have legal and economic power to exclude the interloper from their midst.[6]

An outcome of this which is serious in its implications for anthropology is the vast quantity of studies of the lower class (examples are Lomnitz, 1974; Mangin, 1970; Lewis, 1952, 1960) and a relative scarcity of studies of elite groups or of entire socially ranked societies showing a "vertical cut" with interaction among levels. The vision of Third-World social systems provided in the literature is one-sided as a result.

Studies of elite groups by anthropologists exist, of course, although they are rare. Some examples are Warner's Yankee City series (1963), Whiteford on Popayán and Querétaro (1960, 1977), Leeds on Brazilian leadership (1964), and Harrell-Bond on the study of elites in Sierra Leone (1976).

This study is focused primarily upon an elite group. As was expected, the people influential in planning are from upper socioeconomic sectors; study of process in planning therefore necessitated an upper-class focus. What is more, my best access to Armenia was to, and through, the upper classes.[7] A complementary vertical view of the society was gained through study of incidents in planning, analysis of social class distribution throughout the city, and peripheral viewing of the social structure. The research topic, following the planning process and development processes where they led, ultimately selected the groups to be studied.

(4) The instance of politics provides an example of a border area, between anthropology and another discipline, which I added during the course of the study. Politics is the currency of power in a modern community. Although I had noted pragmatic observers' stress on the very political nature of urban development,[8] the extent of saturation of Armenia's planning and development processes by politics overwhelmed me and altered the nature of the research. Planning is performed by politically appointed officials in a highly political format. Political defensiveness by some subjects in gatekeeper roles limited access to agencies, functionaries, and the process of urban planning. A knowledge of the Colombian political ambience proved necessary to understanding planning and development in Armenia.

Many social scientists (Epstein, 1973; Perlman, 1976), upon reviewing their findings from social research in developing countries, call for cataclysmic social change as a solution for the desperate straits of the poor and disenfranchised. While I agree that in many instances social inequities are so great and institutions for their amelioration so weak that revolutionary change is in order, revolution does not seem a useful position for an applied anthropologist. Specifically, my concern is the application of anthropological research and understanding to the process of urban and regional planning. Need for such planning in Colombia is immediate, and if it is to have effect over the short term,

a commitment often must be made to work with existing systems. This is a situation which faces many socially aware applied scientists in Latin America, and many take the option of working within the system in hopes of improving it.

Colombia has a remarkably stable political system, and a revolution does not seem likely in the near future. In the case of Armenia I accept the existing level of politics as a given, under present conditions, and count it as a principal factor in whatever future urban development has in Armenia. To this end local government structure is discussed in reference to city development; the institution of the cacique is an important institution in this structure. Similarly, the formal structure of agencies is given, despite the fact that one agency or another might not be performing its defined role in city planning. Including these political features, even in making projections of an optimal future for city planning in Armenia, seems responsible applied anthropology.

Urban Study of Colombia

Social study of Latin America does not have a long tradition; earliest studies of Latin American societies date from the 1930s, and urban studies were not among the pioneering works. Studies of cities began to appear in the 1950s, and a current of such studies grew in the 1960s and 1970s; today there exists a substantial body of work on Latin American urban topics.

This is not a place to attempt a compendium of what has been done on Latin American cities. The literature is considerable, and several exhaustive bibliographies already exist (Rabinovitz, Trueblood, and Savio, 1967; Morse, 1965, 1971; Rabinovitz and Trueblood, 1972; Cornelius and Trueblood, 1974; Cornelius and Kemper, 1978) which address the matter in properly comprehensive style.[9]

Before looking to the specific issue of Colombian urban research, let us scan briefly the directions anthropologists have taken in their not inconsiderable contributions to this literature on Latin American cities.

A shift of focus from rural to urban Latin American subjects began for some anthropologists in the 1950s when they followed rural peasant informants on cityward migrations and studied adaptation to new, urban environments. Oscar Lewis (1952) is the classic example: his following informants from Tepoztlán to Mexico City led to an important article, "Urbanization Without Breakdown: A Case Study." (See also Doughty, 1970; Mangin, 1970; Kemper, 1974; Butterworth, 1962; and Lomnitz, 1969, for studies of migrant adaptation in cities and lifeways of the urban poor.)

Where Fox (1975) and others have criticized a tendency among urban anthropologists to focus on small, peripheral groups in cities, several social scientist observers of Latin America are concerned that urban poor are studied out of context and are misunderstood. Perlman (1976), Peattie

(1974), and Lomnitz (1974) insist that these people are not "marginal" to the city's social and economic life, as many have claimed. Rather they are integrated in disadvantageous positions into the total social and economic schemes of large cities, in roles which serve the city well. These people provide cheap labor, political constituencies, and small but consistent consumers for commerce.

A few studies of cities, focused on social structure and governmental institutions, have dealt with cities as wholes. An early attempt of this nature was Two Cities of Latin America (Whiteford, 1960), which compares Querétaro, Mexico, and Popayán, Colombia, through social structure and social institutions. Similarly, Reina (1973) studies the Argentine city of Paraná through its social structure, taking a middle-class cognitive view of the city. Epstein (1973) studies a spontaneous settlement in Brasília through a focus on that community's place in a larger social and institutional scheme. He gives considerable attention to government, planners, and international colonial powers, a departure from usual anthropological practice.

A search for exclusively anthropological urban studies of Colombia would not be rewarding, for such studies are few. Colombian anthropologists generally have not used urban settings for their research[10] and Colombia was "closed" to foreign anthropologists about the time many young anthropologists were moving to urban topics. Several studies do

exist, the best known being those by Andrew Whiteford (1960, 1977) and by his son Michael (1976) on Popayán. Ashton (1977) finds a remarkable case of adaptation of urban poor to project housing in Cali. But, given the paucity of anthropological studies on Colombian cities, it is fortunate that nonanthropologists have made many.

Urban study of Colombia has been focused principally upon large cities, where massive rural-to-urban migration in the 1950s and 1960s generated concern about that and related phenomena. Escalante Angulo (1967) examines migration resulting from the Violencia, a period of political civil warfare lasting from 1948 until about 1963. Camacho de Pinto (1970), Cardona (1970), and Fierro (1973) belong to a generation of studies of migrants in cities.[11] Cardona (1969) further examines the phenomenon of migration and the concomitant phenomenon of spontaneous settlement in various cities of Colombia. McGreevey defines a pattern of rural-to-urban migration which differs from those found for other countries (1968).

Migration to cities continues, but studies on the subject seem to be rarer now than a decade age.

There is a body of work on the social characteristics of Colombian cities. The mentioned Whiteford studies are examples of study of the city through social structure. Ocampo (1972) studies the formation of the upper socioeconomic classes of the city of Manizales during the century

and a quarter of that city's existence. Havens and Romieux (1966) study the impact of the building of an oil refinery on the small city of Barrancabermeja. Wagner describes the social ecology of Cali (1973). Mosquera and Aprille offer a Marxist scheme of the formation of cities during the colonial period (1978). In the area of geography, Amato (1968) analyzes the growth of Bogotá through upper classes' fleeing contact with lower classes, distending the city as they moved the exclusive neighborhoods increasingly farther from the traditional Center.

Works on urban planning and development are few. Mosquera and Aprille (1978) analyze development of cities at a somewhat abstract level, with concrete examples of their points. Reveiz et al. (1977) provide case studies of several planning issues in Bogotá; Gilbert assesses planing in the same city (1978). Portes and Walton analyze the planning of Medellín and Cali (1976), while Dent (1978) looks at government involvement in urban development in Medellín. Pradilla Cobos (1974) critiques Colombian government planning philosophy in a Marxist treatise.

Some of the best and most innovative Colombian urban thinking appears in official urban programs of the government. Eduardo Wiesner, head of the Department of National Planning, suggests a planning philosophy aimed at employing existing resources (1978). The ICT (1977a, 1977b are examples) frequently publishes documents bearing on programs of housing

and urbanization promulgated by that organization, which is a branch of the Ministry of Development. The Department of National Planning (DNP) has, in the past decade, issued several major programs of national developmental policy, within which the urban sector figures importantly: Las Cuatro Estrategias (DNP, 1972), the Pastrana administration's policy, was supplanted by the Lopez Government's Para Cerrar la Brecha (DNP, 1975). Both use an urban strategy outlined in Ciudades Dentro de la Ciudad (DNP, 1974), a plan which divides existing cities into internal sectors oriented to district nuclei and reduces the centralism which currently characterizes these cities.

Such official publications, written by knowledgeable people in government development programs, unfortunately have little real effect, for although they represent state-of-the-art Colombian urban thinking, most of them emerge only at the end of an administration. Subsequent administrations almost invariably want to make their own urban programs, and discard those they inherit. Official publications on urban matters tend to be optimistic literature, whose authors do not appear to have the opportunity to test their propositions in practice.

Little material exists on the city of Armenia. There are a few volumes of value, mostly known only locally. Arango's memoirs of the period of Armenia's founding (1889), the first major work on the region (1924, reprinted in 1975)

enjoy national recognition. The work centers on the institution of guaquería (grave looting), which because of the rich Quimbaya burial sites in Quindío was a major early economic enterprise; the founding of Armenia is only a peripheral issue. Santos Forero (1930) compiled an interesting history of the region and city to commemorate the city's fortieth anniversary; copies are extremely scarce, but are a fine source of firsthand memories of the city's founders. Santos makes a serious attempt at scholarly investigation, analyzing conflicting claims as to who really founded the city.

Valencia Zapata's Quindío Histórico (1963) is a collection of anecdotes and hard data which, aside from newspaper archives, is virtually the only accessible repository of Armenia's history and tradition. Loosely organized and chatty, it offers much data in an essentially raw form. It is a labor of love by a local amateur historian.

The recent thesis by Aguirre (1979) gives a Marxist socioeconomic history of the city, concerning itself with the issue of whether there has been an industrial tradition, and why the region's economy is not modernizing through new industry.

Finally, the recent study by Arocha (1979), although not centered on Armenia, complements this dissertation in important aspects. Arocha studies the Violencia (see p. 99) in a small Quindío town, some forty kilometers

from Armenia. Study of a neighboring coffee region touches important aspects of local (coffee-related) culture which are shared by many people of Armenia.

In summary, this dissertation is related to a wide variety of research interests and literatures. First intended as a neat ethnography of urban planning in a Colombian city, the research situation required widening the focus to include elite groups and politics. It also examines common interests of anthropology and urban planning, and seeks ways in which anthropological research may contribute to the development of urban planning technique to fit specific local needs.

Notes

[1]Richard Bolan describes the "culture of planning" abstractly as stages and factors in the community decision-making process (1973). The present study is an empirical, in-depth analysis of planning in one city.

[2]Warner's Yankee City series is an important exception; such early pioneering studies in the United States did not start a major trend in anthropological studies, as have studies of Third-World cities, whose two main currents are concerned with African cities and Latin American cities.

[3]Similarly holistic studies include those by Gulick (1967), Whiteford (1960, 1977), Epstein (1973), Reina (1973), and Skinner (1974).

[4]It is doubtful that a holistic urban ethnography, even of a relatively homogeneous city, could be written by a team, much less by a single researcher. The famous studies of Yankee City (Warner, 1963), performed by a large research team, did not exhaust the possibilities of a small city.

[5]It might be argued that people within a society already know what goes on in its development processes. This may be true for some of the key actors. However, a detached and

holistic view of the society's development as a system seldom is maintained by participants. Process must be made specific in order to allow others within the society and legitimately concerned outsiders to work optimally with the system, and to function as a control on those who, on behalf of special interests, exploit private understandings of how the system works.

[6]This is not to say that gaining access to them is easy, for there are many devices for holding the researcher at a distance: lying, forgetting important information, refusing to be interviewed or otherwise studied, and refusal of access to a community are examples.

[7]My wife is a native of Armenia. My social position, acquired from ascribed social status and easily identifiable economic factors obtaining through her family, plus my own educational status, tended to place me within the upper class. Educational and professional interests shared with city planning officials helped me win a gratifying degree of acceptance among them. This status dictated my research stance in the community, for it would have been futile for me to attempt a neutral social identity for research among the poorer classes. In a city which "feels" as small as Armenia, people would soon have associated me with such upper-class factors as neighborhood of residence, ownership of an automobile, and family ties.

[8]Examples include Banfield and Wilson (1963), Bolan (1975), Altschuler (1975), and Reveiz et al. (1977).

[9]In addition to their thoroughness, these bibliographies have the virtue of integrating two unfortunately dichotomous bodies of research on Latin American cities. The works by North American and European scholars often are well known due to the authors' access to publishing facilities and ties to an inherited tradition of research. Works by Latin American scholars, often of high quality and provocative viewpoint, may go unnoticed outside small circles of colleagues and students. Latin American scholars do not have a large academic publishing apparatus, nor a mainstream of academic tradition to carry new scholars along. What is published often is in small, "in-house"-type editions, occasionally in mimeograph form. Editions of one hundred copies are not uncommon.

The bibliographies mentioned in the text are scrupulous in their inclusion of Latin American works, and thus give a needed balanced perspective on what has been written on Latin American cities.

[10]The Colombian Institute of Anthropology conducted a series of urban studies for the President's Office during

the López Michelson administration, to be used in designing the Popular Integration urban renewal program (IPC). The studies are in monograph form, and have not been released to the public; I have not seen any of them.

[11]Numerous studies are performed by Colombian academics and are not disseminated. This includes theses by undergraduate students; Restrepo García (1966) is an example. Loss of so much scarce and costly information is most unfortunate.

CHAPTER III
"THE MIRACLE CITY"

Armenia has a positive city ethos, influenced by the Antioqueño regional subculture. Its geographical situation has been important in its history and continues to be strategic. Armenia has specific roles with respect to its region and to the Colombian nation. All these factors must be considered in determining the sort of place Armenia is.

The City's Ethos

Armenia is a new city, founded in 1889; its citizens are conscious of this newness, which is an important element in their collective self-image. Yet given this newness, there is a remarkable folk elaboration of the short history. Armenia's founding fathers are celebrated in what might be called a "founders myth," or even a modern creation myth. Armenians keep a mental picture of bold pioneers chopping down dense forest to create an agricultural paradise. The principal founder of Armenia, Jesús María Ocampo, known by his nickname of "Tigrero" or "Tiger-Hunter," has become a household name, and many know also the names of other settlers who with him envisioned a new town and cleared and laid out its site.

Today they are remembered symbolically in many ways. There is a Founders Park, where a sculpture of the city

symbol may be seen: an axe standing in a tree trunk; the city coat of arms also bears this symbol. City newspapers are full of local poets' paeans to the Founders, and of attempts to bask the city in the light of the Founders' supposed special virtues. The Founders themselves have became symbols, for members of the city's upper social sectors trace their family names with pride back to the original settlers. A perusal of current social club membership lists or a look at lists of professional societies and political office-holders still turns up names like Arango, Arias, Suárez, Baena, and Jarmillo, all family names of original settlers. It is clear that a relatively unremarkable event like the founding of a town has been blown larger than life in the very short period of ninety years, a period during which contemporarily available documentary techniques might easily have monitored the events and their significance.

Armenia's urban character and prosperity have always been tied closely to the rural lands of the Department of Quindío. The Founders mostly were colonists, and they and their descendants planted coffee on their fincas ("farms") when coffee first arrived in Quindío at the turn of the century. Today Armenians are proud of their city as a coffee center, capital of the department which produces one of the greatest per-hectare yields of coffee of any department in Colombia. (Indeed, many Armenians are coffee growers!) Coffee, and the culture and specific terms which accompany

its production, are points of strong identification for most Armenians, even if they have never worked on or owned a coffee farm. Armenia lives from its coffee, and the coffee called Armenia Excelso is internationally esteemed.

The Antioqueños have a penchant for working hard; in fact they have a work ethic. They call themselves the "Yankees of South America" (Parsons, 1968:1). While perhaps this industriousness has been romanticized and overly generalized, it is a trait valued and respected throughout Antioquia and Old Caldas. An Antioqueño motto often seen on signs in Armenia workshops, farms, and small businesses reads "Aqui trabajamos con verraquera." Somewhat off-color, a loose translation is "Here we work with fury."[1]

Another factor which has contributed to the city's congratulatory self-image is a slogan rendered fortuitously in 1927 by Colombia's then-poet-laureate, Guillermo Valencia, who in a public address called Armenia "un Milagro de Ciudad" ("a miracle of a city"). The occasion for the hyperbole was the inauguration of Armenia's new railroad station with the arrival of the first locomotive of the Pacific Railroad, and the inspiration was the growth in less than forty years of a major city on the scale of those times.[2] Armenians have seized upon that compliment and advertise their city to Colombia by the nickname "The Miracle City."

There are various other images of Armenia held by at least some citizens. Many take pride in the city's

prosperity and have developed a brash, swaggering, can-do mentality. Many are aware that the city is new, relative to other cities in Colombia, and are proud of its rapid progress as manifested in the mentioned prosperity, modern structures, and positive acceptance of many new things, especially fashions and products. Some view Armenia as a university city and center of learning, with its two universities. Others, referring to the department's undeniable natural beauty, believe that Armenia and Quindío have great futures as tourist centers. One informant, mentioning the dramatic sky which "never is the same" and provides striking sunsets in the evening, says it has inspired many Armenians to become poets and artists.

Most importantly, the Armenians consider themselves very paisa—a nickname for Antioqueños. People generally can remember their Antioqueño ancestry[3] and know the town in Antioquia from which their forebears came. Paisa sayings and values are widespread, and the people who employ them know their origins, generally having learned them at home from parents and grandparents. There is also inherited from Antioquia a reputed tendency toward largely Caucasian racial extraction through Spanish ancestry.[4] This "whiteness" of Armenians and others of Antioqueño ancestry is a source of considerable pride to some people. Armenians may go to some length to find and show their exact Spanish origins.

(Antioqueño physical and cultural ancestry will be taken up, with greater detail in Chapter VI.

A proud Armenian might thus think of his or her city as a gleaming product of forefathers' boldness and hard work which have yielded a well-deserved prosperity in a rich land. For them this is symbolized by a rapidly modernizing urban center, Armenia.

Geographical Situation

Armenia is located in western Colombia, in an intermontane valley above the broader valley of the Cauca River which separates the central and western chains of the Andes. Armenia's valley, a high basin in the central chain, is called "the Quindío"; its undulated floor, carved by the canyon of the Quindío River, is 610 meters higher at Armenia than the floor of the Cauca Valley.[5] Armenia's altitude is 1,551 meters above sea level. The city lies at 4°31'39" latitude north and 75°36'9" longitude east.

Quindío, Armenia's department, is the smallest in Colombia. Consisting of just 1,925.65 square kilometers, it is roughly the shape of an inverted triangle, and is pinched like a keystone between the departments of Tolima and Valle, with Risaralda bordering across the north. The eastern border, with Tolima, is the crest of the central range of the Andes, with heights rising to 4,800 meters; this range drops precipitously off into the Quindío River Valley. The

Figure 1
Map of the Republic of Colombia
(by Departments)



Figure 2
Map of the Department of Quindío

permanently snow-covered volcano, the Nevado del Quindío, marks the northeastern corner of the department and is one of a cluster of such nevados, the rest of which lie in other departments. Quindío is bordered to the west by a lower mountain range, mere hills by comparison to the range to the east.

Coffee is produced intensively on those lands suited by climate and altitude, which in the Old Caldas area of Colombia are additionally favored by a rich volcanic soil. In Quindío coffee lands include the lower Andean slopes and, especially, the rolling, knobby hills rutted by streams which are found in the central part of the department and which look flat from a slight altitude.

Not all of Quindío is cultivable in coffee. The Andes above 2,300 meters are unsuitable for coffee due to low temperatures (Méndez, conference presentation, 1975).[6] These lands are in forests, truck gardens, and cattle farms. Similarly, the hilly lands north of Armenia are cold and windy and are used for dairy farming and forestry. The shores of the Río de la Vieja ("Old Woman's River") are too hot for coffee, and this rich valley bottom land is dedicated to cattle ranching and mechanized farming of cane, yucca, sorghum, plantains, and corn.[7]

Armenia figures in a "chain of cities" which runs from southwest to northeast through the Cauca watershed for about 300 kilometers. The chain consists of numerous medium-sized

cities and one large one, lying short distances (from about forty to about one hundred kilometers, measured lineally) apart, and ranging from Popayán in the south to Manizales in the north.[8] The cities in the chain include, from south to north, Popayán, Cali, Palmira, Buga, Tuluá, Armenia, Cartago, Pereira, and Manizales. The chain also includes smaller cities of local importance, such as Calarcá, Caicedonia, and Sevilla, all within 65 kilometers of Armenia. Of the cities mentioned, Manizales (founded in 1848), Pereira (1863), Armenia (1889), Calarcá (1886), Caicedonia (1905), and Sevilla (1903) are direct urban products of the much described Antioqueño colonial expansion during the nineteenth century (Parsons, 1968; López Toro, 1970; Also see discussion in Chapter V of this study).

Urban Functions

Coffee production came to the Quindío region at the end of the nineteenth century, its cultivation having been moved southward slowly from Antioquia, through the northern part of Old Caldas. By 1930, coffee was the dominant agricultural product of the Quindío region.

Armenia shared this pattern of coffee-based economy with its sister cities Manizales and Pereira to the north through the mid-twentieth century. By 1979, however, the other two cities had diversified their economies substantially more than Armenia. As recently as twenty-five years ago, Armenia



Figure 3
Locations of Principal Colombian Cities
and Smaller Cities Mentioned in the Text



Figure 4
Map of Old Caldas
(Modern Departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío)

was about as industrialized as either of the other two cities, in fact a bit more than Pereira (Grupo Habitar, 1960: 43). But then due to lack of services infrastructure (electricity and water are scarce and the service erratic), industries began to abandon Armenia instead of moving there. While Armenia has reverted substantially to its agricultural single crop-based economy, Pereira and Manizales have industrialized. Envidious comparisons are made with these sister cities in Armenia's press, and industrialization is a nominal concern. But several high-level city functionaries stated in conversations that in Armenia coffee production and processing is industry enough for the region—betraying a complacency common among the city's upper classes.[9]

With the acquisition of departmenthood Armenia added a major administrative function. It is now a capital city, and its department of Quindío will be symbolized in the imposing building whose unfinished skeleton dominates the city skyline.[10] Becoming a departmental capital brought new jobs to Armenia, and local leaders, whose predecessors saw locally produced revenues siphoned off to Manizales when that city had been capital, probably would point out that departmenthood caused more national and local tax monies to be channeled into projects for Armenia and its tiny department.

Armenia achieved importance as a transportation center early in the twentieth century.[11] Armenia replaced

Manizales effectively as the crossroads for highway traffic going east across the Andes toward Bogotá and other midland cities when the principal highway was built from Armenia and Calarcá to Ibagué. When in 1927 the Pacific Railroad was completed between Armenia and Buenaventura, the port of Cali, Armenia became an inland port for transshipment of goods from train to truck or vice-versa.[12] (No railroad tracks cross the central Andes except at Medellín, where they are considerably lower.)

Today, Armenia is still strategically placed on national transportation routes. Principal north-south and east-west routes cross there: the mountain pass called La Linea ("The Line") continues to be the valve through which most imports move to Bogotá and the interior cities. Armenia still is a major railroad terminal, while Pereira and Manizales have lost their railroad links with the rest of the country.[13,14] Although Armenia has a small airport located sixteen kilometers to the southwest, most air passengers are served through the bigger and more modern airport at Pereira.

Armenia has a near-"twin" city within the department, the city of Calarcá. Calarcá was founded three years before Armenia, and initially was more important on the local level; but Armenia quickly surpassed Calarcá in importance. Calarcá today is primarily a coffee town, but it also is an urban center in its own right, with a population of about

30,000.[15] Seen from the highway crossing the central Andes, Armenia and Calarcá look much more similar in size than they really are, and appear to be two very large, long cities, separated by a thin strip of green park. In fact they are a mere seven kilometers apart by highway, a circuitous, indirect route, and perhaps as little as three kilometers in a beeline. The deep divide provided by the Quindío River, the intensive farming of the roadsides in coffee, and long-standing municipal administrative jurisdictions are the principal factors keeping the two cities from joining through a process of conurbation.

Calarcá has some independence from Armenia socially (as evidenced in a separate social structure); culturally (Calarcá has its own newspapers and a better civic theater than Armenia); and politically (in 1979 Calarcá was the base for effective political opposition to the Armenia-based political machine of the oficialista branch of the Liberal party—the party mainstream linked with the President). Although Calarcá comes firmly under the dominion of Armenia economically and administratively, I was surprised at the relatively scarce mention heard of Calarcá in Armenia during the research period. Hierarchical considerations of an administrative nature seem to preclude any open inter-city cooperation that might be anticipated because of propinquity alone.

Finally, Armenia is the center of a cluster of satellite towns of which Calarcá is one. Montenegro, another, is twelve kilometers to the west; La Tebaida is eighteen kilometers to the south; and Circasia is eight kilometers to the north. These cities did not begin as satellites to Armenia but rather developed in that way over time. There has been a degree of migratory flow from them to Armenia so that many Armenians have links to these towns. Some people use them as dormitory communities from which they commute to work in Armenia. All are coffee towns with some life of their own. Yet in the context of late twentieth-century urbanization, there is a marked tendency toward conurbation, tenuous line settlements snaking along the communication routes between Armenia and each one. Some planners have suggested that the different functions of these towns vis-à-vis Armenia[16] be formalized and the entire five-municipality region be planned as a single city (Departamento del Quindío, 1975).

Notes

[1]Antioqueño-derived values will be discussed in Chapter VI.

[2]For purposes of comparison, Armenia had 17,406 inhabitants in 1918 and 34,304 in 1938. (Figures for both years include La Tebaida, which later became a municipality.) In 1918 Bogotá, with nearly 400 years of history, had only 143,994. Manizales in 1918 had 43,203 and in 1938, 51,025; Pereira in 1918 had 24,735, and 30,762 in 1938. Nineteen-eighteen data are from República de Colombia (1924). Nineteen-thirty-eight data are from República de Colombia (1941). The 1918 figures include the entire municipalities, whereas the 1941 figures are specific for municipal urban areas.

[3]In informal questioning and observation throughout the research period, very few Armenians were found to have no Antioqueño ancestry.

[4]This is a widely accepted stereotype. Many Armenians in all social sectors are phenotypically European or mestizo with very slight traces of Indian or Negro blood. See Chapter VI for a discussion of racial types among Antioqueños.

[5]The valley altitude is measured at the city of Cartago, near Pereira, and to Armenia's northwest. Cartago is at the lower extreme of the Cauca River Valley.

[6]Dr. Libardo Méndez, an agronomist with the Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA), gave a presentation on small coffee farming in Quindío at a 1975 seminar on departmental planning in Armenia.

[7]These low, flat lands are costly and highly prized; they tend to be in the hands of wealthy families, concentrated in fairly large holdings. The fact that most of them are in grasslands—as pasturage for cattle, a low-intensity use for prime land (see Smith, 1967, for a fuller description of this mode of land tenure and use)—is indicative of traditional oligarchic land-use patterns.

[8]By allowing distances between cities as large as 150 kilometers, Pasto could be added at the southern extreme, and Medellín at the north.

[9]The unity of civic leadership with city and departmental agricultural (coffee) interests will be detailed in Chapter VI.

[10]The building remains unfinished due to a work stoppage caused by lack of funds to continue construction: as of 1979 the work had been stopped for five years. Official stamps were sold during this period of stoppage to raise funds for more construction, and had to be affixed to official documents submitted to departmental offices as a surcharge in addition to the national and departmental stamps required. As of December, 1979, funding had been secured from the national government to begin construction once again, although the entire amount needed for termination had not been acquired. The enormous size of the building—twenty stories—indicates the ambitiousness of the project and the probable reason why it was not finished within the original time and monetary budgets.

[11]Manizales achieved importance in the nineteenth century, due in great measure to its situation on important mule routes, and later to the cable, rail, and highway

routes which supplanted them. This is discussed amply in Ocampo (1972).

[12]Although the railroad terminal is in Armenia, highway traffic crossing the Andes actually departs from Calarcá, and one may travel directly from Bogotá to Cali through Calarcá without entering Armenia. On the other hand, traffic to Pereira, Manizales, and/or Medellín must go through Armenia.

[13]In Pereira trucking interests are reported to have been responsible for having the tracks removed from the city. Another report has it that the railroad tracks ran right up the principal thoroughfare and interrupted city traffic intolerably.

[14]Today, transshipment from rail to truck at Armenia is fairly rare, since overland trucks move goods quickly between Buenaventura and Bogotá. Despite Armenia's privileged position on important transportation routes, transportation is a relatively minor aspect of its economy.

[15]Projected 1979 population from Anuario Estadístico de Caldas Quindío y Risaralda 1978, p. 33. My estimate is that Calarcá actually has a population higher than 50,000, and I suspect that the same intentional underestimating of population mentioned in Chapter VI in a discussion of the demographics of Armenia may be at work in these figures.

[16]La Tebaida is a recreational center, its hot climate providing an ideal place for swimming pools and sports parks. Montenegro is a coffee center. Circasia is a dormitory community and cold-climate weekend spot. Calarcá, aside from being a major coffee center, provides dormitory, recreational and transportation functions for Armenia.

CHAPTER IV
CULTURALLY PATTERNED SPACE: A PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF ARMENIA

Anthropologists seldom have studied the process of city planning, and when such a study is done certain things outside their usual experience may occur. In my research on Armenia the physical city—which after all is the ostensible product of city planners—loomed large in the research as a subject in its own right. An anthropologist in these circumstances may come to see the city much as a planner or an architect does: as a tremendously interesting physical artifact.

But the anthropologist also understands that cities are cultural products. A focus upon the physical city can prove quite helpful to the understanding of an urban society. An important technique in anthropological field study is the examination of the physical record of a society for clues to its culture and social structure. In this tradition, a city may be perceived as a complex item of material culture, made by the bearers of that culture, and which changes constantly as the social uses and perceptions of space change. Armenia, by this token, manifests, in its physiognomy, values, social stratifications, political struggles, and economic forces operant upon its people. It reflects the underlying culture

and social structure. When these factors are kept in mind, the physical city may be mined for information about the population and its behavioral systems.

In the following pages a three-dimensional layout of Armenia is complemented with specific references to trends and social forces which affect or have affected it: social classes, esthetic tastes, physical and economic limitations, and cultural tradition. Armenia is presented first in terms of its spatial distribution, with a pilot's-eye vantage informed by the topographical, social, and historical meanings in the city's current format. Second, private space in the city is studied with special reference to residences, in whose distribution there is a strong correlation between social class and geographical sector. Finally, public space is considered: the rich, active mixture of commerce, institutions, recreational facilities, and street life which makes Armenia so exciting and involves virtually all its inhabitants.

Spatial Distribution: An Overview

Seen from the air, the city of Armenia is long and narrow. It stretches for about ten kilometers along a northeast-to-southwest ridge and slopes off to the west, where at its widest point it is three kilometers wide.[1]

From the time of its foundation, the city has been limited and shaped by its topography. In 1889 Armenia was

laid out in the traditional Spanish colonial grid pattern (Foster, 1960; the original plot corresponds roughly to Zone I on Figure 7). The grid pattern was expanded as far as possible, but level land was scarce. The lands onto which the city grew to the north, west, and south were fissured by ravines; in some places they have been filled, but generally they interrupted the grid system. To the east, downtown Armenia ends at the bluff above the Quebrada La Florida (La Florida Creek) and the Quindío River canyon, both of which are about one hundred meters deep. This has left Armenia with the curious situation that the downtown is not centrally located, but rather is situated hard against the eastern limits. Despite the existence of a modern bridge, the city has not developed on the eastern side of the La Florida ravine. Coming from the east, a motorist has the surprise of driving from a rural setting directly into downtown Armenia.

As can be seen from Figure 5, the central grid system is little over 150 city blocks. The rest of the city's barrios (neighborhoods) are crowded along the main arteries or occur in nodes along other, less important, ridge-top streets. Green ravines run between ridges, in some cases right to center city. Coffee is grown at the edges of satellite neighborhoods and even in the mentioned ravines; Armenia's newer suburbs literally are being wrested from coffee farms.



Figure 5
Map of the City of Armenia

Armenia is quite densely built up, with a surprising number of high-rise buildings. The visual center of the city is the unfinished Government Building, which is a concrete-and-brick skeleton rising twenty-two stories over the Plaza de Bolívar. In this same area (Zone 1 in Figure 7) there are other tall buildings, with heights of ten or twelve stories. Most were built during the decade of the 1970s. They are built in modern styles with glass, aluminum, and stone slab facing. Around this nucleus of "skyscrapers" there is an area of transition from old buildings to new multi-story apartments. They correspond roughly to Zone II, Mixed Commercial-Residential (Figure 7)[2] and comprise a concentric circle about five blocks wide around the central zone (Zone I). Whereas twenty years ago Armenia was principally a city of two-story bahareque structures (a style of wattle-and-daub construction common to much of the Americas), it now is occupied by modern buildings of three and more stories.

Since 1975, high-rise buildings of multiple use (residential-commercial-office) have been built north from the downtown, along the Avenida Bolívar. Referred to generically as multifamiliares (multi-family buildings), they occur singly and in clusters all the way to the northern limits of the city, and are invading wealthy neighborhoods zoned for low-density housing. This long chain of condominiums represents an era in which wealthy Colombian families are

beginning to prefer the security of apartment dwelling to the sumptuous large private home (see Figure 7).[3]

Although there is a tight concentric ring of transitional land use around the central city, Armenia does not follow the concentric model of urban transition suggested by Burgess (1925) for certain North American cities. Rather there is a tendency toward line settlement along principal avenues, especially those running north and south. This, along with the fan-shaped residential areas to the west and southwest, suggests instead Hoyt's sector concept (1939).[4] While the upper classes occupy the wedge to the north, residences of the middle and lower classes may be found in a wide western-southwestern sector, mostly housed in one- and two-story buildings. Industry is confined largely to a southern sector.

Seen from the bluff facing Armenia from the Calarcá side of the Quindío River, Armenia looks like a long string of skyscrapers poking out of a coffee-topped ridge. Seen from the air, the city looks much like an aircraft carrier: a cluster of high buildings to the east side of a long urban mass, with a string of towers continuing north along one edge of the city from the downtown.

Private Space

Zoning appears to have come to the city late; drafts of formal land use zoning and a building code were still under



Figure 6
Residential Zones of Armenia



Figure 7
New Commercial-Residential Nuclei

consideration at the end of 1979. But the zones as prescribed tend to reflect a cultural preference for dense use of space and mixed land usage. Private space is seldom strictly residential, commercial, or industrial, but rather somewhat mixed.[5] Users of private spaces discussed are residential, industrial, social clubs, and surprisingly, coffee farming.

Residential Areas

Housing is the largest private use of constructed urban space in Armenia; other private uses are very small by comparison. Predominantly residential areas include the sectors which spread out from the downtown to the north, west and south; each can be characterized roughly by socioeconomic type of resident and a characteristic dwelling type. The downtown shares residential land with other functions, both private and public. The ring of transitional and substandard structures around the modern and modernizing downtown warrants description apart from the others.

North. In Armenia the north belongs to the upper socioeconomic groups.[6] The dwellings to be found to the north of Calle 12 (an arbitrary cutoff line suggested by a local informant) are residences built in modern styles; most have been built in the past twenty years and many are much newer. These houses are quite costly by Colombian standards. They are of one and two stories; typically they have small front

lawns and elegant facades with small balconies, a colonial feature which is worked into newer, more contemporary designs. Almost all Colombian houses are built abutting neighboring houses, in a row-house style; there seldom are side yards. Trees on urban residential property are rare, generally planted by owners after a house is built. The bits of front lawn are an introduction from European or American architecture, and a departure from the Colombian tradition of houses built flush with front sidewalks.

Most of the houses have patios in back—private space, in keeping with colonial tradition. They may be cobbled, or have lawns, fruit trees, decorative gardens, and occasionally a swimming pool. Patios are walled off from neighboring backyards, not fenced or separated by hedges.

The upper- and upper-middle-class residential sector of Armenia is quite extensive, occupying about one-fourth of the city's built area. Yet these classes certainly comprise much less than twenty-five percent of the population. Wealthier Armenians live in residential areas of relatively low density, with ample allocations of space per person, both in their dwellings and in open space.

South. To the south of the city are buildings of a one-story type. Most of this housing has been built within the past twenty-five years, either directly by, or under contract with, the National Urban Housing Institute (ICT)[7] (see Figure 8). The National Urban Housing Institute builds



Figure 8
Barrios Built or Financed by ICT

whole suburbs rather than individual houses. Minimal housing units (called "housing solutions") are the usual type of housing provided.[8] Such subdivisions are monotonous because facades are usually identical, at least at the time of assignment; owners subsequently tend to modify and personalize them.[9] Houses usually are of one story, with a single door and one or two windows facing the street or alley. These houses normally are set aslant on their lots to provide a measure of privacy for each front yard; older projects do not have this feature, but houses are set rectangularly to the street. Most streets in these barrios are paved.

The ICT barrios, although generally built for and assigned to the poor, have a "wholesome" aspect instead of the grim look one expects in impoverished areas. But these people all have enough income to guarantee payment for the housing. The real urban poor do not live in these barrios at all since their incomes are not high enough or steady enough to assure faithful monthly payments to the Institute.

West. The ICT barrios have high population densities. To the west of the city there is a much greater mixture of styles. There are many ICT-built suburbs, and others privately developed over fifty years along similar architectural lines. There also are many middle-class houses of one and two stories.[10] Such houses generally are comfortable in appearance, if not esthetically as elaborate as those in the north. Most of the newer ones have small front yards,

although those nearer the city center tend to be built flush with the street limit of the lot in the old tradition. This sector also includes scattered, old wattle-and-daub houses in varying states of repair.

Inner ring. Like the south, the west is densely populated. Around the downtown there is a ring or band of transitional and poor neighborhoods. The urban transition which is taking place there occurs at several levels. Physically it is an area of deteriorating buildings in the old bahareque style, slowly being replaced by new, higher buildings of apartments and shops. These are more profitable for landowners because they can be let for higher rents or sold by the unit. Functionally, these areas are used for warehousing, certain types of small commerce, workshop-scale industry, transportation terminals and garages, cheap hostelry, recreation (including bars and prostitution), as well as housing for large numbers of people.

In this inner ring the transition is of a sort which displaces lower-class families from the city center toward the periphery, a common effect of more formal urban renewal programs. This downtown slum ring tends to be going into more profitable and more "respectable" use, with occupancy by a different population than the poor who have occupied it until now.

Taking quality of urban development as a benchmark, as the ICT and other agencies did in 1976 surveys to

determine areas for an urban improvement program (ICT, 1976),[11] an internal ring of poverty concentric to the transitional ring may be identified. Manifested physically by a tendency to bahareque construction and some unpaved streets, this ring holds the greatest social and urban problems of any area of Armenia. The inhabitants are among the poorest Armenians. Parts of the area are densely populated slums, where entire families may occupy a single room. Houses which appear from the front to be of a single story may have six floors below the apparent ground level, since houses are built out from ledges on stilts, and additional stories are built inside the stilts. The entrance is thus at the top floor, and numerous floors are hidden below it.

Armenia has few squatter neighborhoods, and no peripheral "bands of misery" which surround so many Latin American cities; its band of misery is around the central core and is not composed of temporary shacks, but more permanent slum dwellings. Early invasion settlements such as La Carrilera and La Unión were handled in such a way as to exchange quality ICT housing for the squatters' shacks, using institutional channels. Since then, as was evidenced in the rapid suppression of the invasion neighborhood named for Salvador Allende in 1978, city administrations have been intolerant of any further massive takings of lands. Occasionally shacks are erected illegally within the city limits and an occasional squatter may crowd onto private

land, but the Municipal Planning inspectors work to discourage this. At the same time, many groups of low income people are finding legal ways to resolve their housing needs, as shown in the case study of Barrio 7 de Agosto, in Chapter X.

Downtown. Residences in the central area of Armenia are of two basic types: old bahareque buildings of two stories and high-rise apartment buildings which are replacing them.[12] Although there is still a fairly large residual of these older buildings of bahareque construction, the proposed municipal planning code requires a minimum height of three stories (in Zone II) and four stories (in Zone I) for new construction. Official policy is that downtown buildings must accommodate multiple functions. In accordance with planning regulations, buildings are commercial at street level; upper levels may include offices and/or residential space. As a result, downtown residences increasingly take the form of apartment units in the high-rise buildings. Occupants of such new apartments must of necessity be of middle class and higher in order to pay the high purchase prices (from a minimum of $600,000 pesos—about $14,000 U.S. dollars at 1979 exchange rates—up to well over $4 million pesos, over $100,000 U.S.). The tradition wherein elites cluster around the central plaza has been continued somewhat in the new high rises: many of those of upper class who have not moved north live in centrally located apartments.[13,14]

Fine apartments appear in unexpected parts of downtown Armenia. They are found in the vicinity of the market with its heady odors and seamy ambience, for example, and along stretches of Carreras 18 and 19 near a red-light district. Residents of these new buildings often are wealthy merchants who select their residences for practical reasons rather than prestige: some are the owners of the new buildings, others are merchants who want to be close to their businesses.[15]

The second type of dwelling to be found in the downtown is the older two-story building, usually of wattle and daub, or bahareque. Some of these have modern cement or brick facades required by the predecessor of Municipal Planning in the 1950s. Occupants of these structures vary in social affiliation. Some are elites who for varying reasons have chosen not to flee the center city. Others are middle- and lower-class persons who, lacking personal transportation, prefer a central location. In many parts of the downtown, rents are low because the buildings are run-down. Also, a freeze on rents decades ago has meant that some fortunate persons have not had their rents raised for years.

Industrial Space and Warehousing

Industry in Armenia is limited. The principal industrial park is located in the south, at the exits for Cali and La Tebaida. This park consists primarily of coffee hulling mills (trilladoras), and corresponding coffee warehouses. They generally are enclosed in large buildings of two or three stories, about the size of airplane hangars.

In addition there are several small factories in the industrial park located sporadically along the Cali and Tebaida highways, within about one kilometer of the hulling mills. Armenia's future industrial growth is projected for this area, although serious lacks of electric and water service must be overcome before the park is able to attract much new industry. As of late 1979, the industrial park was the remotest part of the city from the source points of these services, and would be one of the last parts of the city to receive them.[16]

There are small workshops and factories located throughout Armenia. These are small businesses which produce such items as ironwork, brooms, parts for automobiles and for appliances, printed matter, and food products. Often they are not within properly zoned industrial areas. Most of them predate the new zoning ordinances, and propinquity to the downtown is important for the distribution of their products, which have local rather than national markets. Many are located in areas zoned "mixed" land use (commercial and residential). Manufacturing in Armenia is generally done on this small scale, and often is little more than handcrafting.

By area, warehousing is not a major use of space. There are various coffee warehouses in the industrial park in the south. In addition, many structures located in the transitional area around the downtown are used for warehousing.

Social Clubs

There are just two social clubs in Armenia, plus one located at a distance from the city, near the airport. The most prestigious club, the Club America, is located just one block from the Plaza on the same block where the new Capital building is being built. The club consists of one building of four stories, and occupies about half a block. Nearness to the Plaza probably is related to the traditional desire for upper classes to be near the administrative, governmental, and ecclesiastical center of the city.

The second social club is the Bowling Club (Bolo Club), with a membership avowedly of middle class but which appears rather to be of the upper middle class and newly rich. Its building is located to the north along the Avenida Bolívar. Occupying an area larger than the Club America's, this club has a swimming pool, many bowling lanes, a restaurant, and meeting facilities.[17] The connection between private bowling facilities and social pretension is not clear.

The third club, the Country Club, is a sports and social club located well out of the city, near the airport (about sixteen kilometers south of Armenia, in a warmer climate). This club is located on extensive rolling land, and includes a golf course, tennis courts, and a swimming pool. Country Club membership overlaps substantially with those of the other two clubs, since the latter do not have the extensive recreational facilities it does.

Coffee Farms

Coffee farming is a surprising private use of urban land in the city, and its interface with more normal urban land uses is intricate. Many coffee farms are totally or partially surrounded by barrios of Armenia, and are effectively urban land. Such farms (fincas) are small in keeping with Quindío tradition—perhaps from one to fifteen hectares. In the city they are carefully fenced, since symbiosis between farmers and urbanites is not completely harmonious. Groups of city youths violate the boundaries of coffee farms to filch fruit from the trees planted to provide shade to the old-style Arabic coffees; in the process, they often damage coffee trees and have unfriendly encounters with mayordomos on the farms.

Six-foot coffee trees form solid-green carpets over the hills and embankments. Farm houses usually are located at some distance from the coffee to provide a security zone in which intruders might be seen more easily if they approach the house.

A farmhouse usually is a small structure of wattle and daub, with a single story and a red tile roof. There are several outbuildings near it, which are the places where coffee is peeled, washed, fermented, and dried. (Frequently city farms do not have all the newest production technology, reflecting the owners' awareness that they must one day cede their lands to urban uses, and that heavy investment in improvements might be money wasted.) City

farms reflect a traditional affection for adornment: white-washed houses are surrounded with flowering shrubs, and commonly have carefully tended orchids, geraniums, and other flowers in planters hanging from the eaves of the porches. The effect is one of exuberance and apparent hospitality; the presence of such farms in and on the periphery of Armenia gives it its "open" feel, and compensates for the relative lack of park space and public recreational areas. Few corners of Armenia are more than two or three blocks from such private green space.

Public Space

Public urban space is an important focus of this study for several reasons. One, of course, is that it is the most accessible area for a researcher to view intensively and unobtrusively. But much more important, public space is accessible to all the people of Armenia, and Armenians live a very significant part of their lives en la calle ("in the street"). They use public facilities intensively; many of the poorer citizens have nowhere else to go. The people of Armenia like to be downtown; they like the bustle in the streets and the push and shove on the narrow sidewalks; they enjoy seeing people in restaurants, cafes, theaters and stores. Many who live downtown and who for some reason cannot be on the street spend hours at their windows gazing at the flow of human and vehicular traffic.

They greet friends who chance to pass, and comment with others in the house on the activities in the street.

Armenians watch the city alertly. In the not infrequent event of a purse-snatching in the street, a single whoop or cry of "Thief!" can rally a crowd of one or two hundred persons in minutes: people dash out of stores and houses; they stop in the street to watch; they run a block or two for a better look; some take after the alleged thief. In fact, any out-of-the-ordinary occurrence in a central street will quickly result in the formation of an excited, sometimes even festive, crowd which may hang around for up to an hour. Given this penchant for intensive social interaction in the city's public spaces, the nature of these spaces warrants considerable attention. In this section we shall look at the space given to commerce, to city government, to the central Plaza, to parks and recreational facilities, and to the market place.

Commercial Space

In Armenia commerce is widely spread throughout the city, and coexists with residences in neighborhoods of all socioeconomic levels. In the north, for example, high-rise apartment buildings have boutiques, delicatessens, and restaurants on the first floors. In the south's poorer *barrios*, numerous houses have front-room stores which sell basic items of daily use, usually in small quantities, to neighbors.[18] But downtown, commerce is everywhere. There

are some small mall-type complexes, called pasajes ("passages") which were built between or through the centers of buildings to provide more surface area for stores. And a new planning regulation requires that the ground floors of new buildings be dedicated to commerce.

This regulation enforces the concept that high density of commercial establishments keeps important commerce anchored in the center. Armenia's commerce requires little transportation infrastructure and occupies little land area. Shopping Armenia's streets gives an intense sensory experience because of crowded sidewalks, open-front stores, inviting odors from cafés and bakeries, numerous small shops with crowded display windows, street vendors, and the likelihood of literally bumping into lifelong friends on every block.

Some types of commercial establishments are concentrated along specific streets: jewelry stores, for example, cluster along Carrera 16 between Calles 19 and 21. Other types, like haberdashers, stationers, and stores selling major domestic appliances are located on a very few downtown streets. Close to the market, shops are smaller and sell cheaper merchandise; they must compete with a throng of street vendors, and especially on market Saturdays there is a carnival atmosphere.

There are no outlying malls as yet, although small centers are growing in the newer residential towers and two large shopping centers are being planned, both sponsored by



Figure 9
Map of Downtown Armenia

Key:

A	Plaza de Bolívar
B	Capitol Building
C	Cathedral
D	Site of Future National Palace
E	Municipal Palace
F	Uribe Park
G	Market Place
H	Plaza de Toros
I	San José Stadium
J	Railroad Station
K	Bridge across Quebrada La Florida, on the Highway to Calarcá

interests from outside Armenia. All these new commercial nuclei are located in the north of the city.

Government

Government shares the core downtown area with the principal commercial establishments and institutions. At present, most of city and departmental government is concentrated in the Municipal Palace. (See Figure 9.) Completed in the early 1960s, the palace is a five-story building of modern design. It was built to house municipal government, but since Armenia became capital of a newly formed department in 1966, temporary room had to be made for the departmental government. So at present the fourth floor of the building is called La Gobernación ("the Capitol") and the mayor's office (alcaldía) is on the fifth floor; the two governments share the other floors. On the same block, behind the Municipal Palace, is the Municipal Council Building. National governmental offices and representatives of national agencies—as well as many municipal and departmental agencies—are scattered throughout the city.

New offices for departmental and national institutions are being built. The national government plans to build a large office building behind the cathedral. And the Capitol tower already stands above the Plaza de Bolívar. Although work was stopped on it several years ago, the skeleton is twenty-two stories, easily the highest building in the city.[19] It is visible from the central Andes' slopes up to fifty

kilometers away. Apparently intended as a manifestation of the city's enterprising spirit and economic importance, the building does not go well with the relatively low skyline of the rest of downtown Armenia. It appears that the project was overly ambitious, selected over other more modest proposals at the insistence of an important politician. The departmental government will not need more than five of the twenty-two stories; the excess space is intended for rental to other official or private concerns.

Plaza de Bolívar

As in most Latin American cities (Reina, 1973; Foster, 1960), Armenia's central plaza is an institution in itself. By tradition and by specific urban design, the plaza of Latin American cities was the central place, site of such major institutions as the town government, the police, the tax office, the principal church, and the residences of the most prestigious citizens. From Armenia's founding the Plaza de Bolívar was the center of city life. It was the first site cleared in 1889. Weekly markets were held there. But by 1960 the plaza had been replaced in social function by a more modern commercial and entertainment complex one block to the west. Ten years ago the Plaza was little more than a graceful, old-style park with ancient trees, a formal monument of Bolívar at the center, and wide pavement around it where taxis awaited passengers.



Figure 10
Scheme of the Plaza de Bolivar
Showing Building Facades

Key:

A	Cathedral
B	Bolívar Theater
C	Apartment Building/Nightclub
D	Parking Lot
E	Valorización Building
F	BCH (Central Mortgage Bank)
G	Apartment/Commerce Highrise
H	Apartment/Commerce Highrise
I	Apartment/Commerce Highrise
J	Future Wings of the Capitol
K	Capitol Building (Under Construction)
L	Proposed Underground Parking Lot (Centenary Lottery and Club América)
M	Monument to Effort

The Plaza de Bolívar has undergone major changes in recent years, in an effort to restore its dignity, if not its place in the affections of Armenians. The new Cathedral, a modern structure whose design was inspired by the white tents which Antioqueño merchants once pitched on market days in this same plaze, was finished around 1967 and set the tone for the new design. In the early 1970s, Municipal Valorization (see Chapter 8) began modernizing the Plaza, beginning with a new facade and remodeling for its own building (see Figure 10), and rebuilding the Plaza itself. Today the Plaza de Bolívar is a wide, open space paved with large, flat paving bricks in the style of a plaza de armas ("military plaza") with almost nothing to break the enormous extension of pavement but the walls of surrounding buildings. It is more a place for rallying political followers than the traditional comfortable, formal garden for strolling, drowsing, visiting, and romancing. But it is in keeping with the stark modernity of the plaza complex, for none of the early bahareque structures remains; the lowest building is of four stories. The old Bolívar Theater has been remodeled with sculpted curves. Old apartment buildings have without exception been remodeled. Costly new apartment towers are cropping up along streets tributary to the plaza. The Monument to Effort, installed in the final days of 1979, adds a dynamic touch to one corner. Soon Armenia will have a totally modern heart in its downtown, but one the people do

not seem to enjoy much—for few Armenians dally long in the plaza except when a special event is programmed there.

Parks and Recreation

Armenians are proud of the city's parks, although there are relatively few. Aside from the Plaza de Bolívar, which really is an important park, there are nine parks in the city. An example of city parks is the Uribe Park, an old park with enormous trees. Like all Armenia's parks, Uribe Park is "formal," with paved walkways and walled lawns. As in many Colombian cities, parks are remodeled every few years, and greenery is for gazing upon, not walking on. Schoolgirls study there in the afternoons and gardeners try to keep boys' soccer games out of the flowers.

Armenia's parks are located at the city's center and in the north, near the wealthier neighborhoods. Only one poor barrio—Santander—has its own formal park.[20]

Armenia's recreational facilities include institutions of entertainment and places for informal relaxation. Since most people have few material resources, many people have to use considerable imagination in taking their recreation.

There are several types of institutional facilities. There are four first-run movie theaters and an equal number of second-rate, neighborhood theaters. In the downtown area are numerous bars, caberets, and discotheques, oriented to clients of different tastes, economic means, and morals.

They range from foreign-style bars with American music to establishments which serve mostly aguardiente (a kind of harsh rum) and play old-style music to a clientele seeking nostalgic reminders of former times, to basement bars with billiard tables. In 1979 a red-light district along Carreras 18 and 19 was demolished by order of Municipal Planning; the prostitutes and bars thus dislodged have relocated in other areas to the south of that site and along some of the routes leading out of the city toward Montenegro and Pueblo Tapao.[21]

The café, or coffee-house, is a characteristic Colombian institution, especially in this area of Colombia. The café is like a modified bar for the entertainment of male clients,[22] more by tradition than due to any untoward behavior which occurs there. The principal beverage served in such places is fragrant expresso coffee although soft drinks, beer, and liquor are served. Groups of friends will meet and sit for minutes or hours over coffee or drinks, conversing and enjoying each other's company in an unhurried atmosphere. Clients frequently are regulars; most people have one or two preferred cafes. Much of the important business of Armenia and Quindío is transacted in these places rather than in offices. One—El Destapado ("The Uncorked [Place]")—is known as the "stock market of Armenia." There many wealthy coffee growers, cattlemen, businessmen, professionals, and sales brokers do business over coffee. Some clients show up early in the morning and do not leave for home until six or seven at night; they consider this their "office."

Armenia's soccer stadium, home of Atlético Quindío (Quindío Athletic Club), is called the San José Stadium. The University of Quindío has good sports facilities, including an amphitheater stadium and an olympic swimming pool. Several high schools also have sports complexes for private use. In the El Bosque ("The Forest") Park there is a bull ring, and Armenia is one of the few Colombian cities which has a formal bullfighting season each year.[23]

There are some facilities available to the public for physical recreation. At several places in the city there are sports complexes called polideportivos ("polysports" complexes), which are basketball compounds which can be converted for the playing of some other sports. In some barrios to the south and west, neighborhood action committees (Juntas de Acción Comunal) have managed to level the floor area of partially filled ravines to provide soccer fields and occasional basketball courts, with amphitheater-type seating, for neighborhood teams to play. The common claim that Armenia's poor do not have sports facilities is thus not entirely true.

On sunny Sunday afternoons the city is relatively empty, since much of the outdoor, physical recreation takes place outside the city. There are no public swimming pools in Armenia, but along the highway to the airport are a number of resort complexes built for the general public. The little-used airport is open on weekends and the coffee-shop

becomes a snackbar, with tables pushed to one side so that couples may dance to jukebox music. Many families make day trips to nearby towns like La Tebaida to dance or enjoy the warmer climate. And the poorest Armenians may just trek down to the Quindío River to swim in the river and eat a picnic lunch.

Wealthy Armenians use the private clubs for recreation or visit their fincas outside the city. Coffee fincas are usually attractively maintained for the secondary purpose (second to growing coffee) of providing an amenable place for relaxing and visiting with friends. The more elegant fincas may have swimming pools, guest houses, horses for riding and a well-stocked bar.

Market Place

The public market place is located downtown, north of the central business district (see Figure 9). The market consists of four blocks of public buildings under municipal jurisdiction, rented to individual merchants. Over the front buildings are some minor municipal offices, a police station and a jail. Inside are separate sections for butchers, greengrocers, and sellers of cereals and dry goods. There are small commercial spaces along the outside of the marketplace which house small cafes and bars, food stores, a pharmacy, a bakery, and other retail stores.

Market functions have bled into neighboring areas, also. Across from the northeast corner is a string of

unlicensed stalls selling vegetables, fruits and meats. Such pirate operations are allowed to function through some unofficial understanding with the mayor's office and the police.

Most people in and around the market appear to be of the lower class. Many can be identified readily as peasants who are in town for marketing their products and making purchases. The dress of even the urbanites seen here is generally less stylish than that seen in downtown Armenia, and the poeple are not so physiotypically "European" as in some other parts of the city. People of upper socioeconomic groups do use the market, but often come in private automobiles and hurriedly do their business and leave; others send their servants to market for them.[24]

The market area is a work area. Those who are not working are hanging around, looking or waiting for work. The market is a hiring place for hands to work on coffee farms as casual labor for such special tasks as fertilizing or weeding or picking coffee. Hiring normally is done on weekends for the following six-day work period.

The market is busiest on weekends when more rural people are able to come into the city. On Saturdays, in particular, the wide streets around the market are choked with people, standing or walking with little regard for the congested vehicular traffic which barely moves through them. Sidewalks are too narrow to hold all the people, and many do business in the street.

Armenia, then, is a densely populated city of small physical extension, severely limited in its possibilities for physical growth by a rugged topography. As it grows, the city encroaches upon rich agricultural lands which are only reluctantly surrendered from lucrative coffee production. The people of Armenia live in areas definable by socio-economic traits, and social class occasionally correlates with space use and housing type. Armenians use their urban public space intensively, and seem to maximize the advantages of living in a city; perhaps for this reason Armenians prefer an intense mixture of urban space use—housing, commerce, business, and industry together.

Armenia's urban development obeys cultural preferences. Even the unbenign topography is the result of a culturally determined choice, for Antioqueño colonists have placed their towns and cities on high mountain ridges by preference.

Armenia's physical texture is no accident. City planners preparing plans for Armenia's growth must understand, especially, the predilection for mixed land use, for dense habitation, and for the intense social interaction they facilitate.

Notes

[1]Municipal Planning Resolución 004 of 1979 proposes an extension to the city: a corridor sixteen kilometers long which would be added to the southern extreme of the city. This would add a kilometer-wide tail to the city (as long as the city itself) all the way to the airport at La Tebaida!

[2]Zones I and II correspond to the two central zones established in the building code under consideration during 1979; they were being used by the planning office without official sanction, in anticipation of their acceptance.

[3]Most large multistory buildings in Armenia are condominiums.

[4]Chapin and Kaiser say "This concept holds that the different income classes of a city tend to be found in distinct areas describable in terms of sectors of a circle centered on a central business district" (1979:35). In Armenia this concept is not followed through, especially due to the central concentric ring of poverty and transition, but is roughly accurate beyond that zone.

[5]For purposes of analysis, commercial areas are considered under the rubric of public space because of the free access the public has to them.

[6]Colombians believe that in their cities the north is preferred by the wealthy for their residences. Although that truism does not bear out under close scrutiny, it holds for such cities as Bogotá, Manizales, and Barranquilla.

[7]This is the national housing institute which builds and finances low-cost housing for low-income population. In Colombia housing projects are not rented to the lower classes but rather sold to them under favorable credit conditions.

[8]The ICT has built some housing for middle-income groups, with a clear profit motive. This is justified as capitalization to provide additional funds to work with the lower income sectors. In Armenia, middle and upper-middle income projects include the barrios María Cristina, Galán, and Yulima, all apartment complexes which ultimately become condominiums.

[9]For an illustrated discussion of this process in a similar housing program, see Turner (1976).

[10]Many of these were built individually, by owners, at owner expense and to owner specifications with the services of master builders or draftsmen. (Draftsmen without architectural qualifications often work either independently, with architects' supervision and under their signature, or else directly for architects as employees.

[11]Between 1975 and about 1978 the ICT coordinated a national and local housing improvement program called the Integral Housing Plan for Subnormal Urban Zones (PHIZSU). In 1976 many urban neighborhoods were surveyed and ranked in

order of inadequacy of housing and services before selection of an area for concentration was made. Most of the zones indicated for substandard urban development lay in a rough ring just beyond the inner transitional ring I refer to here in the text. The areas of greatest poverty are not transition areas.

[12]High-rise buildings shall be understood here to include buildings of four stories and higher, the cutoff point in height for buildings of older construction techniques.

[13]An important shift in Armenia's residential pattern has been the move, en masse, of most of the upper socio-economic sector of the population from the downtown into the north in the past twenty years.

[14]A number of wealthy Armenians who haven't moved out of the downtown have remained in older-style dwellings to which they felt strongly tied, or have built new high-rise buildings and retained preferred apartments in them for themselves.

[15]Good security usually is provided for the new buildings by armed guards in the entranceways and/or in the streets in front. Substantial street doors (portones) are provided with several locks and a slide-bar, and usually remain closed during both day and night. Individual apartments are similarly secured. Both burglaries and kidnappings are major concerns of prosperous Armenians.

[16]Because of its low altitude relative to the north and center of the city, water supply is constant.

[17]I remember a graduation ceremony of a law school which was held in the meeting room of the Bowling Club. A formal affair, the ceremony included speeches by rectors of the university, law deans, and the more eloquent student spokesmen. The gravity of the affair, however, was lacerated by the constant roar of bowling pins being knocked over, a sound which came into the meeting area clearly since no partition separates the two spaces.

[18]This corresponds to the "culture of poverty" described by Oscar Lewis, 1974. Poor people frequently do not have enough capital at any time to buy large quantities of food and other items, thus taking advantage of the cost savings in buying bulk. Small neighborhoods stores sell in tiny quantities and often offer credit; these advantages often offset the disadvantage of higher price for poor shoppers. Also, travel distance from larger stores and places of wholesale are often long, and travel costs would wipe out any price advantage in traveling there for lower prices.

[19]Local wags have dubbed the Capitol building "The Monument to Cement."

[20]Upon its completion the Quindío Overlook (see Chapter X) will provide park facilities for many poor neighborhoods.

[21]This information is based upon informal observation and the reports of municipal functionaries and other informed observers of the city. The city was only interested in dislodging this sector of specialized services, not in resettling or rehabilitating the people engaged in the activities which took place there.

[22]Other than waitresses, women almost never are seen in cafés. There are deviations to this rule, but one occasionally sees a woman at a table with a man, seldom alone.

[23]The season runs from December through February. The cartelera or lineup of bullfighters for the season, which appears in Armenia's bullring includes internationally known bullfighters from Colombia and abroad. It is a source of considerable pride to many Armenians, who seem to affect an exaggerated degree of identity with peninsular Spanish culture during this period of the year. The high cost of tickets to these functions makes this a sport for the wealthier people.

[24]Many prefer to do most of their shopping in one of Armenia's five or so supermarkets which are small but often well-stocked; a visit to the market is essential even for the wealthy, since fresh meat and fish is not available in most supermarkets.

CHAPTER V
THE HISTORY OF ARMENIA

The history of Armenia is nearly inseparable from that of the Department of Quindío, which is Armenia's approximate zone of influence or hinterland. Coffee production is the key integrative function in the department, and Armenia's physical, demographic, and economic growths are tied to the growth and prosperity of the region. A common history reflects the essential interrelatedness of Armenia and Quindío.

Armenia's history is reviewed here schematically through discussion of several salient themes: founding, demographic history, and the political and economic integration of the city and its region.[1] For purposes of cutting quickly through ninety years of history, the entire history has been divided into three periods-- 1889 to 1927, 1928 to 1959, and 1960 to 1979—which I consider to be watershed periods in city development.[2]

Founding

The region of the Quindío was isolated from Colombia, as was much of Old Caldas, during the colonial period. The area was densely forested, and the high Andean cordillera (chain of mountains, in this case the central chain) was virtually impassable. After 1800 or so routes to neighboring

Tolima crossed the mountains at Salento and at Manizales; north-south traffic between Medellín and Popayán moved along the level Cauca River Valley, west of the Quindío Valley (see Figure 3).

Quindío was not populated by Colombians until the nineteenth century. By that time the original population of Quimbaya Indians had entirely disappeared.[3] A land grant dating back to the seventeenth century, covering southern Quindío and part of northern Valle, was purchased in 1884 by the Burila Company (La Sociedad Anónima de Burila). This Manizales land company planned to extract salt, gold, and charcoal, and to settle colonists there (Parsons, 1968:81). However, a long litigation ensued between Burila and homesteaders already on the land. Colonization continued; and when Burila lost its lawsuit early in this century, there already were sizeable towns on the land.

Indeed, Burila hardly bought an area of virgin forest. Northern Quindío was populated from the first half of the nineteenth century. Parsons reports that there were strong attractions for the Antioqueños to enter the region:

> The long-evident colonizing fervor of these land-hungry mountain folk from the north seems here to have been intensified by at least four economic attractions: rubber, gold, high hog prices, and the area's advantages as a refuge from the civil wars which were desolating the republic. (1968: 78)

Early settlers tried to produce rubber there, but the world market gave out. Others fattened pigs bought at Cauca

markets (Cauca is a large department south of Quindío, whose capital, Popayán, was an important city in colonial times) and sold them for a profit in Cauca and Antioquia. Especially in southern Quindío many of the early colonizers were quaqueros (treasure-hunters of pre-Columbian artifacts) who were attracted by the region's rich Quimbaya graves, which often held valuable objects of finely worked gold.

A number of Antioqueño towns were founded in Quindío within a short period: Filandia in 1878; Calarcá in 1886; Circasia, close to the north of Armenia, in 1882; and Montenegro in 1890. The towns of Condina and Furatena, founded in the north of Quindío at mid-nineteenth century, had failed and disappeared by the end of that century.

Armenia was founded as a work camp on a site above the point where the semi-legendary founder, Tigrero, was promoting the building of a bridge over the Quindío River. Valencia (1963) cites several conflicting versions of the founding of the town, taken from verbal and written accounts by early settlers. There is concensus among them on several points, however. Armenia's site was not cleared from virgin forest as claimed in local legend but was a central location among the homesteads of many colonists (colonos) who shared a desire for an urban center in their midst.[4] The enterprising Tigrero helped them mobilize for the building of a town; according to one acount, he negotiated the purchase of the clearing where it was to be built (Valencia, 1963:172).

Other people were important in the town's founding. According to a memorandum written by one participant in the founding, the Junta Pobladora (roughly, "Settlement Commission") consisted of nine members. The committee to do the physical work of clearing the site for the Plaza included no less than sixty men, and many of their womenfolk helped. (This sort of work party is called a convite in Quindío.)

There is some disagreement as to how the city got the name "Armenia," although there is general agreement among Valencia's sources that it was given the name of the property upon which it was built. According to Valencia,

> In the year 1885 the Turks perpetrated the Killings of "Armenia" in Asia. These had world-wide reverberations. The name Armenia came to America and during 1894 [sic], when the killings were repeated, world help was invoked. It is possible that the name of Armenia was taken from there for the fonda (inn) which functioned in the sector of Carrera 19 with Calle 27, whence it seems that the name was taken for the city. (1963:298-299, my translation)

But if these dates are accurate, they are too late to have influenced the naming of the fonda and the city.

Amusing confusion is evident in late 1930s interviews conducted by Valencia among the remaining, aged settlers. They disagreed as to who were "legitimate" founders, and made accusations—naming names—that some who were not present at the founding of the city came forth later to claim recognition as founders (Valencia, 1963:113).

According to various accounts Armenia was nearly called "El Cuyabro," the name of a kind of squash. When a neighbor carrying a load of these squash passed the men at work clearing the Plaza site, a wag among the workers joyously called out, "This place should be called 'El Cuyabro'" (Valencia, 1963:127). The name caught on, and it was only by imposing stiff fines on those who used it that Armenia finally defeated its nickname (Valencia, 1963:112). Even today native Armenians are called Cuyabros.

Demographic History

Armenia's earliest settlers were guaqueros and farmers. They soon were followed by merchants who moved into the town once the platt was made and the first houses were going up.[5] The fact that the first builders of houses in Armenia were pioneer farmers indicates that they might have kept houses in town while living in the country, or have had a dual residence, rural and urban. Martínez says this was a pattern adopted by Caldas pioneers as they began to prosper (personal communication, 1979).[6]

Just how fast Armenia grew is indicated by the fact that in 1919, thirty years after its foundation, Armenia had a population of 17,406.[7] Table 2 (page 113) compares Armenia's 1918 population with those of other Colombian cities. Parsons mentions that Armenia grew fivefold in one twenty-five-year period (1968:81).[8]

People came to Armenia from places other than Antioquia. Colombians have come from Cundinamarca, Tolima, Valle, Santander, and Norte de Santander: many of them came as farmers and their arrival is not well documented since they first filtered into the agricultural work force, and entered the cities from there. There have been foreign immigrants since early in the century. During the 1930s and 1940s there came a few Germans and several Jews from Eastern Europe; first- and second-generation Lebanese came in the same period. These immigrants were few in number yet did very well for themselves. Many have prospered as merchants and their children, as professionals; most have entered the upper social classes. Immigrants have come from other areas, such as South American countries; apparently they are well integrated into the city's population. Of foreign residents, only a number of Chinese who operate restaurants and several American missionaries stand out in today's Armenia. By and large, population type has remained stable: predominantly Antioqueño since founding.

A most significant influx of new inhabitants was made up of peasants fleeing from the grisly political violence in the countryside from 1948 until about 1963 (a period called "La Violencia"). These people generally occupied lower socioeconomic positions in the city, and many have returned to the farms since the pacification of the countryside.

Data on Armenia's substantial growth in population sheds no light on the rural-to-urban migration process which Colombia has experienced, especially since the Violencia (cf. Camacho de Pinto, 1970; Cardona, 1970; McGreevey, 1968; Aguirre, 1979). It is not clear that such migration has continued from Armenia toward the largest centers.[9,10] A theory popular among many students of coffee economy and social science for this region is that the introduction of a new variety of coffee called caturra—a high-yield variety which required high levels of long-term investment and technology—has displaced many small farmers from the farms toward cities like Armenia during the 1960s and 1970s (Departamento del Quindío, 1975:6).

Political History

Armenia was established as a municipality independent from its parent municipality of Salento in 1903, and quickly replaced it in influence over the region. Armenia belonged to the Department of Cauca until 1907, at which time the Department of Caldas was formed. (The new department was formed from parts of Cauca, Antioquia, and Tolima.) Armenia continued as part of Caldas until 1966, when it became the capital of the new department of Quindío.

Several things of political importance occurred in the second period, 1935-1959. First, the city came under the political domination of its first cacique, a former military

officer. These early years of personal patronage set the precedent for what has become a Quindío political tradition: a closed system dominated by one or very few regional political bosses.

Second, Armenia became a pole of political opposition and separatism from Manizales. Old Caldas' three important cities of Manizales, Pereira, and Armenia each had a sizeable region of influence. Coffee-derived revenues from the latter two were sent off to Manizales and generally were not returned in quantities sufficient to provide for local needs, while Manizales flourished as an economic, cultural, and political center of national importance. Given Manizales' reluctance—or inability—to redistribute services and political power more equitably with the other subregional capitals, and given Armenia's great prosperity, pressures for separatism from Caldas were felt as early as the 1920s. This was brought to a head in 1965, when Old Caldas was partitioned into three new departments and Quindío was created.

A third important political feature of this period was the Violencia. In this period of rural violence, from 1948 to 1963, many farms were abandoned. Rural Quindío was largely in the hands of the Colombian army (the lower, flat areas) and guerillas controlled the mountainous areas. Most of the guerilla movements were controlled, at least initially, by established political figures in the city.

Cities were relatively safe from political warfare. Armenia filled with political refugees from the surrounding countryside. Landowners, when they dared venture out to their farms, were careful to be back in the city by nightfall.

But although Armenia was relatively peaceful, the Violencia did infiltrate the city. (One person recounted that a friend of her father was killed in a city café by a bullet fired over her father's shoulder from a doorway.) Since cities were truly open, political guerillas could come and go, although they had to maintain low profiles. Many wealthy coffee farmers and cattlemen received boletos (literally, "tickets") which were rough notes threatening their lives unless large sums of money were paid. Such boletos were delivered easily inside the city, and many of these threats were made good. Political violence in Colombia (including Quindío) was not effectively controlled until 1963.[11]

During the most recent period of political history, 1959-1979, Armenia became the capital of its own department. Being a small and prosperous department has contributed to the fact that in terms of infrastructure (rural electrification, water, educational services) Quindío is relatively better off than most Colombian departments.[12] On the other hand, the same complaints about centralism which were made earlier about Manizales—that the center siphons off tax money which is not returned in services—now is made in Quindío about the national government at Bogotá.

Economic Integration

Coffee has been the determining economic feature of both Armenia's and Quindío's histories. First introduced into Colombia as an agricultural export product in the Santanders (departments) around the 1820s (Parsons, 1968:137), it was brought to Antioquia in 1861 (Parsons, 1968:138) and the Manizales area in 1865 (but definitively, only in 1877) (Parsons, 1968:139; Ocampo, 1972:69). Ocampo says that coffee production achieved ascendency in the regional economy of Manizales only at the end of the nineteenth century. For the Quindío region, in 1882 one Leonidas Scarpeta asked the Municipal Council of Salento for support in developing the production of coffee (Valencia 1963:295). Valencia considers Scarpeta the father of the coffee industry in Quindío.

But coffee production did not truly take hold in the Quindío until around 1900. The commemorative city album published in 1930 by Santos Forero celebrates a coffee- and cattle-based rural economy in half-page ads taken by some of the wealthier hacendados, so by that year coffee was well along in its ascendency in Quindío's economy. Table 1 reflects the consolidation of coffee's importance regionally; unfortunately specific data for the region are not available for years before 1927, so much of the drama of its rise in early years is lost to us.

Armenia has become an emporium for a coffee-producing area which includes most of Quindío,[13] and a part of Valle,

TABLE 1

QUINDIO COFFEE PRODUCTION, 1927-1965
(In thousands of 60-kilo bags)

Year	No. Bags	Year	No. Bags
1927	236	1947	530
1928	260	1949	540
1929	280	1951	470
1930	310	1953	660
1931	300	1955	580
1933	320	1957	480
1935	370	1959	640
1937	400	1961	560
1939	370	1963	610
1941	290	1965	560
1943	520		
1945	510		

Note: Data adapted from Aguirre, 1979 (no page number). Data are condensed after 1931. Yearly production fluctuates according to growing conditions and other internal factors. It is interesting that there is no leveling off of production during the Violencia years (1948 through 1963).

the Municipio of Caicedonia.[14] Armenia is not the only outlet for coffee produced in Quindío and northern Valle. Calarcá and Quimbaya are subregional coffee centers within the domain of Armenia. Sevilla, Cartago, and Pereira are the coffee centers which effectively limit Armenia's region of influence on the south, west, and north, respectively. But the National Coffeegrowers' Federation has major warehouses in Armenia, and there are numerous privately owned hulling mills situated there. A functionary of the Coffeegrowers' Committee (a department-level council affiliated with the National Federation) estimated that eighty percent of the coffee grown in Quindío finds its way to Armenia. In return, Armenia sells the goods and manufactured items necessary for coffee production to its hinterland.

Economic integration of Quindío through Armenia is enhanced because many of the largest coffee growers have moved to that capital city. (Others reportedly live in Medellín, Cali, Bogotá and overseas.) Good roads have facilitated communication within the department, and no outlying town is further from Armenia than two to two-and-one-half hours; most are much closer. (Refer to Figure 2, page 45.)

Armenia is the largest commercial center south of Pereira; smaller Tuluá, an active center to the south in Valle, caters to different agricultural and social needs. Consumer goods are considered expensive in Armenia, a belief

which hampers sales by city merchants,[15] but regional coffee-related needs are serviced primarily from Armenia. Cooperative stores belonging to the Coffeegrowers' Committee and the Agrarian Bank help to maintain prices on basic items at reasonable levels even among private merchants.

Aside from coffee, Quindío produced several other agricultural products, particularly plantains and yucca. Cattle are raised in the lower lands, and some dairy farming is done at high altitudes. However, despite Coffeegrowers' Committee attempts to encourage farmers to diversity their crops, new lands are going into the production of coffee. The lands between Armenia and La Tebaida traditionally were considered too warm for coffee, but in the last decade, with the introduction of the caturra variety of coffee, they have proven to be some of the best coffee lands in Quindío. Quindío thus continues dangerously near a one-crop, export economy which might mean the demise of the city of Armenia were coffee production to fail.

Outlook for continued coffee production is unclear. Present world coffee prices make its production profitable, the more so since Colombian coffee is among the most sought-after of coffees. However, Colombian coffee production uses human labor intensively, and receives a barely-hidden subsity in the low wages paid to the work force.[16] Labor and materials[17] (particularly fertilizers) are rising so quickly in cost that coffee produced in Quindío and in Colombia may

be unable to continue competing with coffee produced more cheaply by mechanized means in other parts of the world. During 1979 numerous small producers in the Old Caldas region abandoned coffee production entirely. This may affect the national production levels adversely and certainly will signify the concentration of coffee production in fewer and fewer hands, ending any remnant of small farm tradition in the Antioqueño regions.

If coffee should fail in its role as sole base for Quindío's and Armenia's prosperities, industry will be in no position to replace it. Armenia produces little. Aguirre examines at length the issue of industrialization in Quindío and notes a decline in industry after 1950. Quindío's participation in the gross national product dropped from 2.4 percent in 1950 to 1.02 percent in 1975 (1979: no page number). Major industries at Armenia in 1955 included a cornstarch factory and a bottling plant of the Posada-Tobón softdrink company, both companies of national importance. By 1979 neither remained. There are a few small industries producing foodstuffs, and machine shops make specialized equipment for coffee production and processing. Furniture, metal doors and windows, bricks, and other building materials are produced in limited quantities. But the inability or reluctance of city administrations to provide adequate infrastructure of electricity and water, or any other incentive for industries to locate in Armenia, does not indicate increased industrialization of Armenia in the future.

In place of industry, other activities move the economy. Government offices employ numerous people. The sorts of professions necessary for the manipulation of a prosperous agricultural economy are found: law, medicine, engineering, and architecture. Construction, fueled by the recent coffee boom, is a major economic activity, as is speculation in urban real estate by those who derive substantial incomes from coffee, commerce, and the professions. Tertiary sectors (commerce and services) provide a large portion of the economic activity.

The economic history of Quindío and Armenia has been the smooth consolidation of this pattern of coffee agriculture. It seems that the tradition was well established by 1930, and that any further evolution since then has had to do with improvements in technology and political disturbances in the country.

Notes

[1]The best history of Armenia is Quindío Histórico: Monografía de Armenia, by Alfonso Valencia Zapata. The book exists in several editions, and has been updated by the author several times. Valencia is a journalist in Armenia, and has devoted much of his life to the collection of anecdotes, documents, and bits of information about the city; certainly he is the highest authority on Armenia in print. The book's nonacademic format makes it somewhat difficult to use for research; at the same time it makes for engaging reading and offers the additional advantage that its often unselective inclusion of information and transcriptions of interviews with members of founding families late in their lives makes this the closest thing a researcher may find to raw data on Armenia's history.

Other useful sources on Armenia are Santos Forero's Armenia, Libro Histórico (1930), published on the occasion

of the city's fortieth anniversary. The entire volume, both text and photographs, are useful for establishing a baseline idea of the city in 1930. Parsons makes several useful references to Armenia's history (1968:1-9, 77-82).

[2]Nineteen twenty-seven was chosen arbitrarily as a watershed year because it is the year the Pacific Railroad came to Armenia. The second watershed year is 1959, important because it represents the year of the first master development plan. It may be said that in 1959-1960 Armenia entered its "Age of Planning," a consideration central to this study.

[3]Archaeological evidence from graves indicates that this Indian population had been large. The lack of a base Indian population possibly has contributed to the development of this area by a largely "white" population. See Chapters II and VI for further discussion of race in Armenia.

[4]Parsons says that much of the settlement area—Armenia, Calarcá, Circasia, and Montenegro—was dominated by guaquería instead of agriculture in the early years (1968: 80).

[5]One informant stated, half-jokingly, that the region was populated by Liberals fleeing persecution by the Conservative troops of the national government. In fact, when Tigrero moved to Quindío to establish his farm he was fleeing such troops in Tolima. He had been a Liberal guerilla in earlier years, and feared that General Gallo was trying to capture him (Valencia, 1963:101). See Parsons' reference to civil wars as a factor pushing people into the Caldas area and Quindío in particular (1968:78).

[6]Dr. Harold Martínez is a professor of urban planning at the University of Valle in Cali, Colombia, and has studied Old Caldas building styles extensively.

[7]This datum includes the entire municipality's population, which in 1918 was still substantially rural. At that date Calarcá was still larger than Armenia (including its rural area, which it much larger than Armenia's). Source: Censo de Población de la República de Colombia, República de Colombia, 1924.

[8]The specific period is unclear; it may refer to the period 1924-1949, the date of the original edition of this book.

[9]Meugeot believes that migration flows from Armenia to Cali, since Armenia has no industrial base to support them (Personal communication, 1976). Jean-Luc Meugeot is a Canadian geographer, specializing in Colombia.

[10]According to McGreevey's theory of "step migration," inhabitants of rural areas do not migrate directly to the largest cities, but move a step at a time from smaller to larger population centers over generations, so that net migration results from displacement of older residents by newer ones.

[11]In 1963 President Valencia declared open season on guerillas, many of whom had dropped political pretense and had become bandits. The army quickly decimated most guerilla leaders during the open season. Truly politically motivated guerillas, especially extreme leftists, do not seem to have been so easily destroyed; many continue to function in 1980.

[12]Governmental efforts toward provision of these services is heavily subsidized by the Coffeegrowers' Committee, active in providing coffee areas with good facilities, and the Regional Corporation of Quindío, which provides water and electric power for farms and small towns.

[13]Some Quindío coffee produced west of Quimbaya may be sold through Ulloa and Cartago, Valle.

[14]Caicedonia maintains strong ties with Quindío, based in part on the shared Antioqueño traditions of its people on a long common departmental boundary; on land-holding patterns whereby many Caicedonia fincas are owned by people from Quindío and on an abiding resentment by people of Caicedonia, who believe that the Valle departmental government at Cali neglects this municipality which is relatively remote both geographically and culturally from most of Valle, but which provides much wealth for the department through its prolific production of much high-quality coffee.

The cultural traditions of the municipos of Caicedonia and Sevilla, Valle, correspond more closely with those of Quindío (recent settlement, Antioqueño pioneers, coffee economy) than with the Valle traditions of latifundia, colonial traditions; cattle raising, mestizo, mulatto, and black populations, "laziness" and more recently, sugar production as a dominant form of agricultural endeavor. However, Mosquera and Aprille (1978) offer data and discussion on the "Antioqueñization" of Valle and its agriculture, as enterprising Antioqueños move on to new areas of exploitation. Parsons (1967:82) also discusses the southernmost thrust of Antioqueño colonization.

[15]Many people from Armenia and Quindío in general prefer to buy major items in Pereira, Cali, or Bogotá, since they believe that merchants' mark-ups in Armenia are too high. Armenia merchants have countered with several devices—

bumper-stickers carrying slogans about Armenia, radio pleas to local "patriotism" in buying, and even large raffles among local shoppers at Christmastime. The fact remains, however, that such items as clothing and major appliances may be purchased much more cheaply elsewhere. It is not clear to me whether this is due to an avaricious bent on the part of local merchants who may believe they have a captive market, or whether overhead and the small scale of sales make it imperative to charge higher prices.

[16]Farm workers in Quindío and Old Caldas generally are paid considerably better than farmworkers elsewhere in Colombia. In 1979 a common wage was about $3.00 U.S. per day, plus room and board. But these laborers—no longer peasants but a slowly politicizing proletariat—are in touch with the burgeoning consumerism among Colombia's more prosperous classes. Rising expectations among the workforce and the grueling conditions of manual labor on a terrain which generally would not be cultivable mechanically, or in erosion-inducing crops, may spell a bleak future for long-range considerations of continuing coffee prosperity for Quindío—and Armenia.

[17]Coffee productivity is maintained by intensive fertilizing. Caturra-variety coffee requires 3-4 fertilizings per year. The natural fertility of the volcanic ash soils of the region gradually dissipates through leaching and poor agricultural practices. Erosion is serious since caturra does not require the shade trees used to protect the typíco varieties of earlier times, and many impatient coffeegrowers strip steep slopes of all vegetation to facilitate planting and care of new caturra plantings.

Industrial and commercial sectors of the Colombian economy, sensing an apparent prosperity of coffeegrowers when coffee prices are high (and not sensing the high production costs), "rise" to the occasion by raising prices of all goods the coffeegrowers use, setting off a high rate of inflation. The coffee "booms" of 1975 and 1977 were actually disastrous for the Colombian economy.

CHAPTER VI
THE PEOPLE OF ARMENIA

A city is people, and the people who design and build Armenia are culturally programmed. Culture can affect urban development through the patterns of perception of its people; through their conceptualization of the city's problems and needs and the corresponding appropriate solutions; and through their manner of urban social interaction. In order to determine the degree to which "Armenianness" is important in the way Armenians build their city, the people and their culture must be examined.

This chapter thus deals with the sociology and ethnography of Armenia in broad overview. The population of Armenia is described relative to those areas in which it—or significant sectors of it—are articulated by the development process. The following areas of articulation, or themes, are employed: (1) Demographics. Past and current population figures dramatize Armenia's rapid growth. (2) Ethnicity: The Antioqueños of Armenia. Armenia falls in the subcultural region of Antioquia, and a broad outline of major cultural traits of this group helps to understand values and felt needs which come into play as the city is planned and built. (3) Social Divisions. Social class and mobility among the classes are analyzed broadly to understand the

statuses, the loci of socioeconomic power, the groups, and the aspirations involved in the highly political processes of city development. Special attention is given to the relationship between the production of coffee and the social structure.

Demographics

According to preliminary data from the 1973 census, the population of the Municipio of Armenia was estimated for 1979 at 151,998; the city of Armenia had 142,933, and the remaining 9,065 inhabitants lived in rural portions of the municipality (DANE, 1976:33).[1] As will be explained, these statistics are widely considered to be suspect.

Upon crossing Armenia one receives the informal, visual impression of a much larger population. This may be mere impression, due to the fact that Armenians commonly walk to where they are going, and use open public space much more intensively than, for example, North Americans use theirs. Also, Armenia, like Colombian cities in general, is densely inhabited and has a relatively small land area—6.62 square kilometers (DANE, 1976:17). In such an environment, and given the intensive patterns of public space use (see Chapter IV), a small population would seem much larger.[2]

Nevertheless, most authorities interviewed in the course of this research share the belief that the city is much more highly populated than the census reflects.[3] City officials'

estimates run between 200,000 and 300,000; these estimates occasionally slip unnoticed into public statements, and most certainly into the planning decisions made by city officials.[4]

A working population figure for purposes of this study, then, is 250,000, with the understanding that the exact figure is unknown and the official figure is widely held in Armenia to be unreliable.

Table 2, "Comparative Populations of Armenia and Other Colombian cities in Census Years and 1979," is compiled from multiple census sources. Given the misgivings regarding the credibility of census data, mentioned above, cities might best be viewed on this table only as population values relative to each other, useful for establishing a partial national urban hierarchy.

Of seven cities included in Table 2 Armenia heads the list merely for convenience in locating it. (In 1964, Armenia stood eleventh among Colombian cities; see Table 3.) Data for Calarcá are included to dramatize the inversion of size/influence relationships which has occurred as Armenia has come from behind and outstripped that city. Armenia, Pereira, and Manizales are presented together as sister cities of the Old Caldas area; other intermediate cities are omitted in the interest of economizing space.[5] Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín, Colombia's three largest cities, are included to reflect the relative size relationship between intermediate cities and the largest ones, also over time.

TABLE 2

COMPARATIVE POPULATIONS OF ARMENIA AND OTHER COLOMBIAN CITIES IN CENSUS YEARS AND 1979

City	1918	1938	1951	1964	1973	1979 (est.)
Armenia	17,406(m)	50,838(m)	72,805	125,022	139,433(m)	151,998(m)
Calarcá	19,284(m)	35,230(m)	--	--	--	28,734
Pereira	24,735(m)	60,492(m)	89,675	147,487	201,550(m)	227,660(m)
Manizales	43,203(m)	86,027(m)	92,030	190,036	216,947(m)	237,264(m)
Bogotá	143,994	--	664,506	1,662,000	2,696,000	(5 million)
Cali	45,525	--	245,568	618,000	898,000	--
Medellín	79,146	--	397,738	718,000	1,070,000	--

Sources: 1918: República de Colombia, 1924. 1938: República de Colombia, 1941. 1951: DNP, 1970. 1964 (Armenia, Calarcá, Pereira, and Manizales): DANE, 1969; Bogotá, Cali and Medellín): Almanaque de Colombia, 1976; these are provisional figures. 1979 (except Bogotá): Dane, 1978. The figure shown for Bogotá in 1979 is a widely accepted estimate. (m) indicates the population figure is for the entire municipality, including both urban and rural portions.

TABLE 3

THE TWELVE LARGEST CITIES IN COLOMBIA IN 1964 AND 1973
(in order of decreasing population)

City	1964	1973
Bogotá	1,673,370	2,870,594
Medellín	948,025	1,410,154
Cali	633,485	926,264
Barranquilla	630,651	728,533
Bucaramanga	224,876	337,149
Cartagena	217,910	356,424
Pereira	179,133	245,214
Cúcuta	147,176	216,509
Manizales	195,542	204,024
Ibagué	125,233	180,734
Armenia	155,364	158,388
Palmira	106,502	140,481

Source: Gilbert, 1975:248. Note discrepancies between data in this table and Table 2, for both years 1964 and 1973. According to Gilbert's figures, Armenia's growth rate has been only 0.2 percent per year.

Size ranking of cities, such as we have just observed, reflects social and economic factors operant upon cities. A Department of National Planning (DNP) ranking scheme for Colombian cities within a national regionalization model (in Cardona, 1970) offers an example of the sort of thing which happens to Armenia when cities are ranked by function. That article shows Armenia, considered together with Calarcá as a metropolitan area, ranking ninth by population. In demographic and social functions the city ranks along with Pereira and Manizales, but ranks a full category lower than the other two cities economically. Lack of economic diversification is the probable reason for this lower ranking. As a result, for purposes of national planning schemes, Armenia is not ranked as a major regional center.[6] Indeed, the proposed model suggests a region roughly comprising the Cauca watershed portion of Old Caldas, and centered on Manizales.[7] Another study (Fornaguera, 1970) of regionalization in Colombia suggests a Manizales region of influence, with subzones centered on Manizales and Riosucio; and a Pereira region including zones centered on Pereira and on Armenia. Note that in both these schemes Armenia is made subject to the two other Old Caldas Cities.

Finally, Armenia's growth rate is indicated for some intersensal periods on Table 2. For the period between 1918 and 1938, Armenia had a growth rate of seventy-nine percent, which made it fifth among all Colombian cities. During the

subsequent periods 1938-1951 and 1951-1964, Armenia did not figure among the ten cities with highest growth rates (Koesser, 1970).

The Antioqueños of Armenia

Antioqueño cultural influence has been strong because most of the settlers (and most of the subsequent migrants) were of Antioqueño extraction, and because they and their descendants have strongly embraced the idiosyncratic paisa subculture.

Much has been written about the Antioqueños, and why observers consider them a remarkable people. James J. Parsons' well-known history of the colonization process of which the founding of Armenia was a part, Antioqueño Colonization in Western Colombia (1968), offers a useful characterization of these people. Many other writers also have made important statements about Antioqueños: Smith (1967), Gutiérrez de Pineda (1975), Florez (1957), Gómez Barrientos (1972), López de Mesa (1972), Cayetano Betancur (1972), and Mosquera and Aprille (1978). Many students of this people write glowingly about them; others, like Mosquera and Aprille, are skeptical and wish to temper the Antioqueño image which they claim has come from uncritical works such as Parsons' highly appreciative study (personal communication, 1979).[8] Lacking extensive firsthand ethnography on the people of Armenia, we shall derive a set of characteristics, or model,

from studies of Antioqueños and compare them with my own informal observations of Armenians during my research.

For a beginning we would do well to paraphrase Parsons' concise observations which deal with the major stereotypes regarding Antioqueños. Antioqueños bear a subculture formed over centuries of geographical isolation from the rest of Colombia; in the eighteenth century they were considered to be the most backward of all Colombians. In that isolation these people, who originally were gold miners too poor to replace their own physical labor with that of slaves, eventually developed a work ethic—a willingness to perform and value hard work—which continues strong today. Although there is documentary evidence for many families' "Old Christian" Spanish ancestry (Arango Mejía, 1973), a rumor persists in Colombia that the Antioqueños are descended from Sephardic Jews. Their considerable success at enterprise has fueled this rumor. But although some of the oldest families have tried to maintain racial "purity," and in fact phenotypically are Caucasian, "The basic tri-ethnic quality of the Antioqueño stock is clearly evident in the rural areas" (Parsons, 1968:3).[9] Parsons claims that in Quindío in 1918 the mixed bloods ("mezclados," a term I never heard in Quindío) outnumber the whites by four to one (1968:4). Yet the Antioqueños consider themselves a "race" (c.f. López de Mesa, 1972:53), and Parsons describes the phenotype: "The characteristic Antioqueño physical type has been described as

tall, dark, with large and piercing eyes, an aquiline nose, high forehead, and hair and beard abundant" (1968:4). The Antioqueños practice an intense Catholicism which Parsons likens to "Latin puritanism" (1968:8). He finds that "The rural society of Antioquia is composed of small landholders and homesteaders and is in sharp contrast to most of latifundian Latin America (Parsons, 1968:1). He comments on their dignity and economic opportunism. He finds them to have retained their mountaineer attitude, along with "strong, regional character of Antioqueño diet, dress, and speech" (1968:8)[10] with which they strongly identify. He comments that this people has become very strong politically and economically in recent years, and is dominant in Colombian national life.

To this sketch of the Antioqueño might be added an observation by Smith:

> It does seem evident . . . that in parts of Antioquia and in much of Caldas the rural population has developed many of the characteristics that entitle them to be classed as genuine members of the middle class, albeit their farms are too small to permit most of their operators to attain a status near the top of such a class . . . hundreds of individual farm properties and thousands of other small enterprises have been developed by the enterprising Antioqueños. Considering that they have lived and worked in a country where the many social restraints have operated against the evolution of a genuine middle class, what has taken place seems all the more remarkable.
>
> But the case of Antioquia and Caldas is unique. (1967:338-339)

Smith thus believes that Antioqueños, especially in the newer coffee lands, have become yeoman farmers, which he considers

an essential status in the formation of a "true" middle class. Marxist economists, however, take issue with the ubiquity of such independent small farmers, and insist that the bulk of Antioqueño colonial expansion was done through large land purchases or grants, and that many of the small farmers who came during the nineteenth century quickly lost their lands to larger interests. (For a discussion of this see Machado, 1977; Aguirre, 1979; and Ocampo, 1972.)

Mosquera and Aprille (1978, personal communication) comment that the Antioqueño male is sexist and, although generally a good provider and loving father, often a heavy womanizer. They mention that Antioqueño colonial settlements always established a brothel as one of the first urban institutions. Many observers consider the Antioqueño society to be patriarchal (Cayetano Betancur, 1972), yet my own observation has been that outspoken Antioqueño women often dominate family life.

With what, then, does this sketch of the Antioqueño provide us which might serve as a model for comparing the people of Armenia? The following characteristics, derived from the foregoing descriptions of Antioqueños plus direct observation, are widely recognized in Antioqueño lore:[11] (1) Antioqueño stereotypical ethnicity; (2) intense Catholic religiousness, (3) small landholders and yeoman farmers, (4) entrepreneurial vigor and success, (5) strong identification with regional culture, (6) strong work ethic, (7) sexism,

(8) penchant for having large families, and (9) conservatism. With certain qualifications[12] this model provides a useful sociocultural framework within which the phenomena of Armenia's urban development may be better understood.

1) Antioqueño stereotype ethnicity in Armenia. Like Antioqueños elsewhere, Armenians commonly think of themselves as "white," and one senses an ethnic pride in this.[13,14] There are places and moments when a visitor to Armenia might feel certain to judge by faces and physiognomies generally, that he or she is in a European city rather than an Andean South American one.[15] Armenians, and especially many in the upper and middle social sectors, often have very dark brown or black wavy hair; bright, sharp eyes; aquiline noses; thick, dark eyebrows; high foreheads; skin ranging in tone from transparent white to dark olive in color; angular faces, and medium to tall stature. This coincides almost exactly with Parsons' description of the stereotype Antioqueño. One tends to find these physical types most commonly downtown and in the north of the city, areas which correspond to the upper- and middle-class residential areas. But such physiotypes also are found in all social groups, and among peasants throughout Quindío.[16]

In fact, however, Armenians are of the tri-ethnic mixture Parsons describes for Antioquia, to wit, caucasion-amerindian-negroid. Exact percentages of "white" versus "mixed" elements are not available, but people of mixed blood

may be found at all levels of Armenia society. Recent migrations to Armenia have clouded the ethnic origins of Armenians.

2) Intense Catholic religiousness. This Antioqueño pattern is evoked in books on the region, in the press, and even in daily speech. The most characteristic Antioqueño expression is "Eh, Ave María!", an interjection which spices almost any animated conversations. As in all Colombia, the Church is powerful even in secular matters such as education (both private and public), and politics (there is a strong religious element in Colombian conservatism). Actual churchgoing activity was not observed systematically, but there seems to be adherence to the pattern described by Smith (1967) and Haddox (1962) wherein Colombian Catholicism is often more a matter of positive cultural and moral identity than of actual participation in rites. Catholic values are invoked and revered.

3) Small landholding and yeoman farmers. Although this ostensibly was the dominant settlement pattern in the Quindío region, there is evidence that it never was numerically so significant as it is held to have been (Aguirre, 1979; Machado, 1977; Villegas, 1978), and that this pattern of landholding is rapidly diminishing (Mendoza, 1975). Where observers like Smith (1967) and Parsons (1968) once noted the presence of small holdings, there now is a strong pattern of consolidation of rural land ownership. The recent introduction of the caturra variety of coffee (see Chapter V)

is widely believed by social scientists of the region to have displaced small coffee farmers who swell the ranks of the rural migrants to cities. I found no evidence for or against this in Armenia.[17] But the single, large, self-sufficient nuclear family work force which was considered a distinguishing feature of Antioqueño rural society has diminished as a cultural pattern in Armenia's Quindío hinterland.[18]

4) Vigor and success as entrepreneurs. Quindío coffee farms and other agricultural establishments generally prosper; they show considerable evidence of investment in infrastructure and new technology for coffee production. (For example, costly diesel-powered blower-type dryers widely have replaced the traditional patios for sun-drying coffee as the latter have proven inadequate to handle the bumper crops of caturra coffee.) In commerce, Armenians share the deserved fame of the Antioqueños as vendors and merchants; hundreds of small stores vie for business, and some have grown into national chains. Streets and sidewalks are congested with petty vendors and "penny capitalists" selling everything from fruit to nail clippers to inexpensive clothing. The building professions provide yet another area of entrepreneurial vigor in Armenia, as many wealthy people invest in real estate. But while the famed Antioqueño vigor holds in agriculture, commerce, and building, Armenia departs from the pattern in that it has almost no industry.

One reason frequently given for this is the lack of adequate, dependable infrastructure: water, electricity, and natural gas. Another reason, put forth by some local officials, is that coffee is industry enough for Armenia, that it is the region's tradition, and provides sufficient employment opportunity in production and processing to be considered an industry.

More probably, the reason is that people in economic conditions adequate for financing incipient industry are satisfied with the comfortable way of life coffee affords. The wealthy are conservative. They worry about long-range investment in physical infrastructure such as factories and machinery; about potential labor problems, which in Colombia often crop up even before full production is begun; about limited markets for finished goods in a country where foreign-produced goods generally are preferred to national ones and which finds foreign markets closed to many of its best products. Coffee-derived income is therefore "invested" in safer areas of urban real estate, sumptuous consumer items, and in additional land and agriculture.

5) Strong identification with regional culture. Identification with Antioqueño culture continues in Armenia. Most people think of themselves as paisas, although perhaps as subregional paisas. No specifically Quindío cultural patterns were identified. There is a strong identification with the geographical region of Quindío, with its special

landmarks, topography, and tropical vegetation; and with the special terms, activities, and symbols of a coffee-producing region. Armenians still use Antioqueño folklore, proverbs, accents, and jokes. They still remember the towns of origin of their recent ancestors, and occasionally journey back to Antioquia to "find their roots": visiting ancestral towns, looking for remote cousins, finding records of family heritage. They still adhere to Antioqueño dietary preferences and cultural symbols. But they are not nostalgic for Antioquia; they do not feel like isolated frontiersmen. They do not look to Medellín for fashion or social leadership.[19] It is considered good to live in Armenia.

6) Strong work ethic. Hard work is valued by the people of Armenia, just as it is in Antioquia. People at least profess a willingness to work hard, and an admiration for those who do. Although many laborers and unskilled workers were observed to work either sullenly or sloppily, most also did so vigorously and for long hours,[20] even persons who because of their economic situation might not strictly have to work at all occupy themselves with professional or hobby-type activities, full-time.

Free time, when it occurs, often takes on nuances of work. One plumber, for example, works at two jobs during the week and built his own house on weekends. Lower-income people devote two days each weekend to construction of housing in the self-construction barrio, Siete de Agosto. Many

of the men who spend the whole day at the Destapado coffee shop are performing important brokerage or investment activities. Even informal weekend visits to one's coffee farm usually are for administrative purposes, and may take on professional or political functions when several friends are invited along.

7) Sexism. Men in Armenia enjoy many privileges women do not have. Men are more active and evident in public life. Although there are women situated at high levels of government, politics, and private enterprise, many Armenian men prefer their women to be submissive and devoted to the home. It is widely held that Antioqueño families are patriarchal (c.f. Betancur, 1972). However, I believe that many of the extended families are in fact matriarchal, with women making, or at least participating actively in the making of, important family-level decisions, including economic ones. University educations and opportunities for employment in commerce are increasingly taking women out of the home. And such employment plus the increasing availability of private automobiles mean that women are freer in their movements outside the home.

A moral element accompanies the conservatism and Catholicism operative in Armenian culture. This morality requires correct behavior on the parts of both men and women. In the area of sexual activity, however, men exercise considerable freedom; it is supposed that women do not. As in

Antioquia men frequent prostitutes, or visit "friends"—women of higher social status than prostitutes—who share sexual favors with male friends, who in exchange may pay their rents, bring gifts, or help with domestic costs or professional services. Men frequently have children outside their own marriages, or out of wedlock if they are unmarried. However, women are exercising greater sexual liberty than has traditionally been sanctioned in cultural norms.[21]

8) Large families. It appears that large families were extremely functional on the internal frontiers of Old Caldas and Antioquia during the period of colonization. Large nuclear families provided a basic economic unit with ample manpower for self-sufficient farms. Quindío families commonly have consisted of up to fifteen children or more, although this pattern seems to have ended with the generations of Armenians which in 1979 were grandparents and great-grandparents. Younger married couples, between 18 and 45 years of age in 1979, have considerably smaller families than their parents, although five or six children is not an uncommon family size even today.

There is a heavy family orientation of life in Armenia. Social interaction is intensely centered around the family (both nuclear and extended). Although men often spend much of their time away from home, both at work and recreating with male friends in male-only ambiences, this enhances the role of the wife/mother within the home. Some families do not visit or have many close friends outside the extended

family, and might comment that "within the family you know whom you can trust," and that "one must be solidary with the family." Family units within the extended family frequently exchange visits, as often as several times a week. (Cousin marriages are common in Armenia, both cross-cousin and parallel cousin; this may be a frontier tradition from when social circles were limited by geography—which has been continued in an urban situation where families are so close).

Families also recreate together. Whole families may attend evening mass together. One sees families strolling together in the Plaza de Bolívar in the evenings. Courting couples still may be accompanied to the movies by one or two of the girl's siblings, although unescorted dating now is everywhere in evidence. Families travel together to family-owned coffee fincas on weekends. Even though men spend much time away from home, they do share their time with their families.

In addition, families in Armenia are important for social identification. When one is introduced as a stranger to Armenians, people begin immediately to question about one's family. If the newcomer has family connections with Armenia or the wider Caldas region, an inquisitor will ask immediately for the family name, and computer-like, run the name through his or her mind while asking which Jaramillos one means, and checking against a mental list in order to ascribe the newcomer a status.

9) Conservatism. This trait is associated with the fundamental Catholicism of the Armenians, but also with political conservatism and with attitudes toward life generally. In Armenia this trait continues, although it may have mitigated somewhat. The severe living conditions of survival agriculture in unfertile lands in colonial Antioquia, which helped to form and enforce the conservatism of the colonial period Antioqueños, do not exist in Quindío. However, the adherence to Antioqueño culture and lifestyles is evidence of conservatism among the Armenians.

Social Divisions

Colombia is a nation divided by regionalisms and traditional differences in privilege, education, wealth, race, and ethnicity. All the differences have nuances of meaning on a vertical social scale, and as a result the neat tripartite social class system which works—or has been made to work[22]—for Europe and North America, does not fit Colombia well.

Nevertheless, from the early 1950s until today, efforts have been made to handle the concept of social class in this complex society (Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1952; Smith, 1967; Whiteford, 1960). It is generally agreed that Colombia has been characterized historically by a major bifurcation into a tiny, privileged ruling class—usually referred to as an "oligarchy"—and a vast, disenfranchised lower class. The issue of whether a middle class exists has been long debated: Smith (1967) perceives a "middle sector" which is basically

a client of the upper class, and lacks the conditions he considers essential to the constitution of a "class."

After grappling for some time with terminology and criteria for analyzing Armenia's social stratification, two things have encouraged me to abandon further worry over whether to employ the term "middle class." One is that the people of Armenia already have adopted the three-class system into their cosmologies; people commonly refer to themselves as belonging to one of these three classes.[23] (As an interesting aside, several informants considered themselves to be of the "professional class," as differentiated from the "political class."[24] The other is a realization that, since the purpose of my short statement on social divisions in Armenia is simply to provide an idea of the range and types of socioeconomic variations within Armenia's population, with no pretense at devising iron-clad descriptions, the term "middle class" is useful enough when used with adequate care.[25] In fact, the continuities and contacts among the upper and middle classes are more interesting—and probably more useful, in studying this fairly open society—than a tight focus on the differences among them.

Social Class in Armenia

Emically, the people of Armenia classify themselves in traditional class terms—upper, middle, and lower—although the terms lack precision. No informant could give a good delimitation of these classes. Geographical referents were

used by several informants as indicators of social class: if you live in such-and-such a barrio, probably you are middle class. Level of income is widely employed as an indicator, but it is complicated by the fact that no one in Armenia has good indices of true income levels for the whole city. Dishonest tax reporting and the phenomenon of multiple incomes for single families and individuals obviate the reliability of available data. Membership in certain social groups often is a reliable indication of social class. Family name and kinship affiliation also are helpful guides in pigeonholing people socially; peer comments are another. All of these methods were used in this study of Armenia, and together they formed a composite picture which, although imprecise, offers a very workable approximation of social structure in this city.

Table 4 presents the sort of scheme used officially for showing class divisions. The figures probably are based on income-tax-return information which, except in the cases of salaried employees, is almost categorically fictitious. The percentages of homes (for which we should read "families") in each of the strata, however, probably are fairly accurate. The extensive elaboration of a middle sector—which CENAC sets at forty percent of the population-- is interesting, as is the fact that the term "sector" is employed instead of "class" (Alcaldía de Armenia, 1978:28).

TABLE 4

SOCIAL STRATA BY INCOME IN ARMENIA, 1977

	Monthly Family Income	Percentage of Homes
Upper	$22,000 Pesos and Up	5.1
Upper Middle	11,751-22,000	6.8
Middle Middle	6,501-11,750	16.5
Lower Middle	4,051-6,500	17.5
Lower	Less than 4,050	54.1

Adapted from Centro Nacional de Estudios de la Construcción, CENAC, data quoted in Alcaldía de Armenia, Plan de Desarrollo de Armenia, 1978-1998 (Proyecto de Acuerdo) (1978:

The reality of social stratification is more complex than Table 4 indicates. Following Gulick's informal statification of a Lebanese city (1967:183), I have adapted the following scheme for Armenia. It comes closer than the concepts in Table 4 to reflecting some of the social diversity of Armenia. Differential crystallization of social, cultural, and economic factors causes significant internal differences within both the upper and the lower classes.

Upper Class Rich—old coffee and cattle fortunes

Upper Class Rich—new wealth, not totally derived from coffee; rather moving from commerce, professions into coffee

Upper Class Nonwealthy—old families which have lost their fortunes; genteel poor

Upper Middle Class—rising professionals and merchants

Upper Middle Class—modest wealth strictly from coffee; active administration of coffee farms

Upper Middle Class—status achieved by a creative merger of professional activity, party politics, business deals, and buying into coffee

Middle Middle Class—good salaries or other income; young professionals starting out, merchants, skilled artisans

Lower Middle Class—modest salaries, but multiple income families; occasional overseas employment

Upper Lower Class—upwardly mobile; salaries or wages, multiple income families; overseas employment

Lower Class Poor—wages, unstable employment, low mobility

Lower Class Destitute—unemployed and underemployed, "marginal" to city and national economies; includes beggars and petty criminals

This scheme is an attempt to reflect the fact that there are palpable differences among the poor, for example, and within the upper and middle classes. Lumping them together for convenience is too simplistic since it occults qualitative differences in lifestyle, world view and in the dynamics of social mobility. The fact that I have followed economic rather than social criteria in making this chart does not mean that social criteria are overlooked; rather they underlie the separation of each of the three major classes (again, upper, middle, lower) into smaller segments. Some of the segments, such as those within the "upper middle class," are more parallel than hierarchical. Internal socioeconomic differences among the more prosperous sectors are small, but are significant culturally. In fact, source of income is of cultural importance since it colors world view.

The six upper- and upper-middle-class groups in my social scheme may give an inflated idea of their true numbers. In truth it would be most difficult to determine the number of families which belong to any of these categories. The upper classes must number over two hundred families; the upper-middle-class groups must be much larger.[26] Armenia is one of the most prosperous cities in Colombia,[27] and these

two groups (six sectors) may be several thousand families strong.

Much of the stuff of life lies in effecting the transition from one class to another; there is considerable movement among the classes, both upward and downward.

Armania is a city of fast fortunes. It is not uncommon to return to Armenia after one or two years' absence and find old acquaintances with new fortunes. Here the Antioqueño penchant for hard work figures, as in the case of new stores or restaurants made to prosper partly by the owner's willingness to put in twelve-hour workdays. In such ventures many people's willingness to take economic risks in the can-do spirit alluded to earlier frequently pays off. If it does not, bankruptcy is no disgrace, apparently, and many businessmen have been into and out of bankruptcy and perennially bounce back.[28] Given this range of lattitude in socially acceptable occupation and failure to sanction wavering economic fortunes in the upper levels of Armenia society, the reader might well imagine the frenzy within each of the classes as people struggle to achieve their next rung in upward socioeconomic mobility.

In Armenia, wealth lubricates social mobility.[29] Very little of the sort of scorn for the newly rich that Reina noted in Paraná (1973) was found in Armenia among the upper

classes. In fact it is apparent that in Armenia many of the wealthy are newly so, if not most of them. It should be remembered that in Armenia "old money" can only be ninety years old.

Armenia follows the findings of Whiteford in Popayán (1960), Reina in Paraná (1973), and Smith for Colombia in general (1967) in the fact that there is attrition from the higher social levels to lower ones. Society has mechanisms for handling this. For example, in the case of a family in the nonwealthy upper class, others in the upper class may find reasons other than wealth to revere that family. Extended families often "carry" those branches of the family whose fortunes have fallen by providing certain subsidies and by guaranteeing respectability. Also, such redistributive means as inheritances, in the case of land-wealthy families, offer poorer members a second chance at prosperity. In the lower classes inflation and even plain bad luck—such as illness or losing a job—can completely destroy a family's tenuous economic base, which may be the only factor differentiating the family from the lower levels.

Figure 11 is a graphic approximation of the social structure of Armenia. It is modeled after the one devised by Whiteford (1960) for the social structure of Popayán. It does not follow his design closely, however, since the strata do not bear the same meaning as his.[30]



Figure 11
Scheme of Armenia's Social Structure

Key:

1 Upper Class Rich (Traditional)
2 Upper Class Rich (New Wealth)
3 Upper Class (Nonwealthy)
4 Upper Middle Class (Professional/Merchant)
5 Upper Middle Class (Coffee)
6 Upper Middle Class (New, Professional/ Political)
7 Middle Middle Class
8 Lower Middle Class
9 Upper Lower Class
10 Lower Class (Poor)
11 Lower Class (Destitute)

Figure 11 differs from Whiteford's in several ways. It is not a true pyramid, pointed at top, but rather more a trapezoid. The purpose of this is to indicate that no ranking system was found which would allow for an apex within this class. Second, both the upper and upper-middle strata are shown as having three parallel sectors instead of three ranked in hierarchical order. This is to reflect my perception of a society whose component elements are straining to rise in the pyramid rather than defend minor status differences internally.

The upper and lower boundaries of the classes and subclasses are places of crossing. Figure 11 shows the dynamics of movement within this scheme: arrows indicate the common lines of social movement among the segments.

Class and Coffee: Four Perspectives

As has been shown, coffee production is a process which integrates the Department of Quindío and links it to its capital, Armenia. Coffee production is not identified with any specific social class, although levels and qualities of involvement are different. In the following few pages I shall examine some of the ways in which this coffee production meshes with the social structure we have defined for Armenia. Four fictitious characters are used to dramatize the interrelationships which can exist.

1) Upper Class: Traditional Coffee Wealth. Many of the Quindío coffee landholdings are direct inheritances from

original settlers, which have been passed down within families and made to prosper through vigorous administrative practices; many of these inheritances have been enlarged by consolidating smaller farms and other haciendas into them.

Efraín Ocampo is a man of the traditional coffee-wealthy upper class. When the Quindío territory was being settled in the late nineteenth century, Efraín's grandfather came as a colonist from Antioquia and established a large hacienda west of Armenia. He farmed the land subintensively in corn, sugar, and other crops and nearly damaged the land with his poor agricultural practices. Efraín's father, however, planted the farm in coffee in the 1920s and with the resulting wealth purchased other farms, a pattern which the family continues even today.

Efraín is a medical doctor, but this profession is almost a pastime for him, since the income from his two haciendas and four fincas far surpasses his professional income. He studied medicine to prove that he could earn his own way, and because he does not enjoy idleness. Efraín is active in the Armenia Coffeegrower's Committee, of which he has been president several times. He is well-know nationally for these endeavors, and has held political office in Armenia.

2) Middle Class Professional. Young professionals and people who achieve economic success in areas other than coffee agriculture often move toward coffee farming as an economic activity when they are able.

Joaquín Baena is an architect of middle-class status. At age twenty-nine, he has been practicing in Armenia for six years. Although his father belongs to the upper-middle class, which derives its income from coffee, the family has only one hacienda and a smaller farm, and it is unlikely that Joaquín (who is one of six children) will inherit enough farmland to provide an income. He must find his own way into the coffee-growers' ranks.

Because he has prospered as an architect, in part through family influence and through his personal political affiliations, Joaquín was able to save enough money to purchase a small coffee farm, called La Betulia. At present he is replanting the farm in the new caturra variety of coffee; his seedlings should reach bearing size in about three years, and his years of sacrifice will then begin to pay off in abundant crops. Because his income from architectural work is adequate for his immediate needs (although not permitting many luxuries), Joaquín should be able to reinvest his coffee income in new coffee properties. If Joaquín follows an established pattern among those in his social situation, he will be able to establish himself as a coffee grower of upper-middle or upper-class status and retire from his architecture practice by age fifty or fifty-five and devote himself to a full-time life of leisurely "farming."

3) Transition from Rural-Lower to Urban-Middle Classes. Coffee production has been a powerful social catalyst. Many small farmers, by hard work and strategic personal economies,

have managed to acquire additional lands, moving up economically, if not socially. Such new rural prosperity leaves subsequent generations with better opportunities for ascending the social scale.

Eleázar Jaramillo is a man in his late sixties who has managed to parlay his earnings as a mayordomo, which were substantial during some good coffee years, into eleven small farms of his own.[31] Although he is not affiliated with any particular social class in Armenia, he moved to that city during the Violencia and resides in the middle-class Barrio Granada. Eleázar still dresses and acts as a campesino, and identifies with the countryside from which he derives his sustenance.

Eleázar's family, however, will derive the social benefits of their father's prudence. Several of the oldest sons live on Eleázar's farms and administer them for him; one of them also owns several houses in Montenegro, which he rents for additional income. The youngest of the three sons, however, is in his second year of law school at the university, and will have a good chance of acquiring upper-middle-class status. Eleázar's oldest daughter owns a boutique in neighboring Calarcá and the youngest will study education at the university next year. As may be seen from the fortunes of Eleázar Jaramillo's children, the range of careers they have chosen is wide, and they will be scattered through several social strata in various parts of the

department. However, he has seen to it that each has been able to do what he or she wanted to do and was capable of doing; the more extensive study given to the youngest two reflects the rising family fortunes over the years. None of the children will be in the lower social class.

4) Ascending Lower Class. At the lower end of the socioeconomic scale there are also ties to coffee production: attrition among small growers in the countryside has caused migration into the cities and, generally, entrance into the lower social sectors.[32]

Edgardo Montoya owns a small café in Barrio Popular, a lower-class barrio just south of downtown Armenia. Edgardo represents the end of a long family tradition of coffee production: he has left the country for Armenia. His father was a colonist from Caldas, but the family coffee farm was a small property too high in the mountains to produce good coffee consistently, due to the cold climate. The Montoyas struggled for two generations to survive by coffee production but low yields and the Violencia forced him to sell his finca in 1955. He recieved enough money to move to Armenia and open his coffee shop. Now when Edgardo wants a day on the farm—and one does miss the relaxed beauty of the Quindío countryside—he visits a younger brother who is a mayordomo on a farm near Pijao, about forty kilometers southeast of Armenia, in the mountains. In the absence of the owner who seldom visits on weekends, Edgardo and his brother and their families have their "own" farm for a day.

Edgardo's son has graduated from high school in Armenia and is working tenuous political connections, trying to win a job as a clerk in the Public Utilities office. Although Edgardo's family dreams of one day establishing the boy on his own farm, they know that the small farms are now too costly and that many are now consolidated into larger holdings of wealthy Armenians. Their coffee farming days are over, and limited opportunities for employment in the city are making them embittered.

How, then, are demographic and ethnographic statements about the people of Armenia germane to a study of urban development? Simply stated, social factors indicate many of the constraints operant upon urban planners and developers. Viewing the demographics, for example, we have found that city officials of Armenia do not even have accurate population figures for the city.

Cultural patterns which have distinguished Antioqueños over time will affect planning for Armenia. Allowance must be made, in designing urban space, for a large and vigorous commercial sector, for family-type facilities, and for religious institutions. Planners and developers might look to traditional Antioqueño and Caldas towns for clues as to how urban space might be allocated, and what sorts of public space are important to _paisas_. Traditional conservatism of Armenians in matters of investment signals the need for economic planning; the economy is absolutely tied to coffee

and no industry is likely to develop in Armenia given the mentioned cultural values. The values for upward mobility of many people of all social classes—and the marked success of many in improving their situations—should influence the housing market. City governments will need to provide adequate infrastrucutre to allow neighborhood improvements over time.

Likewise the social structure should be taken into consideration when analyzing the ambience within which planners must operate. The upper classes, with their power and wealth, are in a position to influence decisions city governments make. Planners need to know and understand the elites; developers are likely to have considerable identity of interest with those classes. By the same token, the lower classes must be understood: their numbers, and the kinds of demands they may make on the city.

Such information provides an important social context for the following chapters.

Notes

[1]There always is a lag of several years in compiling the exact census figures. Nineteen sixty-four is the last census year for which fully compiled data are available. The figures cited above are from the 1977 statistical yearbook for Caldas, Quindío and Risaralda (DANE, 1979). It also should be noted that the yearbooks are issued with a two-year lag between the year for which the information is presented and the year in which the edition finally is published.

[2]A foreigner's ethnocentric concepts of visible population density vis-à-vis city size also would cloud exact determination of "true" population.

[3]One city functionary confided that the official census data may be consciously skewed toward a lower figure by DANE. That agency, says this informant, is expected by the national government to report census figures as low as possible, since the amounts of tax money which must be redistributed to the departments is computed by relative size of population. Smaller census findings would mean that less money had to be returned. My source insists that the government uses this sleight-of-hand as a standard policy. No other information was acquired to substantiate this account.

Not all observers of Colombian demographics agree that DANE's information is sloppy, or skewed. Sra. Lee De Gauffray, of the Colombian science foundation COLCIENCIAS, notes that the census is taken house to house by trained census-takers, and that all areas are canvassed. She compares the quality of the 1973 census favorably with the likely outcome of the 1980 U.S. census.

[4]For example, in the working document "Plan de Desarrollo de Armenia, 1978-1998" most of the diagnostical statements on city administration use the official DANE figure for 1978: 147,800 (Alcaldía de Armenia, 1978:32). But in the midst of this inadequately edited document, one writer comments on how a city of "only 200,000" can have rush-hour traffic.

[5]The interested reader might look at the listed sources of data for Table 2, for information on such cities as Cartagena, Bucaramanga, Ibagué and Cúcuta—all larger than Armenia—or on smaller intermediate cities like Tuluá, Valledupar, Palmira, and Popayán.

[6]Another likely reason is that the propinquity of Armenia-Pereira-Manizales (all within one hundred kilometers of each other in a slightly crooked line; see Figure 3) probably precludes each being a regional center anyway.

[7]In practice this area still is considered a natural region for many reasons: cultural similarity, traditional patterns of interaction, historical tradition, region-wide infrastructure (networks of highways and electrical systems) and general smallness of the newer departments it comprises. Normally, Manizales is considered the "center" of this region, despite the fact that it is disadvantageously located in the northeast in a remote mountain site, off the best modern transportation networks—highway, rail, and air—which link Pereira and Armenia with the rest of Colombia.

[8]Mosquera and Aprille are professors of urban planning at the University of Valle, in Cali, Colombia.

[9]López de Mesa says "Ethnically, they should be classified as Ibero-Afro-American" (1972:53, my translation).

[10]This includes a rural ethos—Antioqueños are urbanizing appreciably only in the late twentieth century. In fact, a stereotype image which Antioqueños enjoy projecting about themselves is that of rough-talking muleteers, more at home drinking aguardiente in a mountain inn or leading a recalcitrant mule train across rugged mountain passes than in a modern factory of office.

Theirs is a corn-based agriculture and diet. Although bakeries are now springing up and prospering in Armenia, the basic bread has traditionally been a corn biscuit called an arepa; hominy is eaten in a porridge called mazamorra. Beans are also a major staple, being a kidney variety prepared with garra ("fatty pork rinds").

[11]These traits are based upon many observers' comments, both emic—that is, from inside the society—and etic, that is, outsiders' supposedly "objective" views. Although Parsons is used here to derive the model, most of the other sources listed on Antioqueños agree with at least most of them. Also, they are frequently mentioned in informants' comments during research interviews, in the popular press in Colombia, and in other informal contexts.

[12]There are certain weaknesses apparent in such a model. First, the ethos outlined above is largely based on historic information about a once-rural people. In fact, Antioqueños are urbanizing rapidly. Medellín is Colombia's second largest city, with over one million inhabitants; and the whole Antioqueño cultural area now contains viable large cities and towns. The muleskinner ethos hardly applies to those Antioqueños who now occupy important positions in industry, commerce, the professions, and national government. In discussing Armenians, references will be to an urban population with strong ties to rural "roots" and to a prosperous hinterland.

Second, the model is not offered as a tightly empirical ethnographic framework. Instead, it is a stereotyping device for "characterizing" a people estimated at almost six million in 1972 (Serna Gómez, 1972:4).

Third, my information on Armenia and Quindío comes largely from having observed from an upper-social-sector and "professional" Colombian point of view, so observations may be more accurate for these social groups than for lower social sectors.

[13]Gómez Barrientos, an Antioqueño, goes to considerable lengths to establish the near-whiteness of Antioqueños generally, offering a whitening process—a preferential selection for lighter-skinned individuals—in mating among the three component races which make up Antioqueño ethnic stock (1972: 17-18).

[14]Another idea is offered by Zapata Olivella. On a 1979 television documentary on blacks in Colombia, he commented that Quindianos are white, being descendants of the final wave of Spanish immigrants into Antioquia who, not finding opportunity there, quickly migrated to the newly opening regions in the south. This account, however, does not coincide with careful observations by other sources.

[15]"Control" or dominant occupancy of public space may vary even by the hour, and that the same downtown corner in Armenia which seems so European at 5:30 p.m., when executives and office workers are leaving their offices, may seen very "mestizo" at 3 p.m. when the "whiter" elements are still at work and those who have more menial delivery or outdoor-type jobs are legitimately in the streets. (This concept is propounded for a Chicago neighborhood park by Suttles, 1969).

[16]Similarities between peasant and urban populations may be due in part to the fact that social differentiation among these descendants of colonists commonly is of recent origin. Many Armenians are only recently urban. Frequently they are descendants of muleteers, frontier farmers, and small merchants. Armenia's upper classes have a very shallow history.

[17]I asked several community leaders from low-income barrios, plus several social workers. Nobody apparently had conceived of their clients in these terms, and there was no hard data available on urban or rural origins of such people.

Several informants on low-class communities in Armenia informed me that, when the coffee harvest is on, the urban work force depletes substantially, totally stopping some construction projects. For an expert picker, coffee harvesting can pay as much as four times the daily wage of an urban worker. This also may be evidence of rural backgrounds of urban workers.

[18]Valencia Zapata suggests that it might have begun to disappear as a pattern about the time of the Violencia, in the late 1940s. During that period migrants from other areas, and especially the Santanders, became available for work crews on coffee farms in Quindío—at the same time when many farmers were fleeing the land with their families for the safety of the cities (personal communication, 1979).

[19]Many Armenians, faced with the prospect of taking a short trip for recreational or shopping purposes, prefer Cali or Bogotá to Medellín.

[20]The surliness of some workers, especially young ones, may be due to a heightened class consciousness; leftist

influences are ubiquitous in Colombia, operating through labor unions and other vehicles. The submissiveness which once characterized cross-class interactions by representatives of the lower classes was only very seldom observed; rather a defiant attitude, fiercely democratic, was generally taken.

[21]I knew several young women who had children out of marriage and who, if stigmatized at all by society, showed no evidence of shame or even concern over social reprecussions. Traditionally, women in such situations are shamed, while men are encouraged to be active sexually inside and outside marriage.

[22]That is, the tripartite scheme has been expanded into a nine-level scheme by subdividing each class into upper, middle, and lower. It may be that reality—or at least cognitive reality—of European and American societies has followed and adapted to the class scheme, rather than this scheme following strict empirically determinable reality.

[23]Lower-class individuals refer to themselves as "poor" or "working-class" rather than "lower-class."

[24]Upon further questioning, they also would find themselves to be of the upper or middle classes.

[25]I found some of the elements of Smith's "true" middle class present in Armenia in 1979—notably the willingness of educated, professional-level people to perform physical labor.

[26]Professionals—doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects, and university teachers—comprise parts of the classes from middle-middle up through the upper classes. As will become apparent from the context of the rest of this chapter, professional activity may be a sole source of income or be combined with other economic activity such as coffee farming.

[27]An unconfirmed report from an informant has it that Armenia has the highest per capita automobile population of any Colombian city. (In Colombia a very sorry used car costs at least $200,000 pesos, or around $4,000 U.S. dollars at the 1980 exchange rate.)

[28]There is marked contrast between the dour conservatism of coffee-wealthy landowners and the swashbuckling merchants.

[29]An amusing anecdote will illustrate this.

In 1978 and 1979 an embezzler operated very successfully in Armenia. Arriving in 1978 with no references, he was able to manipulate symbols, personal bearing, and cultural naunces so successfully that he was warmly received

into the upper class. In just months the man had gained people's confidence through sleight of hand in an automobile business. He sold cars at prices lower than factory outlets through careful juggling of accounts—borrowing, lending, and carefully repaying all his debts quickly, so as to create good faith among the economic community. With a prestigious and satisfied clientele, he was able to open vast lines of credit at most of the city's banks. He was considered a financial wizard, and esteemed for it. One day in 1979, with about forty million pesos in debts, consignemnts, down payments, and good-faith payments, he left Armenia, reportedly for Mexico.

His victimized creditors, when listed, read like a social register of Armenia. Several months later, the tangle of legal problems stemming from multiple claimants of automobiles had not been cleared up. The fact that Armenia's high society was so easily taken in by a man whose principal recommendations were his apparent vast wealth and business acumen is a powerful comment on the values of the city's upper classes' trust in prosperity as a manifestation of character. This openness, unusual in Colombian society, often has worked favorably for the Armenians and has allowed them to prosper more than many, more conservative populations in Colombia.

[30]Whiteford's strata were closely correlated with substantial data and interview material gleaned during extensive field study focussed specifically on this topic. Whereas Whiteford's angled lines represent differences in wealth and status internal to the classes and comparatively, between classes, my strata are not based upon such subtle study of the classes; my own are left horizontally parallel, and merely attempt to respect the proportions of social classes given in Table 4.

[31]Before well-intentioned laws forced landowners to abandon the compañía system of farming (a type of share-cropping whereby the owner paid for fertilizer, insecticides, and other capital costs and the mayordomo paid for occasional labor and food), mayordomos might pocket substantial amounts of money—one half the total sale value of the coffee crop.

[32]It should be noted, however, that former owners of small farms generally are able to demand substantial prices for their lands, and so do not come to the city with empty pockets—although as innocents in cities they are easily unencumbered of their possessions, especially cash.

CHAPTER VII
CITY POLITICS AND PLANNING: THE ROLE OF PERSONALISM

Politically, Armenia is run almost like a village. Most of the people of upper and upper-middle class know each other, and a very few of them hold political power. In fact, a single person is predominant on the Armenia political scene. This person is the Cacique, or political boss. Although Armenia has several political leaders cast in the boss mold, the Cacique stands preeminent over all the rest, having most of the qualities of the classical Latin American cacique.

Schmidt, in a comprehensive review of literature on the institution of the cacique, describes him as a broker affixed to patron-client relationships (1976:39). The basic patron-client relationship is a dyadic, or one-to-one, relationship of mutual aid, characterized by reciprocity, inequality of status, unequal access to resources, face-to-face contact, and complexity (1976:32-32). However, Schmidt borrows Wolf and Hansen's "stacking" of dyads, into what Schmidt calls a triad (1976:33). The triad consists of two, overlapping dyads with the middle agent being a patron of the lowest-status party and a client of the highest-status one. The middle party is a broker, called cacique or gamonal in Colombia. Schmidt's quote of former President Laureano Gómez is relatively accurate for Armenia's boss:

> The cacique is the mayor, or president of the municipal council, or municipal treasurer, or judge invested in that office which best suits his purpose, or which best allows him to share his preeminence with the cacique of the other party. He does not disguise his satisfaction of feeling himself to be "the owner of all this. . . ." (1976:37)

Armenia's boss does not have a counterpart of equal power in the other party, however, and his political rank is of a higher level than that suggested by Gómez, above. Armenia's boss is in fact closer to what Fals-Borda and Schmidt call a caudillo, which is really a higher-level political boss (Schmidt, 1976:38). For purposes of consistency with local (Armenia) usage, however, the personalist leader will be referred to as "Cacique."

The Cacique—let us give him the pseudonym of Dr. César—is a man of about fifty, a lawyer by profession. Dr. César's fortunes have risen with those of Armenia and Quindío; in fact they are directly linked. He entered politics as a student, and was active in the ranks of the Liberal party from the early 1950s on. As a young lawyer in Armenia he won a mayorship—an appointed position bestowed by the departmental governor in close consultation with active party membership—in 1958.

It is said that Dr. César is the "father" of the Department of Quindío. He led the separatist movement which won the formation of the new department in 1966. His efforts were rewarded when he was made the first governor, from 1966 to 1970. Since the end of his governorship,

Dr. César has been a senator of the Republic. Far from removing him from his power base in Armenia, this position is powerful and allows him to work in Bogotá for Quindío and yet to return frequently to Armenia to keep his political machine functioning.

Dr. César's political life has spanned three decades. Still relatively young, he already has held the governmental positions which a man of Armenia might hope to hold in a lifetime. But rather than allow himself to be retired or "cashiered," César now has consolidated his power. Formal positions are in many senses symbolic ones, fronts for larger and more occult interests. Dr. César now is more integrally involved in those occult interests, ones which boost presidents and select candidates for mayor and for governor.

National Centralism

The Cacique's position and his power may be comprehended better when they are viewed in juxtaposition to the Colombian political structure. Colombia is a strongly centralist country, a fact dating from the nineteenth century. During that century, especially the second half, traditional regional rivalries and mistrust between the two traditional political parties—the Conservatives and the Liberals—kept the nation in civil war much of the time. In 1886 a Liberal government, victorious after lengthy civil wars, imposed a

constitution establishing a centralized national government in order to hold the nation together. Still today, the government is structured in a curious way, tying together all levels of government in a tightly centralist system.

Colombians vote directly for the president, and the presidency is awarded on the basis of absolute majority of votes; there is no electoral college. The Congress consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate; members of both are elected by direct popular vote, for terms of four years. At the departmental level the legislature is a unicameral body, the Departmental Assembly. Deputies are elected to the Assembly every two years, by direct, majority vote. At the Municipal level the legislative body is called the Municipal Council—a unicameral body elected by direct, popular vote for periods of two years. These are the only government officials elected by the people of Armenia.

The centralist feature of the Colombian government knits these various levels tightly together. The president, in close consultation with his cabinet, personally selects all the departmental and territorial governors.[1] The governors then pick the mayors for all the municipios in their respective departments, each choice made in close consultation with local political parties and their machines. The mayors then select their own agency heads—or cabinets—in consultation with the new governor and the political parties. In this enormous spoils system, all the officials named at each



Figure 12
Scheme of Dr. Cesar's Power Base
(Indicating Applications of Influence at Critical Junctures)
(Arrows indicate points at which Dr. Cesar is influential in the selection of office-holders.)

level are considered to be part of the president's national government.

The people of Colombia thus formally place their greatest trust in the high national government functionaries. Executive authority is placed at the highest level; this power then flows back down through the system. The implications of this are great. The Armenia electorate has no direct voice in selecting the local executive officials. The local branch of the national political party which is successful in the presidential election can wield power—through influence in the selection of departmental and municipal executives and functionaries—which was never voted directly to it. Those executives and functionaries—governor, departmental cabinet, mayor, municipal cabinet—must work both for the government and for their political party. It is at the junctures where government consults political party that the caciques consolidate their local power.

The Senate as a Power Stance

It has been stated that senators are elected directly by popular vote for four-year terms in Bogotá. The formal role of the Senate is to legislate. But a senator may do much more, informally, outside his mandated governmental role. Taking Dr. César as an example, we may note a series of "shadow" functions. A senator who has backed the president in his campaign, using his own political machine

to deliver the vote, is in a strong position to be called in consultation in the naming of the governor for his home department. Although his personal choice may not be selected, certainly he has a hand in limiting the slate of candidates, and can exclude those who are political "enemies." The Senator has an even stronger voice in the selection of municipal mayors, departmental cabinet members, and municipal cabinet. (At this level, of course, it is much easier to influence much more roughly than in Bogotá.) For example, Dr. César is especially strong in Armenia, where his own power base lies.[2] He and his supporters were able to apportion sixty percent of all the spoils-controlled jobs. This is a dialectic process—the various parties dispute the positions until a satisfactory distribution formula is found. Through these appointments Dr. César activates his patron-client networks; favors are repaid, future cooperation is cemented, alliances are made, old alliances come apart. Placement of professionals who belong to his political group gives him an opportunity to reward their support and at the same time build a mechanism for influencing all decisions to be handled locally and regionally in the near future. The series of mutual obligations thus activated is most real. When discussing individual public functionaries, a politically informed Armenian will say matter of factly, "O, sí, él es de César" ("Oh, yes, he belongs to Cesar"). Politically appointed functionaries are considered a sort of personal property or fiefdom of the Cacique.

The Cacique is not an absolute tyrant. There is ample opposition to him: from sectors of the press he does not control,[3] from intelligent and articulate political opponents, and from fellow politicians at the national level. At points in his political career he has fallen from power, his machine failing to provide the support he needed for a commanding participation in political dealings[4]; conservative allies have abandoned him; political colleagues in the Senate have "betrayed" him and his ambitions. But Dr. César survives; he has not lost his senate seat since 1970, whatever his momentary stance was in Armenia.

A Cacique's Support in the Community

The manner in which a cacique establishes and holds power is closely tied to the social structure of the community which elects him to political office (in those instances, like Armenia, where the cacique in fact holds elective office). By reviewing quickly the extensive network of social statuses Dr. César holds in Armenia, and the devices whereby he maintains his position, it is possible to understand his "rootedness" and, ultimately, how such personalism in public office can affect the process of urban development.

Statuses

The term "status" is employed here with the meaning of "social position." An individual may hold more than one

status at a time, of course, and Dr. César holds various important statuses:

1) He is a senator.
2) He is of the political-professional-coffee growing upper class.
3) He is a wealthy coffee grower.
4) He is a member of an extended family of Antioqueño extraction; such a family can be drawn upon for various types of political support.
5) He is a member of the prestigious Club América.
6) He resides in one of the best neighborhoods of the city, in the north end.
7) He is a lawyer, member of the Armenia Bar Association.
8) He is the Cacique, known and referred to as such, even by friends and family.

By exercising roles associated with all these statuses, Dr. César constantly proves himself to be an important figure in the social structure. His statuses may be used to impress constituents, to legitimize bids for other high-level statuses, and to elicit support from others in the same status categories when common interests appear to be at stake. This broad status base enhances his political power.

Devices for Mobilizing Support

The series of status groups with which Dr. César maintains affiliation does not per se maintain him in national

office and local political prominence. A number of mechanisms are employed to operationalize this support.

1) "The Association." Dr. César maintains an undisclosed relationship with the local power group known as "The Association." He appears to be a political ally of this important economic nucleus, and seems to coexist with them by largely avoiding their sphere of influence.

2) The Cesarist Organization. Dr. César maintains a corps of able professionals allied with him for mutual benefit. He trains them, moving them through various functionary positions, and then rewards their fidelity with political appointments and contracts. They back him politically from their public and private positions.

3) Popular Support. As passionate supporters of the Cacique, large segments of the lower class are his real political base. They swell political rallies, shout vivas during speeches, and organize support for him at the ballots. These are his most abject clients; he rewards the most faithful with political favors, small grants-in-aid, and jobs in public administration.

4) Municipal Council. Selected by the Departmental Assembly, Dr. César was president of the Council in 1979. He controls several councillors' votes by affiliation, others by coalition. By controlling the agenda, he further influences matters dealt with by the Council.[5]

5) Redistribution of Scarce Resources. In a country where people have an abiding belief that the state can and should take care of their needs,[6] senators have certain discretionary funds to use in their departments in pork-barrel programs. Although the amounts involved generally are niggling, sums of $20,000 to $50,000 Colombian Pesos (U.S. $500. to $1,250) sound impressive to client groups.[7] Table 5 shows sample auxilios (grants-in-aid) won for Quindío community interests in 1979.

Dr. César also dominates the community action organization, Acción Comunal, whose neighborhood chapters win additional grants from the national government—provided they align politically with the Cesaristas.

6) Alliances. Dr. César often joins forces with one of the two Conservative factions in the city. This assures his hegemony over local politics and allows a minority faction some participation in governing and designing programs. In 1978, the Turbay administration had established a formula of sixty percent of spoils jobs for "officialist" Liberals and forty percent to be divided between the Conservative factions.[8]

Summary

This discussion of the ways a cacique manipulates a city's political forces is intended as an illustration of an institution sanctioned and patterned by culture—Colombian critics of the system notwithstanding.[7] Its wellsprings are

TABLE 5

PARLIAMENTARY GRANTS-IN-AID FOR QUINDIO IN 1979

Municipality	Recipient	Sum (pesos)
Armenia	Quindío Cattlemens' Committee (for purchase of a lot)	20,000
Armenia	Fireworks Technicians Syndicate	30,000
Armenia	Plantain Dealers' Syndicate	30,000
Armenia	Barrio Las Américas, for medical and social services	300,000
Armenia	Cultural Center for Barrio La Castilla	40,000
Armenia	The "Quindío Choral Group"	20,000
Calarcá	"Atanasio Girardot Elementary School	20,000
Armenia	The Parish of San Franscisco	100,000
Filandia	The Parish of Filandia	30,000
Génova	Fire Department	30,000
Calarcá	Junta for the Construction of the Fairground	1,000,000

Source: El Quindiano, September 22, 1979. My translation. Every seventh item was selected from a longer list, in the interest of providing a short but representative presentation.

"native" and the entire Colombian political system functions through such devices. They are ways of personalizing institutions. Dr. César is a generic political figure, and his case is used here as an illustration of the genre. Men like him, to greater or lesser degree, are to be found elsewhere in Armenia and in all sectors of the Colombian polity. What may be unique in his case is his special opportunity to have become "father of his department," a rare opportunity in contemporary times, and to reap the political gratitude and benefits which come from such occasions. He seems to have some charisma for sectors of the population as well as a vigorous machine. And in recent times there have been no political forces of sufficient vigor to balance him.

Dr. César (or, better, the institution of caciquismo he represents for our study of Armenia) serves as an unchartered bridge between two sectors of Colombian government, the executive and the legislative. He stands at a juncture which is not mandated in law—nominally each branch is independent of the other. Yet as caudillo, the highest-level broker for Armenia, he controls the "critical junctures" (Schmidt, 1976:39) between two branches of government and the voting public. He is instrumental in helping the president become elected, and thus earns the right to participate in the selection of the central chain of command.

He controls both appointed officials and, through them, much of the residual work force in the public sectors of Armenia and Quindío. The formal system is not structured intentionally for people like him to perform this function, but if this exchange of influence is not legally authorized, certainly it is authorized by custom.

In this system in which strong personal ties and allegiances are fostered, there is a steep social pyramid of socioeconomic classes with a closely knit upper sector which is almost unanimously involved in coffee production. The lack of significant diversification of the economy through industrialization, and the consequent lack of other sorts of economic elites and of a counterbalancing organized labor force, tightens the personalist nature of Armenia's social structure. There is a harmonious relationship of socioeconomic powers with political ones. Armenia's Cacique merely exploits his various statuses within this social system for personal political power. It would be difficult to imagine impersonal or "rational" political and organizational behavior in this sort of socioeconomic environment.

Analysis of political bossism is significant to our consideration of how urban development takes place in Armenia, in several ways. The boss in question, having infiltrated the political structure at all levels of government,

controls or influences what happens administratively in the city. Since urban planning and unplanned development take place in a highly politicized forum, this single individual has enormous control over them. He selects many of the planning officials. He and his organization set the tone of planning—what issues are addressed, what sorts of sanctions or incentives are offered for development, what items may be left aside. Although his control is not absolute—there have been municipal administrations completely free from his control—his influence during the research period in 1978 and 1979 was ubiquitous.

Notes

[1]In the case of the presidency of Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), the selection of governors was a painstaking process, with due care given to putting together a field of governors which included the delicate considerations of such matters as political affiliation (taking care to include Conservatives in his Liberal government in the exact proportion in which their candidate for president had received votes—forty percent); regional favorite sons; political favors owed by his campaign; competency to govern; likely loyalty to the national government. At several times during the first year of his government (1978-1979), Turbay several times called on his ministers and governors to shape up politically or resign.

[2]I repeat that "Dr. César" is being used here as an archetype. Other political leaders of much smaller factions also have a "right" to participation in the spoils system apportionment of mayors and other department level functionaries, according to the official formula (in 1978, 60/40 Liberal/Conservative). The Conservative party's forty percent, however, was split between two rival factions, while Dr. César was able to dominate all the sixty percent of the Liberals' spoils, despite the existence of other Liberal factions.

[3]One newspaper editorial attacked him on every point from his honesty to his haberdashery, and declared him a rude backwoods type, unfit to represent Armenia before the nation.

[4]He has not lost office, but his hegemony has been curtailed on the wider spectrum of local politics.

[5]In 1979 he actually avoided convoking the Council at all until the last possible moment, expecting that at that time urgent matters of budget approval would crowd a feared debate off the agenda altogether.

[6]This may not be such an unreasonable idea, given the relative indigency of most of the people and of most community treasuries, especially after heavy taxation by the central government.

In Quindío, furthermore, there is an abiding belief that the national government taxes coffee regions like theirs by multiply taxing coffee production—through income taxes and the forced selling by growers of their production at prices determined by the government-affiliated National Coffee Growers Federation; these prices are about half the export price (the other half goes to the government and the exporters). Since Quindío produces so much high-quality coffee (ten percent of all coffee produced in Colombia, according to Aguirre, 1979:34), local governmental and civic leaders feel that the government owes the department far more than is ever returned.

[7]Such clients are quickly disabused. Twenty thousand pesos would not even pay for a respectable fiesta for a neighborhood, for example, or the roofing materials for a small, one-room community center.

[8]This is a generous participation, reflecting the skimpy victory of Turbay over the Conservative candidate Betancourt. It also has had the effect of coopting the opposition.

Dix (1967) comments on the fact that in reality the unities among the upper classes are far more consistent than any ideological difference apparent at the political level. Political leaders are members of the same social clubs, the same professions, and sometimes the same extended families. True political fanaticism exists more at the levels of popular involvement, where politically motivated violence often occurs while the leaders of the factions involved maintain serene, friendly dialogue.

[9]Santa (1978), for example, is bitterly critical of the personalist Colombian political system.

CHAPTER VIII
PLANNERS AND DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS

The process of urban development in Armenia is a diffuse one. During the course of research it quickly proved a useless task to seek out only that which is specifically "urban planning." Armenia does have a Secretariat of Municipal Planning which is a principal focus of this chapter. Yet, as we shall see, the functions of this office are limited; seldom is there any opportunity for this agency to attack the issues of urban development aggressively, to plan imaginatively (or even competently) for the future.

Therefore, the focus of research was widened to include the broader concept of "urban development," wherein other agencies and interests which help to shape the physical city may be assessed. Following the physical orientation of urban development in Armenia,[1] development agencies and interests are discussed conjointly with those of planning to provide a knowledge of the cast of entities involved in Armenia's development forum.

This chapter looks at planners and developers in several ways. First, the numerous agencies and interests of planning and development are examined. Each is described with its major attributes and primary missions in the planning field.

Municipal, departmental, and national interests are discussed. (Table 6 is a condensed scheme of these organizations for comparison at a glance.) Second, a profile is given of the planners as a group: their backgrounds, the sporadic nature of their involvement in planning, and their impact as planners. Finally, several composite career patterns in planning are given, using fictitious planners as examples.

Agents of Planning and Development

The following list of agencies and interests comprising Armenia's development universe was not found in a single, master scheme. There is a lack of formal coordination of development efforts, although nexi are maintained which allow all the involved agencies, institutions, and individuals to interact in the process (see Chapter IX for this format). The network had to be revealed by tracing the ties among components—that is, those ties informants remembered or would admit, or which could be discerned from other contexts—and then reassembling them from field notes.

Municipal Public Agencies

Secretariat of Municipal Planning and Technical Services. This is Armenia's official planning agency, for both urban and rural portions of the municipality. As nominal center of formal city planning, this agency was a principal point of focus during the research; it is treated here in more detail than some other agencies.

Municipal Planning, as it is called informally in Armenia, is a centralized organ of municipal government.[2] This means that it answers directly to the mayor. Like most planning offices anywhere, its functions are more technical and administrative than executive. Municipal Planning's formal functions are set forth in a recent legal document, Municipal Law No. 07 of March 13, 1978. Under Article 4, this law establishes the functions of the planning office as the following:

1) To perform economic, social, physical and administrative research and analysis for formulating municipal development policy.

2) To develop a General Development Plan to be presented to the mayor for consideration by the Municipal Council. (Note that the planners submit their work through the mayor's office).[3]

3) To establish norms for urban development (which means physical development matters like building).

4) To prepare, in conjunction with the secretariat of the Treasury, the proposed budget for the municipality. (Municipal Planning employs one of the few economists in municipal government service.)

5) To review and coordinate plans from the national, regional, departmental, and municipal levels of government, to make sure that they are feasible and fit the existing municipal development plans.

6) To aid the other municipal agencies with their programs and plans (with the consent of the mayor).

7) To perform social cost-benefit analysis on the plans and projects referred to in item 6, to determine whether they should be included in the budget submitted to the Municipal Council.

8) To coordinate plans and programs of municipal development with those of other municipalities, with the intention of furthering regional and subregional development.

9) To analyze and issue permits for new urban developments (single homes and entire suburbs) and for subdivision of urban lands; and to make recommendations about these projects for consideration by the Planning Board.

10) To prepare statistics, in coordination with the National Department of Statistics (DANE), which the *municipio* must supply, and determine what systems should be employed.

The planning office normally provides more limited services than these. Limited trained personnel, low budget, and short duration of each head planner's tenure limit the office's fulfillment of its charter. Instead, Municipal Planning's primary functions are the establishment of building norms and their enforcement, zoning, approval of new construction, and other day-to-day operations. The required coordination with other municipal agencies is done intensively through the person of the head planner, although the

content of consultation may be more political than technical. Required statistical functions are few; data are generated solely from standard questionnaires filled in by builders and developers soliciting permission to build. In 1978 a development plan for 1978-1998 was prepared in coordination with other municipal agencies, but the municipal administration—including the head of Municipal Planning—changed before it could be submitted to the Municipal Council for adoption.

Municipal Planning is divided into four sections. The Secretary's office consists of the Secretary and his secretary-receptionist. The head of the Division of Norms and Design rules on the acceptability of plans and blueprints submitted for approval; two draftsmen and two topographers work for this functionary, who necessarily is an architect. The Socio-Economic Division advises on fiscal matters and generates social and economic data for specific problems; the head of this division normally is a sociologist or economist, and is assisted by a secretary-statistician. The Division of Physical Control is the branch which supervises the quality of building in Armenia. Consisting of a professional (in 1979 there was an architect, followed by a civil engineer in this position), a secretary, and four inspectors, this agency patrols the city for violations of building codes and provides Municipal Planning's "eyes and ears" on the street.

TABLE 6

PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

Agency	Cent.	Decent.	Other	Local Contr.	Own Funds	Local Coord.	Plan. Funct.	DeFacto Pl. Fun.	Tech. Serv.
Municipal Planning	x			x		x	x	x	x
Public Utilities		x		x	x	x		x	x
Centenary Lottery		x		x	x	x		x	
EDUA			x	semi	x	semi		x	
Departmental Planning	x			x		x	x	x	x
CRQ		x			x	semi		x	x
National Planning	x						x	x	
ICT		x		semi	x	semi		x	x
BCH			x	semi				x	

Note: Cent. = centralized agency; Decent. = decentralized agency; Other = agency neither centralized nor decentralized; Local Contr. = agency controlled locally; Own Funds = agency which controls and/or generates its own operating budget; Local Coord. = agency which coordinates its activities with other agencies in Armenia; Plan. Funct. = agency has expressly mandated planning functions; DeFacto Pl. Fun. = agency enters into informal or nonsanctioned planning activities, or otherwise affects planning; Tech. Serv. = agency provides planning or development-related technical services.

As all municipal agencies in Armenia, Municipal Planning is governed by a board of directors, in this case the Municipal Planning Board. The board consists of other agency heads and a representative of the Municipal Council; it is chaired by the mayor. This is the executive office of Municipal Planning, which makes formal recommendations and decisions. There is a technical committee, ancillary to the Planning Board, which makes recommendations concerning technical planning issues.

As an angry city planner wrote to the mayor in 1979, the Municipal Planning office mostly functions as a "police station" to watch over the developers, and lacks an authoritative city plan which would give the office a logical set of guidelines to orient city growth.

Valorización Municipal (Municipal Valuation). Municipal Valuation, or "Valorización" as it is informally called, is Armenia's chapter of an important Colombian institution. It is a public municipal institution whose purpose is to finance municipal public works through assessment of a sort of tax on beneficiaries of each project they build.[4] Valorización seems to have its origin in the Marxist concept of surplus value (plusvalía, in Spanish)—the excess value of something beyond what it costs to produce. Valorización attempts to recapture for the municipality the increase in value which accrues to private properties because of publicly financed infrastructure which is placed near them. This

added value is considered unearned, and often is large: for example, the resale value of a man's house might increase twofold if the street in front of it were paved. Such assessments on private beneficiaries are really an enabling process for financing public works.[5]

Valorización does not actually tax the added value Instead it recoups the cost of the project. For any project, beneficiaries are taxed within a zone of influence figured by an elaborate formula which assesses differentially according to nearness to the project. Shared among many beneficiaries, the cost of most projects is not too high, and many benefit. Public infrastructure is provided without government's having to pay for it. (Were the state to have to pay, many projects would go unbuilt.)

Valorización has a long record of accomplishments since its founding in 1943. It has been a true action agency for Armenia (again, probably because it pays its own way). Some of the more important projects include the construction of the Avenida Bolívar, beginning about 1958; the widening, straightening, and paving of the highway to the airport at El Edén, sixteen kilometers away, in 1954; remodeling of most of the city's parks; the construction of Avenida 19, a major north-south artery; widening of many downtown streets; and the paving of many, if not most, of the streets in outlying barrios.

Valorización is a decentralized agency of municipal government. It has its own capital and a degree of autonomy from the mayor's office. (The mayor, however, freely selects and removes the head of Valorización, and sits on the board of directors.)

Although Valorización's own small planning office was discontinued in 1975, the agency still has important planning-related functions in the designing and building of physical infrastructure. Valorización's director works in close coordination with the head of Municipal Planning.

The component divisions of Valorización are the directorate, a small executive office; a technical division, which designs the projects; a legal office to handle the legal implications of the large projects; an auditor's office; and a financial section (a grade below a "division" because of lower level of training of its head) which handles the billing and collection of the assessments. Valorización has a large number of personnel due in large part to its financial transactions.

In 1979 Valorización was temporarily in economic straits due to unproductive investment in the Quindío Overlook project (see the case study in Chapter X). Because the project was postponed indefinitely, there were no beneficiaries to be taxed. Millions of pesos are tied up in the lands Valorización purchased, and the agency must make large interest payments regularly.

Public Utilities (EPA). Public Utilities is Armenia's provider of public services. It is a decentralized agency—like Valorización—and owns most of the utilities in Armenia: telephones, electricity, water, and sewerage. But Public Utilities must provide these services for the entire city with delivery systems which are inadequate and for which funds for repair and replacement are not available. For example, Armenia has only 7,000 telephone connections, and the entire system is outdated. Public Utilities is able to generate enough electricity to meet the burgeoning demands of a city which has grown dramatically in a short period.[6] Much of the power is purchased from Hydroelectric Corporation of Caldas, and more could be purchased if Armenia's lines and substations could handle it. (As a result, many sections of Armenia are without electricity for many hours each day.)

A similar situation prevails with water service. Treatment plants are old and were built to handle much smaller volumes of water than they now are called upon to treat. One expert considers the water unhealthy: inadequately treated and having a high bacteria count. Parallel water lines distribute water inequitably to various parts of the city. Some barrios are said to have water only for two hours daily—in the middle of the night. Utilities functionaries are concerned over the insufficiencies but do not see short-range solutions at hand.[7]

Along with Municipal Planning and Valorización, Public Utilities is one of the most important agencies in city planning. Although governed by a junta including the directors of Municipal Planning and Valorización and subject to checks on its operations, it operates in areas of de facto planning. It has its own diminutive (one-person) planning office. Public Utilities is big enough and powerful enough to affect the development of Armenia through its decisions as to where to place new systems of infrastructure.[8]

Public Utilities has many technical and financial departments.[9] Personnel include many young professionals—generally engineers—who direct technical divisions. There are numerous field personnel, maintenance personnel, inspectors, and construction workers. A large number of cashiers and accountants handle a complex billing operation for all municipal services (bills are delivered house-to-house by messengers on foot).

The Centenary Lottery. The Centenary Lottery, a decentralized municipal agency, is a special-purpose institution created in 1963 to finance "the construction of works which embellish the city to national prominence, in commemoration of its centenary" (Alcaldía de Armenia, 1978:97). It never runs its own lottery, but derives its funds from a percentage of the earnings of the national Christmas Lottery (Sorteo Extraordinario de Navidad). The Lottery has administrative autonomy and an independent budget.

The Lottery has had difficulty developing suitably important projects which can be carried out before the centenary in 1989. Under a Conservative administration in 1977-1978, the Lottery was committed to finance the Centenary Stadium; it funded feasibility studies and other initial works, but a change in municipal administration caused the demise of the stadium project (see case study, Chapter X). In December, 1979, the Lottery was planning to build a large apartment complex on land it owns in the Quindío Overlook. At the same time Lottery officials were considering altering the mission of the Lottery, to that of a catalyst agency to generate and aid in many municipal programs.

Internal problems have affected the Lottery also. One has been the discontinuity of administrators (which, of course, affects all municipal agencies but affects the Lottery especially, since major projects require long-term serious commitment to them). Another—related to the first—is the discontinuity of the thinking of city administrations and municipal goals. With its independent yearly income from nonmunicipal sources, the Lottery is one of the municipality's major financial resources and has been used as the proverbial "piggy-bank": a petty cash fund for non- or underbudgeted projects. Finally, Lottery officials fear that time is expiring without the agency's being able to provide the required projects.

The personnel of the Centenary Lottery are few. In 1979 there were four persons, including the manager and an architect. The manager is selected by the mayor and may be removed by him at any time.

Urban Development Enterprises of Armenia (EDUA). EDUA is an unusual public agency. It is Armenia's chapter of a semiprivate, semipublic agency established in several cities by the Ministry of Development in 1976. Its mission is to promote and facilitate urban development and redevelopment within the guidelines of the national urban development plan.[10]

Not being a city agency, EDUA has a relative degree of autonomy. It is authorized to buy and sell properties, to construct new buildings and complexes or to contract for their construction with private companies, and to promote sectoral development within city areas. It may act as a broker in the selling of municipally-owned properties, avoiding much red tape and a complicated bid system. This role of expeditor of city development is EDUA's principal function; it is designed to be more agile than normal governmental agencies.

Three shareholders own EDUA. The national government is represented by the local office of ICT, a dependent of the Ministry of Development; substantial Central Mortgage Bank funding is administered for EDUA by the ICT. The second stockholder is the Municipality of Armenia, represented on

the board of directors by the mayor. The third stockholder is the Centenary Lottery. The Municipality thus has two of the three votes on the EDUA board, so control of the agency is local. The fortunes of EDUA have been complicated by city politics. (See the case study in Chapter X for an account of how the stockholders have taken away EDUA's banner project, the Quindío Overlook). Without support of its stockholders, EDUA's full potential as an agile, funded agency capable of coordinating ungainly municipal bureaucracies has yet to be realized.

The EDUA has a small staff, consisting of the director, an architect, an accountant, and two secretaries. Because the directorship is not tied to municipal administrations, it is relatively more stable, and may provide continuity over periods of several years.

Departmental Public Agencies

The departmental level of state government plays a very small part in Armenia's urban development—notwithstanding the fact that the departmental planning office stands in hierarchical relationship to Municipal Planning.

Departmental Planning. This agency stands hierarchically between Municipal Planning and National Planning. It is responsible for providing planning for the entire area of Quindío, including both rural and urban areas. However, it does not directly administer the urban areas of Armenia,

Calarcá, and Circasia, all of which have their own planning offices.

Departmental Planning does receive a periodic report from Armenia's Municipal Planning office. One would expect a strong exercize of the hierarchy, but this is not the case: instead the relationship is one of colleagues. For example, in 1979 the head of Departmental Planning sent a draft of the proposed new departmental building code to the head of Municipal Planning for a critical reading. Planners at Municipal Planning had already struggled with the writing of such a code and indeed had a good understanding of the format and process. The city of Armenia has engaged in some type of planning for over fifty years, and experience is likely the reason that the departmental office does not try to hold the city office subject in matters of planning.

The Autonomous Regional Corporation of Quindío (CRQ) The CRQ is a regional development corporation whose jurisdiction includes the entire Department of Quindío. It has no direct jurisdiction in Armenia[11] except for the watersheds—the green arroyos which carve up the topography of the city. These areas fall under CRQ's jurisdiction as part of that agency's responsibility for water and other natural resources. Quindío has scarce water sources, and now there is a concerted effort to maintain steep creek banks in forest, and to replant those areas which have been denuded in the past. Any filling of ravines with watercourses, and

any cutting of trees or guadua, must be previously approved by the CRQ.

The CRQ has a large staff due to its large-scale operations in the department (its initial function was to effect the rural electrification program, which now is largely completed, and which still is administrated by CRQ). The directorship is a position which, although nominees are derived politically, does not change with departmental administrations. A functionary who performs satisfactorily may last for five years or so. The CRQ is a dependency of the National Planning Department (DNP).

National Public Agencies

By and large, national agencies do not act directly in Armenia. They are more important in determining national urban philosophies within the constraints of which national funding and other aids become available to the municipalities. For example, during 1979 Armenia's administrations functioned within the "Cities within the City" program of the National Planning Department in the administration of President Pastrana (1970-1974) and the city development ideas of President López' (1964-1978) administration, set out in a global policy entitled "To Close the Breach." Both programs have their origins in Currie's Four Strategies, from the 1960s.

Department of National Planning (DNP). The DNP, the national planning office, headquartered in Bogotá, has

little to do with Armenia and Municipal Planning directly. Municipal Planning submits a periodic report to National Planning, but interaction does not go beyond this. (Even a previous service provided to municipalities has been discontinued: roving teams of DNP planning experts which visited municipalities to help them improve their planning techniques.)

National Planning generally is not active in most Colombian cities except in special projects; instead, it functions at a macro, national level, studying trends in growth and devising the planning philosophies of each presidential administration.

National Urban Housing Institute (ICT). This national public housing authority is a large national agency active in most urban centers, including smaller ones. The ICT's principal service is the construction of low-cost housing which is sold to low-income families on favorable credit terms, with financing over fifteen or twenty years.[12] The ICT also is used as an instrument of Colombian government housing policy in other areas. For example, in Armenia, ICT (which is a centralized dependency of the Ministry of Development) has administered the EDUA and was instrumental in its establishment; similarly, ICT coordinated the PHIZSU, a project for upgrading substandard urban neighborhoods in Armenia. Armenia's local ICT office collaborates with municipal planning efforts in various ways;

for one, the head of ICT sits on the Municipal Planning Board as an invited observer.

The ICT has built a substantial portion of Armenia since its establishment there in the 1940s. As of 1978, ICT had built thirty-eight barrios and had collaborated with various agencies on five other housing programs. Including the first stage of Barrio Yulima, which was under construction in 1978, this totals 7,108 houses.[13]

The agency has been criticized for the haphazard way in which it has built its barrios. The practice has been to seek lots for development which are both level and low in price, which normally means farmland on the periphery of the city. This has accentuated the finger-like pattern of growth—in nodes along ridges extending out from the city center, often hopping areas of farmland which thus become "urban." For over thirty years ICT has been the dynamic force in pushing Armenia's growth into the southwesterly fan, an area comprising roughly one-third of the city's total area (see Figure 8).

The ICT has been criticized nationally for not focusing its housing programs on the neediest sector of the Colombian society. This stems in part from the fact that ICT funds are considered "seed money" and must be recovered; housing programs therefore are aimed at income groups which can guarantee repayment. Recent thinking has been that ICT should concentrate on lower classes and leave the middle

and lower-middle income groups to such agencies as EDUA and UPAC lending programs.

Armenia's ICT office is a relatively large organization. The director is selected from among local building professionals, but answers to the national ICT; his tenure is not linked to municipal administrations, although it does reflect changes in presidential administrations. The ICT in Armenia has technical, financial, and social work divisions. Housing currently is contracted with private developers, with ICT designing the housing and overseeing the construction of the projects.

Central Mortgage Bank (BCH). The BCH was not studied during the research, but as the principal national lending institution for housing it plays an important role in determining what sort of housing may be built. The BCH was important in the development of the Barrio 7 de Agosto (see case study, Chapter X).

Interest Groups

The Society of Architects. The Society of Architects is Armenia's chapter of the Colombian architects professional association. It functions to promote the interests of architects as a group and as individuals. The Society occasionally takes formal, official positions on public issues of interest to the building trade and the community—especially areas of urban development. In fact, as part of the national charter of this organization it is established

as an official consultative body to the nation and to municipal governments. Supposedly it is called upon to take part in deliberations on urbanistic and design issues.[14,15]

The Society of Architects has an office in Armenia, staffed in 1979 by a full-time secretary/receptionist. There was a director and a board of officers. Officers mostly are young persons who have been active as architects for ten years or less. The relative youth of active members may limit the Society's effective influence on the city planning establishment. (This is more remarkable in light of the fact that most of the officers in December, 1979, had been functionaries of the municipality in the recent past, and included one former director of Municipal Planning. This may attest to the fact that young professionals are considered by many to be pawns rather players in the Armenia power scheme.)

The Society of Engineers. The Society of Engineers is the engineers' counterpart to the Society of Architects. Like architects, engineers are powerful and active in urban development in Armenia—as individuals. But their professional organization traditionally has been more active and more united as a group than the former. The organization appears to function more as a social organization than to promote professional interests (although I did not view this group closely).[16] The active membership, unlike the architects' society, includes many mature professionals—both as members and as officers.

One instance of the engineers' participation in an urban development project as a collectivity was noted: the Society provided a professional opinion as to the best of the several proposed sites for the construction of the Centenary Stadium in 1977 (although some later wanted to recant the selection, apparently for political reasons) (see case study, Chapter X).

The Colombian Builders' Association (CAMACOL). The CAMACOL is the Armenia branch of the national association of building interests: builders, suppliers of building materials, and real estate companies. It promotes the interests of the industry before national and local government, provides training seminars on aspects of construction, does formal studies on aspects of building, analyzes and studies governmental projects under consideration for law or already established, provides members with up-to-date statistical information on the industry, and issues various publications. On a few occasions in Armenia, the organization has been able to provide special supplies of scarce building materials—such as cement, which has to be brought from other departments and frequently is rationed by distributors who speculate in price—at nominal prices for members.

Individuals or organizations may affiliate with CAMACOL. As of November, 1979, there were seventy-two members in the Armenia chapter. In addition there is a permanent office with a full-time director and a small staff.

Armenia's chapter of CAMACOL was founded in 1978. Its members do not represent the entire construction industry of Armenia, which is sizeable. In fact, the directorship is selective as to who is allowed to affiliate. At present CAMACOL, still in its formative stage, is not powerful in Armenia. But CAMACOL is highly regarded nationally, and that prestige seems to accrue to the Armenia chapter almost gratuitously. The organization brings together a wide range of interests in the building trade, and could become a powerful factor in city development in the future.

Association of Construction Technicians. The Association of Construction Technicians is a guild-like association of master builders, an upper-level blue collar group, which promotes the interests of this sector of construction labor. It is chartered nationally, and the Armenia chapter was organized in the 1950s.

There are several principal interests. One is professional solidarity; these builders back each other up when building contracts are scarce—as in 1979—and when misfortune befalls a member. Second, they defend collective interests through petitions to local and national government, and offer opinions on important issues affecting the construction industry. Another very important function is the inscription of members before the national and municipal governments (a function the government has given them).

Master builders are laborers who have risen through the guild system (through a mechanism which was not clear to

me). Many are prosperous and operate as small contractors or as subcontractors for established professional (engineers or architects) builders. They have been so successful during the recent building boom of the mid-1970s in underbidding the mentioned professionals that they have cut into their business (although in fact master builders were on the scene in Armenia and in most of Colombia long before university-trained builders were available). Apparently as a result, master builders were required to be licensed by the national government before a 1979 deadline, and are legally limited to the budget (which, of course, determines structure size) with which they may work. At the same time the government is requiring some university training and generally higher qualifications for any new master builders to become licensed.

The Association of Construction Technicians has its seat in a building which is being built by members of the organization in their spare time. (The building is of three stories and contains office space, a large meeting hall, a classroom area, and commercial locations for rent downstairs.) The president and board of officers is elected each year.

The degree of power exercized in Armenia by the master builders seems minimal. They have made offers to various mayors and city planners to participate in city development matters, with no takers. This is unfortunate, since these men are well trained builders with a sense of the history

of the city's construction (they have constructed much of Armenia themselves).

"The Association". "The Association" is an informally associated interest group, consisting of a very few individuals of upper-class social status and considerable wealth. Among them they hold major areas of urban land, coffee interests, and dominion over the major institutions of the city. They control banks, commerce, construction interests, and segments of politics. Around the small nucleus of individuals are arrayed other influential individuals in what have been described as concentric spheres of influence. Some influentials are in spheres closer to the nucleus; others are farther from it. Thus "The Association" influences Armenia in several ways. They directly control large parts of it; and through friendships, alliances, and subtle and unsubtle vassalage control a much larger area of influence. It is most difficult to accomplish anything in Armenia in the areas of banking, commerce, or construction (or in areas influenced by them) without the assent of "The Association" which often gives or withholds it through its agents. A large number of professionals and semiprofessionals exist on the periphery of this group of influentials, receiving small contracts as prizes for faithfulness or obedience. Other focal points of power—for example, Dr. César—exist independent of "The Association," with mutual understandings between them and symbiotic relations worked out.

With such substantial influence in Armenia, it is apparent that this group must have ties at many levels to the other institutions discussed in this chapter, and to the structures and processes discussed elsewhere. Because of the nebulous nature of this group, and because of dangers I sensed in approaching it too closely during the research, the exact degree of this permeation remains unmeasured. It is certain that they are central to the movement to establish a new development pole south of the city, discussed in the Centenary Stadium case study, in Chapter X.

Other private interests. There are multiple smaller interests which may at times influence city development; many are builders or building companies. Others are professionals, such as the engineer Montoya in the Centenary Stadium case study (Chapter X). Most have organized means of promoting their interests, such as CAMACOL or the professional societies. The most effective participation in urban development, however, is won through personal and political contacts with the formal (i.e., political parties and governmental leaders) and informal ("The Association," for example) power structures. The most important contracts are awarded through the bidding process—and nevertheless go consistently to a handful of building companies and contractors.

A private citizen concerned about a matter of city development which might affect his property's value may deal

directly with a public official, especially if the former is of upper- or upper-middle-class standing. Lower classes might use a sponsor, or patron, to arrange a meeting with the official in question, or else trust their case to an intermediary.

Citizens with an altruistic concern for development issues commonly associate for greater impact—as in the cases of "Friends of Armenia," the "Society for Public Betterment," or, marginally, organizations like the Garden Club (which strives for the pulchritude of the city's more visible areas). Many individuals may work through the other organizations described here to correct or address issues of concern. Loners may recur to the press for a forum.

The Catholic Church

The Catholic Church is emerging quietly as an important agent of urbanization in Armenia, through the provision of communal do-it-yourself housing programs for the poor. The first program was the construction of several houses in Barrio Los Quindos—an ICT barrio, although this program was not in association with ICT.[17] Later a strip of housing was built beside Barrio Zuldemaida. In mid-1979 a coffee farm next to Barrio Zuldemaida (and across the street from the planned ICT Barrio Calima) was purchased by the Diocese for the purpose of building the first large-scale, church-sponsored barrio built in Armenia by do-it-yourself projects; that is, the people who are to benefit from the housing do

the actual construction of the units themselves, working in teams. Plans are provided by the Church.

This is a new policy of the Church. The entire program has centered on the activities of a single parish priest in Barrio Los Quindos.

The impact of this new church program cannot yet be assessed, although it clearly is filling a need in an area in which official entities have not been able to do enough. In this sense it will wrest opportunities from established builders,[18] although it should be a welcome complement to agencies like ICT. Official reaction to the Church's involvement was not registered, beyond noting the governor's acknowledgment in a newspaper article on the program, that it is an important contribution to the housing shortage's solution.

The Press

Although the press is not involved directly in urban development, it is important as a gadfly. Here, "press" is taken to include both the printed media and the "spoken press"—in the Armenia context, radio, since there is no local television station.

Given the size of the city, newspapers are surprising in their number—at least six regular publications[19]—and field of opinion. Opinion ranges politically from strictly ideological sheets like Batalla Liberal (literally, the "Liberal Battle"), which is the formal organ of the leftist faction of

Liberal Party, to the Diario del Quindío (the Quindío Daily--which comes out every three days), an uncritical mouthpiece for the departmental and municipal governments of whatever political persuasion, to the cantankerous El Quindiano (The Quindian), which takes an oppositionist position to the Cacique-oriented Liberal faction but seems independent and circumspect on most civic issues. In my view the Quindiano and Satanás (both weeklies) and occasional columns in the Dairio del Quindío offer useful comment on the city's growth, on apparent directions of public policy, and on both open and covert personal interests on the parts of individuals in city government and urban development. Background information on current policy is given frequently, and hints and innuendo occasionally are employed in supposedly allegorical opinion features when direct statement of information would be libellous or when evidence is insufficiently hard to warrant outright statements of fact. (Such items generally are unsigned.)

Such journalistic procedure titillates, but it damages the credibility of other items in the press. For example, El Quindiano repeatedly was used to embarrass both Secretaries of municipal planning in 1979. Editorializing is overly preachy, and no Armenia newspaper or radio news program may be credited with total objectivity in reporting the news.

The impact of radio may be stronger than that of newspapers, since it reaches segments of the population which cannot—or do not, habitually—read the press.[20] Armenia radio stations commonly have political alliances. One, in fact, "belongs" to the Cacique. The local radio talk show is "Habla Armenia" ("Armenia Speaks"), a phone-in, listener participation show emceed by a self-styled "champion of the people." This man hears complaints by listeners over the telephone and, if the complaints seem important, immediately telephones the entity complained about and asks for explanation or redress over the air. Despite the emcee's egotistic mannerisms his show has the largest audience of any daytime radio show, and it is listened to in government offices as well as in homes.[21,22]

News media are important in urban development, especially insofar as they serve or attack the political structure. Media inform and channel public opinion as to what the events, issues, and options are. This impact is ignored by nobody in the urban political and urban development spheres. Various governmental entities used the media in 1979. Some officials had direct recourse to news reporters who would print stories as delivered to them; thus they used the press for public relations, promoting both planning issues and personal careers. Municipal government used the Diario del Quindío to publicize its news bulletins and minor news items, but both departmental and municipal governments preferred

to make their major statements through La Patria, a Conservative daily published in Manizales and distributed throughout the Old Caldas region. The Armenia correspondent for that paper seemed to be a "pocket journalist" for the two governments, and published government news releases almost verbatim, instead of providing critical coverage of news. The Manizales newspaper seems to be considered of higher status than local papers, perhaps because of its dignified daily format and its region-wide circulation.[23]

Politicians

Both Dr. César and other politicians are powerful within the scope of urban development. As has been amply illustrated, Dr. César is influential in city development process in several ways. First, he places and influences many municipal authorities; in 1979 the Mayor, the head of Valorización, the head of Public Utilities, and the head of Municipal Planning were widely known to be political friends of the Cacique. Second, as president of the Municipal Council he influenced the making of municipal law. Third, from the Senate he was instrumental in arranging a flow of resources back to Armenia from the central government. Fourth, he enters into alliances with other local political leaders, which wins a broader base for support of his projects (and also allows more significant participation of political leaders of smaller factions who are willing to be coopted).

Other politicians operate in analogous ways to Dr. César's, with an important difference of scale. Most command only a small number of positions in the spoils system, and find it necessary to work with Dr. César to at least some degree.

Examples of how Dr. César, in coalition with other politicians, affected urban development in Armenia are abundant throughout this dissertation. Mention of a few here should suffice to illustrate the point. Physical infrastructure permitting further development was placed in the south of the city. Dr. César strove to thwart the placement of the Monument to Effort in the Plaza de Bolívar—a reminder of a Liberal opponent's governship at a time when his own power was at an ebb. And the binding contract between Armenia and the national sports program COLDEPORTES manuevered the city into a legal obligation to abandon the Centenary Stadium site and build any new sports facility on the site preferred by the *Cacique*'s political faction.

A Profile of Planners

Who are the *planners* within this system? That is, who is responsible for providing the professional expertise on matters of urban development? Who advises and informs the politically-oriented decision-makers at the municipal level?

Backgrounds: A "Pool" of Planners

"Planners" in the formal sense of specially trained urban planners with university degrees in that field, or

extensive field experience, is not a useful concept to guide this inquiry. There are only two or three university departments of urban planning in Colombia, all of which are fairly new. Their graduates seldom find work in cities like Armenia. Rather, the medium-sized cities tend to employ economists, architects, and engineers as planners.[24]

One informant gave as the reason for the dearth of trained planners in city planning the lack of tenure in planning positions. If a young person were to study for a degree in planning and then return to Armenia, he or she could not count on getting a job at once, and there are no planners employed outside the public sector. The wait for a first job in planning could be quite long, and would not end until the essential political links could be established. Were a job to be acquired, it would be of short duration. The term any public official may expect to hold office in municipal government is a maximum of two years, and usually less.[25] (Municipal government commonly changes administrations one or two times per year.) In any government turnover, chances for retention in one's post are slight, and for the agency heads—such as head of planning—almost nonexistent.[26,27] After the term of office had expired, Armenia would no longer be a fruitful place to seek work as a planner; and other cities like Armenia also would not be good prospects since all smaller cities like to "hire their own."

A professional trained in a classical profession, however, could return to one of the relatively more abundant situations for them in the private sector.

It is necessary to seek more widely to identify the "city planners" of Armenia. As this study hopefully illustrates, many agencies participate in planning and development; discussing all their functionaries as potential planners will allow a better concept of who plans Armenia.

Planning functionaries are drawn from an informal pool of educated citizens who from time to time are "tapped" to help run one agency or another. Commonly these people are architects, engineers, or economists. Many are able and adaptable, as one would need to be to manage a typical shuttle from Public Works to Municipal Planning to mayor with any aplomb.

The number of professionals who may become involved with municipal government in this fashion is hard to determine. The number "eligible" might be approximated by summing the memberships of the professional organizations of architects, engineers, and economists, who would total several hundred individuals. In practice, the pool may be considerably smaller, with principal constraints of politics and age operant in reducing the number.

Individuals eligible for planning jobs should be affiliated with important political figures (which entails a decision to join an active faction of the Liberal or

Conservative parties) or else be politically neutral.[28] Decisions to join one party or another may be based on family tradition, personal ideological conviction, or perceived relative advantage.[29] Functionaries may not truly share the political convictions of their sponsors.

Age is a de facto constraint of planning functionaries. Functionary positions tend to be filled by younger professionals, including people just graduated from university. It seems that youth and inexperience are compensated by their relative lack of autonomy to act without orders from political and hierarchical leaders. Such positions often are used to groom promising young professionals for higher positions in party or government. The tendency to hire younger professionals reportedly is fairly new; several decades ago public officials were older persons.

More mature persons—in their forties and fifties—are sometimes found in functionary-level positions; the second municipal administration of 1979 had several such functionaries, all of whom had seen prior service in municipal government. But one reason that more of the city's mature professionals are not active in public administration is that many have more lucrative activities stemming from their private practices. They are not eager to hold government positions, which frequently pay much less than their private practices. Those older professionals who do participate in government are called upon to fill positions at the

secretarial (agency head) levels of city and departmental government; their acceptance often has more to do with personal and party allegiances than with any need for employment. The more successful ones may be called upon to serve as mayor (although the mayor also often is young) or governor, or to fill a position in national government in Bogotá; the latter positions enhance professional stance and seldom are refused.[30]

Motives

The pool of professional functionaries available for municipal service includes persons with several motivations for taking such work.

Many are simply eager, or desperate, for work. Armenia is a closed market for new professionals, who must establish clienteles over time, through social and political networks. Many, after struggling to complete their university degrees despite poverty, find themselves without a base for acquiring jobs or contracts (as independent builders, for example).

In Armenia as in Colombia generally, people tend to look to government to provide employment opportunities. Municipal salaries in Armenia are considered good, ranging in 1979 from around $17,000 to $30,000 pesos monthly for professionals at directoral levels. These salaries are said to be higher than those paid by the Department of Quindío and the

Colombian national government to their functionaries. Municipal functionary jobs therefore are prized and sought after—notwithstanding their generally short duration. A competent and politically agile professional can, under ideal circumstances, become a "survivor" in this inhospitable environment, moving from position to position as administrations change; under the best of circumstances, these moves may be upward to higher and better paying positions. Some professionals remain at the level of middle-management (second- or third-level functionary) positions, and avoid the heavy attrition when administrations change. A particularly good (or loyal) functionary may be pardoned by the spoils system and retained in his position.

A second reason for recruiting into the municipal administration is to gain experience. A young professional recently graduated from a university may take a position in public administration in order to improve professional skills or to learn the system from the inside.

Others join municipal government to establish professional contacts; this goes hand in hand with experience-seeking. From inside public administration one has the opportunity to discover how contracts are awarded and what favors may or must be exchanged to win them. A person in a functionary position may find that he or she is expected to perform favors for a future colleague or employer, whether it be to expedite permits for construction, for example, or

to become officially unaware of what somebody is doing within one's jurisdiction. What is entailed in these instances often is not overtly illegal action but small concessions to informal systems of getting things done in the municipal government.

This is not to say that many or most municipal functionaries engage in dishonest practices. Many resent pressures and refuse to compromise. But municipal government is a spoils system, and participation in it induces a reinterpretation of certain principles in the names of party interests, friendship, administrative tradition, personal security, and expeditive administration. For a very new young professional, the willingness to engage in mutual back-scratching can be a factor in achieving success.

A fourth reason for becoming involved in municipal administration is to collaborate with the government or party in power. This phenomenon is observed in the case of more established professionals who may lose income by taking time from their thriving practices in order to help a political leader form an administration. Frequently these are persons who have held municipal positions previously and know the municipal government inside out. Sometimes a close personal friend has been named mayor, and the professional who accepts an offered position is enacting both personal and party loyalties in collaborating with a new administration.

In the course of a professional career, a person in the pool of professional and administrative talent may participate in various municipal government administrations with planning functions. It is unlikely that the professional will work in municipal planning more than one time, however.

The Impact of Planners

The effective input that this pool of professionals makes into the planning process is difficult to determine. Planners are not the real locus of planning decision-making. Like planners elsewhere (Bolan, 1975; Banfield and Wilson, 1963), the planners in Armenia are politically weak as a group and as individuals. However, their political links are strong; the fact that these persons are in office indicates political connections. As a result, many of the planners' recommendations are heeded provided they are presented and acted upon within one administration's tenure. (Existing plans are almost always filed away immediately upon inauguration of a new administration, since there is no prestige in approving and implementing another administration's policies.)

Although the most successful planners mesh their efforts with the global designs of municipal administrations, planners are not lackeys. They have their professional titles and their reputations to live up to, so most planners make the effort to give their best efforts toward competent

planning, given the constraints implicit in the programs of any administration: low budget, inexpert new staffs, and a broad confusion as to the mandated role of planning.[31] Among the Armenia planning office personnel and among the many eligibles in the construction industry in Armenia, I sensed a high degree of seriousness and integrity regarding the job of planning.

Frequently a degree of bluff is involved in job performance. Many people take planning jobs with a minimum of specific training and have to muddle through the first months in some fashion while learning the job. In these early periods planning functionaries maintain a seriousness of purpose, to judge from watching and conversing with them, and try to project an image of competence, even if they do not know exactly what they are supposed to do.[32]

The proposed city development plan of 1978 is an example of a serious attempt by city planning authorities and other municipal functionaries to put together a master plan to govern city development during the coming twenty years. The sponsoring administration allowed a great deal of freedom for its functionaries to come up with a well-designed urban plan, and many of the administrators, including the mayor, took part in its design; several scores of functionaries labored over this plan for months during 1978. Some of those involved admit they did not have much idea of what procedures to follow and what should be specifically

addressed by the plan. Some admit that the plan as presented in 1978 is the mere skeleton of a truly well-made city plan.[33] Yet one also may observe within this plan inklings of "standard" planning procedure and the first honest native attempt to grapple with specific local problems and potentialities.[34]

Many of these planners work in administration periodically and then return to private practice with their integrity and idealism intact, despite frustrating experiences. A number of others leave office so embittered by their experiences in public administration that they have vowed to leave the whole political realm of city government alone in future. Yet others make the decision to become more active in politics and use a more powerful status as a tool to effect the sorts of changes they want to see. The risk in becoming powerful, of course, is that more personal motives and compromises may supplant altruistic motives. Yet it may be hoped that over time Armenia's professionals will be able to resist such temptations, subvert a callously politicized planning system, and at the very least begin to supply the ongoing system with better, more objective, and selfless norms and ideas for city development. In my judgment, this pool of planners is Armenia's best resource for urban planning.

Career Patterns in Planning

The following are composite career patterns of fictitious professionals in Municipal Planning and other planning-related agencies.

1) Planner A—let us call him Arango—a civil engineer in his forties, recently headed Public Utilities. During his twenty years of professional practice he had been head of the Physical Control Division of Municipal Planning, technical subdirector of Valorización, and head of Public Works. Arango had been out of public administration for six years preceding this job, running his lucrative construction business. His only reason for rejoining the city government was to do a favor for another professional friend, a Liberal businessman who was named mayor and who wanted a strong slate of experienced administrators to mark his own entry into local politics. Arango performed his job in a relaxed manner, never worrying about job security for, as he was fond of pointing out, he actually was losing income by participating in government at that point in his life. He worked only a year in that position, then returned to his engineering firm and to his coffee farms.

Arango was unafraid of the sorts of threats which some frustrated citizens sometimes make in order to try to influence public policy decisions regarding them. He was at least frontally uncorruptible, although his strong political ties with the system represent a heavy degree of

personal compromise which, of course, influenced his operating philosophy, if not his performance of specific duties. Many professionals feel that, during Arango's years in public administration, political performance has outweighed technical performance in accomplishing duties—although this does not mean that he is not competent as an engineer. But the directorship of Public Utilities required him to perform as an administrator, not as an engineer; he had underlings to perform the engineering tasks. Arango's high status with other public officials allowed him to effect some of the better planning-related notions which came from Public Utilities.

2) Planner B—Betancur—currently does not hold a municipal job. His return to private engineering practice is a direct result of his political ties to a weak faction of the minority Conservative party—and of the fact that he participated in a municipal administration as head of Valorización at a time when the Cacique was out of power. Betancur is thirty-three years of age, and came to Armenia after graduating from a university in Bogotá, eight years ago. He first worked with the ICT, then was named to the directorship of planning under a Liberal administration which was willing to use adventurous, technically-oriented personnel rather than party regulars for city administration. Planner Betancur is nominally a Conservative, although this is mostly for the convenience of a modicum of backing from

the Conservative party, which at the moment he graduated from university was looking for some bright young people to recruit. Betancur considers himself more technically oriented than political. His engineering ability is widely respected among his colleagues, and his seven-month term as head of Valorización was marked by several attempts to launch major projects, including a parks project and an urban renewal program. He was encouraged to innovate and initiate during his administration, but the municipal government to which he belonged was short-lived; the following administration quickly scrapped his planning proposals.

Betancur is angry at the failure of the city's leaders to adopt some of his better ideas. He looks back with some bitterness at the experience in government, and does not contemplate returning to municipal government. Such a return is unlikely anyway, although an invitation from a good friend forming a progressive administration might tempt him again in the future.

Betancur now does fairly well in private practice. Ties with ICT architects, his ability as an engineer, and several new contracts with Conservative clients helped him reestablish himself quickly once he left office. Although Betancur is one of those to whom the salary tied to a position as public administrator was attractive, and he profited by holding such a job,[35] public administration now does not interest him.

Planner Betancur is considered politically weak but technically (that is, professionally) strong.

3) Planner C, Cardona, is a woman civil engineer,[36] twenty-seven years of age. She was head of Municipal Planning in the late 1970s. Her administration was widely reported in the press and hailed by high public officials and political figures as being active and positive. In fact, however, her administration was a holding pattern, with no innovation in planning ideas or directions. Her ideas quite clearly came from the mayor's office where she spent most of every working day. She could be called a "team player": her smooth meshing of city planning with other city agencies' interests during her administration allowed the few, modest norms and proposals put forward by her office to be politically sponsored before the Municipal Council, and to become municipal laws.

Cardona was considered a s second-rate engineer by many of her professional contemporaries, who point out that she has long ago abandoned technical criteria in favor of politics. At any rate her willingness to compromise planning principle in the interest of political and administrative unity has helped her career. She was transferred to head a Public Utilities division after her planning term ended; although this is considered a demotion, she realized that this is part of a process for grooming promising young professionals who "play the game." From Public Works she

was moved to a directorship at ICT, where she expected to stay only a short time. From there, the Cacique hoped to situate her in a technical directorship at the Ministry of Development in Bogotá.

In summary, planner Cardona was young, politically strong, and technically weak.

Notes

[1]The concepts of "planning" and "urban development" are used exclusively by Armenians in reference to physical phenomena. Only physical factors and physical goals are specifically considered, although often they are informed by social considerations. Matters of social planning and the coordination and provision of social services are left to other agencies, mostly local offices of national agencies such as the National Urban Housing Institute (ICT), the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF), the National Apprenticeship Service (SENA), Popular Integration (IPC) and others.

[2]The concepts of "centralized" and "decentralized" are necessary to understanding the sorts of interrelations which present themselves in government involvement in city development in Armenia. "Centralized" refers to those agencies which stand in a direct hierarchical relationship to central authority, that is, to the mayor at the local level, or to the governor or president at departmental or national levels. Such agencies are in direct subalternate relationship to the corresponding executive.

"Decentralized" means that the agency is removed from the direct chain of authority and has some autonomy. However, under closer analysis the decentralized agencies generally are found to be controlled by central authority through various mechanisms: free mayoral selection of functionaries and central government domination of boards of directors are examples.

Some agencies stand apart from these standardized centralized-decentralized relationships, however, and confuse the organizational picture at local level. The ICT is such an agency, a decentralized agency operating locally but answering directly to national headquarters in Bogotá; EDUA is another. This range of maverick agencies makes chain of command, power, and development itself a complex hodgepodge which is difficult to coordinate and which fosters scrambling for enough power and influence to be able to function. Chapter X provides examples of this.

[3]This is normal in the United States, also, where there are strong mayoral systems (which is the most prevalent). (Feiss, personal communication, 1980; Carl Feiss is Professor of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Florida.)

[4]Valorización officials insist that this is not a tax, but an assessment.

[5]In the United States this is called "value-added" taxation. The British call it "Betterment" (Feiss, personal communication, 1980).

[6]Armenia and Quindío generally (excepting Calarcá) lack hydroelectric resources of the sort which allows Manizales to prosper industrially and still "export" electric power.

[7]Neither water nor electric service are faulty in the north of Armenia, where upper and upper-middle classes live.

[8]Among other functions, Public Utilities negotiates its own loans from international funding institutions, to finance public works in Armenia.

[9]An organizational diagram was not available at the time of my visit there.

[10]Known as "Cities within the City," this scheme calls for the redevelopment of Colombian cities around multiple internal nuclei, into interdependent but relatively autonomous communities, each with its own commercial center, industries, or other specialized sources of employment, and residential areas.

[11]Under the urban and regional planning program of the Turbay government, announced in 1980, regional corporations will have a primary mission in coordinating urban and regional planning.

[12]Colombia's solution to the serious housing shortage at the level of lower-income groups has been to build basic housing to be sold—not rented, as in the case of the U.S. government—to the lower classes. Home-owning as a solution to housing needs appears to be a "given" in the Colombian urban process, and in much of Latin America (see Turner, 1976).

[13]This datum was obtained by adding the number of housing units from each ICT barrio appearing on a list obtained from the ICT in Armenia.

[14]Many "urban planners" in Colombia are architects who may or may not have taken specialized courses in urban

planning. Often architects are the accepted authorities on planning matters, and consider themselves as such, especially in smaller cities like Armenia.

[15]A conscientious effort was made to influence the Municipal Planning Board to oppose Resolución 004 of 1979, a self-serving attempt by some land interests and their allies in municipal government to include a long corridor of rural land within the city limits. A letter, which to me seemed reasoned and circumspect in the best urban planning terms, was read at a meeting of the Board by the director of the Society, but glossed over by members of the Board.

[16]Of course, social events allow plenty of opportunity to handle business matters in a congenial atmosphere.

[17]The houses were built several years after ICT had finished the barrio, and ICT was no longer an authority there.

[18]There are numerous building programs of this sort in Armenia organized by neighborhood organizations. The concept is so new that the established builders (many of whom compete for ICT contracts) have not realized its potential impact on their business. (Many builders seemed in 1979 heavily focused on the lucrative market for luxury and multistory housing.) See the case study of Barrio Siete de Agosto for and analysis of a grass-roots-sponsored do-it-yourself housing program.

[19]To wit, the six are El Quindiano, Satanás ("The Devil"), El Diario del Quindío, Ecos del Quindío, Batalla Liberal, and El Cambio.

[20]The importance of radio and television is evidenced by the fact that on national television a daily news program is apportioned each of the major factions of the two political parties (Liberal and Conservative), and that they do not lose the opportunity to color the news, stressing parts of it which suit them. Parties clearly are aware of the impact of mass media.

[21]In one instance an elderly lady called to complain about the treatment given her in the passport office of the departmental government. By the time the emcee had called the office, the young lady who issues passports already had received a telephoned reprimand from her boss, the secretary of the treasury, who had been listening to the program.

[22]Not surprisingly, this radio show became a political base for its "host," who in 1980 led a popular coalition which dealt Dr. César a serious blow in departmental elections.

[23]Such a newspaper allows for presentation of a controlled image of local affairs to a wider audience than local papers. However, it is interesting that the Conservative La Patria would make common cause with the Liberal regime in Armenia.

[24]In the National Forum on the Problem of Popular Housing, held in the city of Neiva in March, 1979, I did not meet a single urban planner by training—nor did I hear of one in attendance. The planning offices of four departmental capitals were represented: Armenia, Ibagué, Neiva, and Pasto. There were, however, some architects with post-graduate planning training. In Colombia such professionals are called arquitectos urbanistas.

[25]This limit has been set not in law, but in practice.

[26]In fact only one man has held the position of head planner twice, and his terms were about thirteen years apart.

[27]Section heads occasionally are held over from one administration to another and, along with technical-level employees, provide a modicum of continuity to this agency.

[28]A neutral or an inactive partisan may become eligible for a planning job when neither party's candidate is acceptable to the other and yet a coalition government is ruling. This occurs occasionally, when the popular vote for congressman, senator, or President is close and neither party wins an appreciable advantage over the other (between Liberals and Conservatives).

[29]Many young professionals do not join ranks with the Cacique despite the advantages, in terms of acquiring jobs and influence.

[30]They also are viewed as opportunities to help the Department by sponsoring programs of a pork-barrel nature, to improve roads, water supplies, or departmental budgets.

[31]Professionals working in planning often find themselves in the sort of situation Schmidt reports for young technocrats working in small municipios in the Department of Valle (1974), wherein the new professionals strive to create objective, professional criteria for the performance of their jobs, bucking the pressures to politicize heavily. They can do this to a degree since their jobs do not depend only upon favors from the political bosses or gamonales but also on professional competence.

[32]Often planners are hired by people who also do not know what planners should be expected to do. In many cases,

the municipal administration expects its planners to do make-work and simply to be responsive to orders from on high. I noted pressure to do rubber-stamp-type functions during both planning administrations in 1979.

[33]Its many weaknesses include an unrealistic over-emphasis on specific budgetary details for all of each agency's projects, with no interagency hierarchy of priorities among projects; an inadequately holistic assessment of existing city structures and services; a conservative view of trends of city development; an uncritical view of agency projects; and a timid forcast of city growth (for more information see Glick, 1979). On the positive side, the plan addressed real infrastructural needs, zoning, urban density, a building code, and a need to restructure municipal government.

[34]The first city plan, the 1959 Plan Piloto, was prepared by a consulting firm from Medellín.

[35]An administrator in such a position generally maintains his or her private practice on the side, performs consultantships, and holds some other economically profitable activities in order to round out income. An administrator's salary is considered inadequate for supporting a family in Armenia. Even for a single person it would not permit such "luxuries" as a privately owned apartment, an automobile, or active participation in social club activities, all of which are benchmarks of economic well-being in Armenia, and to which a young professional might aspire.

[36]In Colombia being a woman is not a handicap either professionally or politically, at city and departmental levels. If Cardona continues professional practice when she married, it is quite likely that she will merge her professional interests with those of a professional husband (if they are of the same profession). If she enters politics, she might easily eclipse a professional husband, in the public eye. Because of the ambivalent position Cardona enjoys at the moment—with the options of remaining a professional-administrator or entering politics—it is too early to say whether with time she will become much like Planner Arango in later years. Meanwhile she is somewhat typical of the young professional who has learned to work smoothly, if not effectively, with the political-economic-social establishment in Armenia.

CHAPTER IX
THE PLANNING FORMAT: PRESCRIBED AND REAL

Having reviewed the wide field of agencies and interests operant in city development in Armenia, we may now take a look at how development actually is accomplished.

Municipal Planning is not a decision-making body. Yet since it is the nominal center of city planning it is worth studying more closely to determine what it is supposed to do and what it actually does. The first two sections of this chapter therefore look at Municipal Planning. First the prescribed process of urban development is examined through a look at the formal codes which give Municipal Planning its franchise and legal powers. Then the second section describes the actual way in which planning functionaries comply with prescribed duties—or do not comply.

The third section examines the sorts of informal interactions among agencies, interests, and individuals which are important in determining the outcome of planning, and which in effect are the vehicles which are used to turn the more formal "planning" into the idiosyncratic "development" of Armenia. These are the important nexi which give Armenia its real urban character, the configurations of interests whose discovery makes the study of planning in any given city instructive.

Codes: Prescribed Practice

Municipal Planning has no substantial body of governing rules and procedures. However, aside from some office traditions and the personal style commonly given each planning administration by the mayor and head planner, several documents do provide an inkling of what the office's legal mandate is.

The Pilot Plan and Five-Year Investment Plan for the Municipio of Armenia

The Pilot Plan and Five-Year Investment Plan was developed between 1958 and 1960 by a private consulting firm, Grupo Habitar, from Medellín. It was presented to the Municipality of Armenia in 1960, and was approved formally and adopted by the Municipal Council in 1963.[1]

The 1960 plan was made at a point in the city's history when it appeared that the Violencia, which had driven many people from the countryside into the city, was on the wane and that the city's population growth was leveling off. The plan, called the Regulating Plan (the same name applied incongruously to the planning office it fathered), has been largely ignored by twenty years of public administrations. However, the Regulating Plan Office, a forebear of Municipal Planning, was established as a concrete result of the 1960 plan. And city projects like the Avenida 19 and the Quindío Overlook, presently under construction, also were called for in the plan.

Grupo Habitar reaffirmed the enduring physical orientation of urban planning in Armenia when it bid for the contract to perform the Plan, back in 1958:

> The regulating plan, the office and its chief, with his team of collaborators in the technical department do not have exactly the mission of constructing, but rather of planning, of orienting and controlling the works which will be carried out both by government and by private interests. Therefore, the approval of plans for subdividing, control and overseeing of works, the fixation of new metes and bounds, as well as indicating the characteristics and the priorities in public works so that the executive may work on a firm basis, is the fundamental task of this office. It is really an assessing agency and the right arm of the mayor in many things. (Grupo Habitar, 1960; appendix page unnumbered. My translation)

At the time of my research in 1979, most of the Municipal Planning functionaries had not read the plan at all.

Municipal Law 07 of March 15, 1978

It was not until the Municipal Council's passing of Municipal Law 07 that a comprehensive statement of functions of Municipal Planning was made, outlining job descriptions for planning functionaries. This document sets out concisely the functions of the Planning Board and the Planning Technical Committee, the Secretary of Planning, the Physical Control Division, the Norms and Design Division and the subsection of Topography and Drafting. For some reason the Socio-Economic Division is not mentioned. (The very conciseness of the job descriptions, however, is misleading since it overlooks informal and nonsanctioned functions which will be discussed later in this chapter.) Much more than the

1960 Pilot Plan, Municipal Law 07 is the document which directly governs the Municipal Planning Office; it is the only one written expressly for contemporary planning conditions in Armenia and for Municipal Planning as I observed it in 1979.[2]

The Planners' Legal Tools

The Municipal Council's formal acceptance of the Pilot Plan in 1963 does provide a legal mandate for planners, but that document has become in many senses irrelevant over the time which has passed, and the terms and conditions of the 1960 document are long since forgotten. Any reading by planning officials of the 1960 Pilot Plan—Municipal Planning's only copy is a faded photocopy—is done merely for curiosity's sake.

Like Municipal Law 07 of 1978, most of Municipal Planning's current legal tools for planning and regulation are of recent origin. Several of the more urbanistically sophisticated mayors and directors of planning have in recent years become aware that powers for performing the mandated functions were lacking. In response to this lack, several such tools have been legislated, or decreed: three kinds of them are considered here.

First is a body of "resolutions" (drafts of proposed legislation) drawn up by the Municipal Planning Office and sanctioned into law by the mayor at a time when the mayor

enjoyed special powers. They are designed to provide Municipal Planning, somewhat arbitrarily, with enough power to act on specific issues. Specifically, Resolutions 045 through 051 of March 2, 1976, and Mayoral Decree 052 of May 13, 1976, were produced in this fashion. They include the granting of powers to Municipal Planning to regulate parking on some streets and to sanction certain infractors of planning ordinances, an approval of new reglamentation for multifamily housing and the approval of an urban renewal zone. Decree 052 of May 13, 1976, declared an arbitrary mayoral decision to widen Carrera 15, forcing landowners along that avenue to move the facades of their buildings back to the new right-of-way within four months.[3] Although some are of questionable legality, most of these resolution/decrees remain unchallenged and are used in daily Municipal Planning operations.

A second body of regulations was issued in the form of circulars during 1978. These, of which there are three, are documents which state procedures for dealing with the different divisions of Municipal Planning. They were issued by decree from the head of Municipal Planning in use of his legal faculties.

A third set of regulations, quite extensive, is the proposed building code, which was being prepared during 1979 by the head of the Norms and Design Division. This code is intended to replace the arbitrary one enacted by mayoral

decree in 1976 (Resolution 182, May 10, 1976), which has proven to have several defects. The new document, whose basic form follows Resolution 082, is being prepared in consultation with a legal expert so that it will have no irregularities upon which it could be assailed legally, once enacted. Although the code must be debated and approved in three sessions of the Municipal Council to become law,[4] Municipal Planning is already using it to approve or disapprove cases which come before it.

Observed Practice

Despite the provisions of the Pilot Plan and other legal documents reviewed to this point, the planning office has evolved into an organization with different functions from those just described under "Codes." Some operational changes, of course, reflect changes in the city's circumstances as well as in official ways of perceiving them and responding to them. But a reading even of the most current documents on planning in Armenia does not provide an adequate idea of how planning is done.

In fact, planning is oriented largely by informal devices. City planning officials have proceeded to interpret their functions at their pleasure; according to their special capabilities, visions, and limitations; or as the administrations to which they belong order them.

On the other hand, office tradition has been a mechanism for stabilizing planning from one administration to another.

Despite the fact that planning heads and their functionaries change very frequently, there is a residual element of the planning force which lasts at least for several administrations. This element comprises the staff—receptionists, secretaries, inspectors, draftsmen, and topographers. Although they normally do not approach new planning directors and suggest how to run the office, they do provide continuity through their consistency in performing routine tasks, and often they are consulted as to how a given matter is "customarily" handled. At moments of politically motivated personnel turnover, the less vulnerable status of planning staff, therefore, tends to provide a repository of technique and tradition. This is important, since many of Municipal Planning's functions are matters of licensing and enforcing rules and regulations. Ongoing staff is a conservative force which can provide quiet opposition to impetuous changes in policy.[5]

Research on actual planning procedures was complicated by the fact that Municipal Planning keeps no archives with any historical depth. Records were on hand for the past two years, and nobody knew where the records of earlier (pre-1977) administrations were. There was no objective way of finding what had been done—or was claimed to have been done—in the name of city planning in Armenia before 1977. Interviews with former planners and with employees provided "spotty" information.

Armenia's Municipal Planning Office performs mostly routine bureaucratic functions, intended to regulate building in the city and assure the quality of structures and urban design. These are what were referred to as "police" functions in a letter from one chief planner to the mayor in 1979. Although the office is mandated to perform some aggressive planning functions in Municipal Law 07 (see Chapter VIII), the office never really overcomes the daily routine. Instead, what is done is "contingency planning" (Bolan, 1967), called "daily planning" by the planning official who wrote the mentioned letter.

Table 7 provides a quick comparison of the jobs called for in Municipal Law 07 of 1978 with the degree of compliance I observed during 1979. It should be understood that the amount of compliance registered is my own subjective list and may not be absolutely accurate, especially since many of Municipal Planning's activities were not observed.

In Table 7 the items assessed are the ten functions specified for Municipal Planning.[6] My observations are recorded for the year 1979; compliance with these job requirements in earlier years are recorded in the following column, where it was determined to have taken place. "Comments" qualify or explain the nature of the work done under various job requirements.

Because the formal requirements of Municipal Law 07 are not all fulfilled, and because other functions are

TABLE 7

MUNICIPAL PLANNING COMPLIANCE WITH MANDATED FUNCTIONS

Item Number (from Municipal Law 97/78)*	1979	Earlier Year	Responsible Functionary**	Comments
1	Yes	Yes	S-E(H); N-D(H)	Limited field work. Archival: interview.
2	No	Yes	All functionary level	Development Plan Proposal, 1978-1998.
3	Yes		N-D(H)	Designed Building Code.
4	Yes		S-E(H)	
5	No			None
6	Yes	Yes	S-E(H); N-D(H)	Personnel loans, inter-office coop.
7	No			Not visible; may be in Cabinet.
8	No			None was found.
9	Yes	Yes	Head Planner, P-C(H); N-D(H)	A principal function.
10	Yes	Yes	Statistician/S-E	Only on construction in Armenia.

* 1. Research for municipal policy formulation.
2. Preparation of General Development Plan
3. Establish norms for development.
4. Prepare municipal budget.
5. Review and coordinate projects for "fit" with existing municipal plans.
6. Aid other agencies in planning and operations.
7. Perform social cost-benefit analysis on all municipal agencies' projects and programs.
8. Coordinate plans and programs of municipal development.
9. Analysis and issuance of permits for building, and advisement on how they might be improved.
10. Prepare municipal statistics for DANE.

**S-E = Socio-Economic Division; N-D = Norms and Design Division; P-C = Physical Control Division; (H) = Division Head,

performed, the following areas of special endeavor in Municipal Planning are discussed, to give a feel for what really takes place in Municipal Planning in the name of city planning. The items below do not match the ones in Municipal Law 07 and Table 7 by number, but are cross-referenced with them for referral back to the table.

1) Creation of a General Development Plan (Reference Item 2). The need for a new master plan is widely acknowledged in Armenia. Municipal Planning did indeed engage in "master planning" in 1978, coordinating the preparation of subsections of the plan by many city agencies, writing some subsections, devising the basic scheme for the plan, and preparing the resultant plan for submission to the Municipal Council for adoption. A major shift in the control of municipal government resulted in the definitive tabling of the plan, however, at the end of 1978.

In 1979 both secretaries of planning recognized the need for such a plan. The second secretary determined that the plan should be contracted with a university or consultant firm in order to guarantee a more professional job than that performed in 1978; the entity which received the contract would be expected to work closely with municipal agencies and private development interests in preparing the plan, however. The Municipal Planning Office was said to have neither the trained personnel nor the time to develop an effective plan and still maintain its more routine functions.

A request for several million pesos to perform this planning operation was submitted with Municipal Planning's annual budget requests for 1980, and initial contacts with possible agencies were underway at year's end; the hope was to leave subsequent administrations a binding contract so that they could not throw out the plan proposed.

2) The issuance of permits (Reference: Item 9). All aspects of building are regulated, to the degree of the city's ability to detect them. (Some clandestine slum housing is built without notice, and regulation of slums is lax.) New buildings must be approved by the Division of Norms and Design, which reviews the zoning, the aesthetics, the distribution of space and provision of legally required air and light standards, conformity with established rights-of-way on city streets,[7] accuracy of structural calculations, and the supervision of an accredited builder.[8] The head of the Socio-Economic Division was assigned, in 1979, the tasks of reviewing the conformity of projects for multifamily constructions (condominiums) with formal legal requirements. The Division of Physical Control issues permits for minor reforms (less than thirty square meters), improvement of building facades, and other minor reforms. The executive secretary and the secretary of Municipal Planning (the head planner) handle applications for permits to operate businesses in the city, under the declared criterion of maintaining a balance of types of commerce in the various

sectors.[9] All professionals in the construction industry—architects and engineers—are required to register with the planning office and receive a license to function in Armenia, as are all master builders.

3) Statistical Reports (Reference: Item 10). A certain amount of statistical information is generated by the Socio-Economic Division of Municipal Planning. That division has a statistician whose responsibilities include collecting and filing information on the number of square meters of building approved by Planning each year. Data are collected from formal requests for building permits, and there is no subsequent control on information to determine whether approved buildings have been built. The collected information is made into monthly and yearly reports for internal use by Municipal Planning. It is also supplied to DANE's (national bureau of statistics) Armenia branch office, to CAMACOL (which prepares and circulates reports on construction in Armenia) and to other agencies which formally request information.

This is far from the complete involvement with DANE and Departmental Planning called for in Municipal Law 07: to help in the elaboration of all the statistical information which the municipality must provide DANE each year, and coordiantion of the statistical systems which should be used. In-house statistics on building approvals, however, are being

reported more completely, as additional information is included in successive reports.

The head of the Socio-Economic Division occasionally generates additional statistical information from informal surveys, and acquires statistics from other municipal, departmental, and national agencies. An attempt to provide a locally-produced statistical yearbook on Armenia failed in 1979: intended to provide more accurate information than that provided by DANE, the project was abandoned when the various institutions contacted to provide data showed little interest in collaborating.

4) Advising the Municipal Government (Reference: Items 1 and 3 through 8). The Municipal Planning Office advises both the Mayor's office and the Municipal Council on matters of city development and, ostensibly, on coordination of municipal government in general. Advisement was observed on matters of physical city development, statistical information, and budget preparation. It is possible that in the closed sessions of the Planning Board and in personal conversation the head planner also advises on other matters of municipal government; but if this is the case, the office's planners and staff are never brought into such advisement.

Several of the functionaries do provide direct advisory services to government. The Secretary of Planning is active on numerous boards of directors of municipal

centralized and decentralized agencies. Also the head planner is a key aide to the mayor, and they work together on planning and other administrative matters.

Other functionaries are called upon by the mayor of Municipal Council as expert witnesses, or are loaned to other municipal agencies. During 1979 the head of Norms and Design was preparing to be called by the Municipal Council to defend her project for the Municipal Building Code. The head of the Socio-Economic Division occasionally was called upon by the mayor for statistics or analyses of economic situations; he also was called to help prepare the city budget for the 1979 fiscal year. As one of only two economists in municipal government employ, he was loaned, on one occasion, to another municipal agency to help with fiscal matters.

Normally the mayor is the one who requires these services; in other cases requests are made through him or her. In this system of central government, each employee and functionary in any municipal agency is considered responsible directly to the mayor, over any other boss, and may be "pulled" for special assignment, or even transferred to another agency.

5) Architectural Design (Reference Item 9). The division of Norms and Design is a position created especially for an architect. Aside from guaranteeing the standards of new construction and major reform, controlling the city's

zoning ordinances, and creating the new building code, this functionary occasionally is called upon to create architectural designs. This functionary collaborated with an architect at the Centenary Lottery in designing the proposed Centenary Stadium, in 1978. In collaboration with Valorización, she designed a downtown intersection for an important throughway.[10] In a different sort of action, an architectural plan for remodeling a park in Barrio Santander, a lower-class barrio, was made. This was considered a collaboration of Municipal Planning with the neighborhood action group (junta de Acción Comunal), which had decided to remodel its park with its own labor and materials.[11] In a similar fashion Norms and Design occasionally collaborates with poor persons who are unable to provide at their own expense the plans necessary for them to be able to build or reform their houses.

6) Surveying (Reference: Item 9). Surveying is done by Municipal Planning topographers. It is not a service to landowners, except when it is for the purpose of resolving disputes as to land boundaries. Rather, the topographers do studies of sites where municipal projects are to be built, maintain up-to-date topographical maps in their archives, lay out streets, define the public rights-of-way and easements in new subdivisions, and review adherence to new street boundaries in areas of urban renewal and housing reform.

7) Control: Inspections, Work Stoppages, and Sanctions (Reference: Item 9). The Division of Physical Control is the inspection and enforcement arm of Municipal Planning. Its mandate derives from a section of Municipal Law 07 devoted to its own specific operations, instead of the agency-wide charter shown in Table 7. The head of this division is the planning functionary who travels the city most in performing his job, visiting the sites of serious violations of regulations and delivering the more delicate sanctions. Ideally he is the staff member most knowledgeable about what really goes on in the city streets.

This functionary is supported by inspectors who are responsible for the city's four control zones. (There were four inspectors under the first 1979 planning administration, reduced to three during the second). These inspectors, paid by Public Works, visit citizens who request approval for reforms or who make complaints about city or neighbor violations of urban norms affecting their properties. They deliver orders to stop construction on sites of violations of city building code norms.

The inspectors have a fairly free hand in making early determinations as to the legality of what they see. If an inspector makes a surprise visit to a construction site and the builders cannot provide the required permits and approved plans on the spot, the inspector stops the work until the master builder or the contractor brings in the

plans, talks to the head of Norms and Design or Physical Control, and resolves the problem. Inspectors also can temporarily close business establishments if they violate city licensing or zoning regulations: such stoppages are only temporary, to give the city an upper hand in the dispute and time to work out the problem satisfactorily.

Alert and aggressive inspectors are an integral part of the planning system; they are the agency's eyes. Some are used occasionally by the secretary of planning as advisors or consultants—a charge far above the nominal low status of their positions. Inspectors have considerable freedom to establish their own work patterns, routes, and even hours, since street commitments seldom require their attention during a full eight-hour day.

Builders found in violation of city regulations, altering approved plans, or building without permits may be sanctioned with fines, with requirements to demolish the part of a construction which exceeds or violates the permit, or with suspension of their licenses. Generally the sanctions are not extreme, and difficulties are quickly resolved. The few cases observed of drawn-out problems regarding building permits tended to involve personal dislikes of high-level authorities in the planning office and building professionals in private practice.

Nexus: Points of Interaction

In Armenia's strongly centralist municipal government the true locus of power is the mayor (along with any political leaders who influence him). It is expected that the mayor will deliberate with a group of political and administrative advisors before making decisions on important matters—and indeed there is both a formal cabinet—the Government Council, comprised of all agency heads—and an informal one which is discussed at the end of this section. The mayor can legislate by decree, which gives him a strong hand. True legislation must come from the Municipal Council, which is elected by the people and supposedly is independent.[12] Development decisions may be influenced also by the sorts of private interests discussed in Chapter VIII—developers, professionals, the Church, and the press. In a very real sense, then, a description of the planning agency is not a description of how urban development decisions are made. For this information we must look for those points in the structure where interactions among all these personal, professional, political, and official interests take place.

Municipal Planning's Contacts

As has been shown, Municipal Planning performs as a routinized bureaucracy, issuing permits, trying to codify building standards, and policing that which exists or is being built. Its major formal connections with city

government are vertical—through the mayor's office and the person of the secretary of planning—rather than lateral. Most of the functionaries and employees have little official reason to interact with agency officials outside the immediate office.

Informal ties to the other municipal agencies and to the construction industry do exist at several points, however. For one thing, Municipal Planning shares the same floor of a building with the Centenary Lottery's office. There is a free, informal circulation of personnel back and forth from the executive Planning office to the Lottery office, involving executives, division heads, and secreatries. Secretaries from all offices visit each other casually during the day, especially at slack moments.[13]

Telephone and personal visiting with professional friends in other public offices and in the private sector are important channels of communication for the planners, although the frequency and amount of planning information which flows along them remains undetermined. One secretary of planning spent much of his office time on the telephone, and a principal conversant was the mayor. Both planning secretaries had easy telephone access to their mayors, and to judge by bits of conversation which were casually overheard, relations were personal, informal, and friendly.

Informal personal conversations with other public officials and professionals outside the office are an

important link to the rest of Armenia. The secretary of planning, for example, commonly socializes with the mayor and other public officials after hours. Such contacts take place in the mayor's office, in the Club América or another social club, at Dombey's (a local café where Armenia's chic young people gather), on a finca, in a private home, and so forth. There can be little doubt that conversations there turn to politics, to administrative matters, to exchange of information, and anecdotes, which all provide a major common fund of data and a forum for extramural policymaking.

The lower-level functionaries—the Division heads—have similar social vehicles for keeping lateral and professional contacts. There are the same clubs and cafés and restaurants, the exchange of home visits and parties, the professional associations, the Lions and Kiwanis Clubs, and the collaboration on private contracts to keep young professionals in touch. There is a very effective grapevine whereby information pertaining to the construction industry in particular, but also to politics and items of social interest is flashed around the city.

Most of the planning officials have additional employment outside the public sector, to make ends meet. Their extra jobs are related to their professions. Architects, for example, may work on small contracts after hours. Planning officials also are valuable as sources of accurate information. As building norms become more complex, expert

knowledge of them becomes marketable; the city planner who for purposes of his or her job has been required to read and digest the complicated regulatory documents can save time, money, and frustration for a construction firm, and some of them moonlight at this sort of work. At the same time, functionaries are aware of potential problems of conflict of interest. One functionary was observed to refuse to handle personally the approval of architectural plans which members of that person's family had been involved in preparing.

Meetings of the Municipal Planning Board

The Planning Board is the deliberative body of Municipal Planning, which must approve new rules, projects, and other in-house acts of the Municipal Planning Office; commission studies by that secretariat; approve new subdivisions; and so forth. Presided over by the mayor, it comprises the secretary of public works, the secretary of municipal planning, the secretary of the treasury, the director of Valorización, the manager of public utilities, a representative of the Municipal Council, the secretary of Departmental Planning, and the former secretary of Municipal Planning; the director of the technical subdivision of ICT is an invited guest without voice or vote. The Board meets only sporadically, and there have been years when it did not meet at all; I was told that its convocation depends on the inclination of the secretary of planning.

I was unable to observe the Planning Board in session. However, from reports by those who attended regularly, I could establish that the mayor runs things firmly. Business is attended to in a straightforward fashion, issues being brought up for consideration one matter after another, and ruled upon. It seems that there is a premeeting "screening" of items for consideration and that some matters are not brought up at all or are tabled. It likewise seems that decisions which are required on delicate matters are already made elsewhere before they are brought before the Board. Thus the minutes of the Board meetings—also generally denied to me—indicate a straightforward, business-like meeting where all matters appear to have been handled in cold, rational terms. This would aid in occulting the real nature of decision-making and the vested interests behind the decisions.

Mystification of Public Information

Notes, minutes, correspondence, and even some documents addressed to the public are rountinely locked away in archives, guarded by secretaries and functionaries. Although the cost of disseminating information is high and adequate copies for distribution are not easily affordable to short-budgeted agencies, the real meaning of this denying of information seems to be a fear of what its dissemination might bring—not an unreasonable consideration in a society where the various political and economic factions routinely

sue each other for misgovernment, conflict of interest, libel, and theft. In a word, there is a process of control of information, perhaps unconscious to a degree, but very effective. To research in such a situation one must develop a network of well-connected friends and convince them of one's motives and one's "need to know."

When I asked one functionary for permission to look through the archives, the reply was that this is private information and that he could not see why I should be allowed to see it. In another instance, permission to make a photocopy of the 1978 draft of the Development Plan was denied, since that was not an official document yet, and the office must control misimpressions being released to the public, which might mistake them for official information. (This seemed reasonable to me until it was found that every former functionary who had participated in its preparation has a personal copy and that it was in no way considered classified by the administration which produced it.) Overall, there seemed to be a widespread fear of releasing public information, and a genuine distrust of the photocopy machine. As a result, an office like Municipal Planning maintains only a single copy of some important working documents, complicating the collaboration of its various functionaries working on projects for which there is a single copy of the working document.

Centralism: The Mayor

The political system of Colombia is structured so that the power at every level—national, departmental, and municipal—is concentrated in the hands of a single executive. The presence of the mayor has been shown in every municipal agency:[14] the mayor personally (with political leaders and other powers) selects the heads of Planning, Valorización, Public Utilities, the Centenary Lottery, and Public Works, among others. Just as he freely names them, so may he remove them if he sees fit. In addition he chairs all the governing boards of the five mentioned municipal agencies. (See further description at the end of this chapter, p. 239.)

Nominally, at least, this degree of centralism in the person of the mayor allows for a master coordination of municipal agencies in terms of budget, programming, and priorities. Yet there is some disorder within the municipal structure itself, and the fact is that the national government and the departmental government (to a smaller degree, since the department respects Armenia's municipal autonomy rigorously) reach into the city at many points with reduplicated and conflicting programs. An example is the overlapping of redevelopment efforts by IPC (the president's program on urban redevelopment), PHIZSU (ICT's neighborhood rehabilitation project), and EDUA's urban renewal program which offers some of the same services. Municipal government is also confronted with the conflicting interests of the sectors of

society which may support or oppose the mayor and his agencies. All this makes for relative chaos where one would expect the greatest dictatorial harmony.

Centralism: The Cacique

The centralism personalized by the mayor does not really belong to him. The possibility for a political boss to reach into every realm of municipal administration through the person of his mayor is truly impressive. In fact, the hand of Dr. César may be seen everywhere in Armenia's municipal government. It should be remembered that he selects the mayor when his party is in power and influences the selection when it is not); sits in huddle with the mayor when municipal agency heads are selected; and selects many of the employees of the municipal agencies.[15] So the institution of *cacique* in Armenia exists in perfect symbiosis with the centralist mayoral system. Government administration of urban development is thus effectively delivered into the hands of the *cacique*.[16]

The "Floating Crap Game" Style of Agency Administration

The Mayor of Armenia does have a formal cabinet in the Government Council (not to be confused with the Municipal Council, which is the municipal legislative body). The Government Council consists simply of the heads of all municipal agencies.

However, in matters of municipal development and planning the entire Government Council is not consulted. Instead the mayor draws upon certain agency heads to take part in what amounts to a "shadow" city development council. This council is neither formal nor official, and probably the members would not recognize its existence at all. It never meets in a formal session with all members present, since it consists of the various boards of directors of agencies significantly involved in planning and development-related activities—Municipal Planning, Valorización, Public Utilities, Public Works, the Centenary Lottery, and occasional others—and because board makeup varies by agency. There is so much overlapping of board memberships that a core of this group meets repeatedly, with different titles, in different board rooms. On Monday, for example the Municipal Planning Board may meet at the Mayor's office, and on Wednesday many of the same people meet as the Board of Directors of Public Utilities.

Table 8 is a compilation of the boards of directors of the variuos municipal agencies involved in this "core," or "floating crap game." The Table is cross-referenced so that the degree of repetition of the various agency heads in membership on other agencies' boards is readily visible.

The importance of this mechanism becomes apparent: on a regular basis certain functionaries meet in one office or another to govern the host agency's activities and make its

decisions. This assures the mayor a pool of experts who are aware of what each agency is doing. As may be noted from Table 8 , Municipal Planning's secretary is one of the most active officials on these directive bodies. In fact an active director of planning spends as much time away from the office as he does in it, all legitimately within the performance of his or her job.

This sort of informal cabinet consolidates planning authority in relatively few hands. A principal problem which this system causes is that the agency heads generally give ad hoc types of opinions on planning matters, instead of carefully researched and considered opinions based on expert input from their staffs.

It may be supposed that what goes on at these meetings is something other than disinterested technical debate about the real merits of the problems which come up. This is evidenced by the Planning Board's proposal for municipal law, Resolution 004 of 1979, which was submitted to the Municipal Council. This proposal to attach a sixteen kilometer corridor to the southern tip of the city, between Tres Esquinas and the airport, violates the urbanistic principle which has reigned in Armenia in recent years, that the city must hold its present limits and densify. Resolution 004 could best be characterized as ill-considered in planning terms—occasioning astronomic investments in infrastructure and services thorugh the creation of a city

TABLE 8

PARTICIPATION ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS

Head of Agency	Municipal Planning	Valori-zación	Public Utilities	EDUA	Centenary Lottery	ICT
Mayor	X	X	X	X	X	
Municipal Planning	X	X	X		X	X
Valorización	X	X	X			
Public Utilities	X	X	X			
Municipal Council	X				X	
Centenary Lottery				X	X	
ICT	Ø			X		X
Municipal Treasury	X					
EDUA				X		
Departmental Planning	X				X	

Note: X = agency head present on Board; Ø = agency head is an invited observer.

about twenty-five kilometers by two kilometers—and serving the economic interests of a few wealthy landowners and developers. The Planning Board passed this proposal, but fortunately a rebellious Municipal Council rejected it during its end-of-year session in 1979.

In effect, the planning office loses the expertise of its functionaries through this exclusive "floating crap game" manner of urban policy making, since generally the supporting technical functionaries and employees of the agency are not brought to the meetings where the considerations are taken. It does, however, provide a forum for orchestrating all significant municipal and construction interests.

Like planning situations in many places, then, urban planning in Armenia follows several courses. There are a series of codes which establish a planning office and outline its functions, but actual powers to plan are limited. Most of the few legal planning powers Municipal Planning has were given in an arbitrary fashion by certain mayors sympathetic with the cause of planning, and might not stand up well in a court of law.

In the discussion of "observed practice" it was noted that the planning office is a bureaucracy which performs operations on a day-by-day basis—contingency planning—with little hope of projecting far into the future. Individual planners perform those of their functions—as

specified in Municipal Law 07 of 1978—which are of importance to the planning secretary of the moment. (These specific individuals' functions were not listed as they appear in the law.) But few of the office's ten sweeping, mandated planning functions are accomplished, due to lacks of budget and the sort of intramunicipal coordination by which Law 07 envisions.

Discussion of the nexi, or junctures, at which real development and planning interactions take place points up the sort of ideal-real dichotomy which is to be expected in political institutions. Informal interagency contacts; informal contacts among planners; meetings of the Planning Board (whose members come from various sectors of city government and are responsible to the construction industry, also); centralized administration through the powerful mayor and the cacique, and consensus through an informal "shadow" cabinet wherin the same functionaries meet repeatedly under different titles, all are devices which the real thrust of city development and planning are determined. They are informal, personalistic relations of the sort which permeate most human institutions, even the most stiffly formal ones.

These formal and informal linkages are dramatized in four case studies in the following chapter.

Notes

[1]As will be shown later in this chapter, there is considerable concern that a new, up-to-date plan be designed and adopted. In 1978 a lengthy process of developing a new plan was undergone (see page 224) by municipal agencies, with the idea that the best plan for Armenia would be one developed locally, with local knowledge of city needs and problems. The proposed draft of the plan, however, died with the administration which had patronized it.

[2]Various reorganizations of the planning office during the past decades also brought with them the reformulation of both the office's organization and of its functionaries' responsibilities. The office began in 1927, with the establishment of the Municipal Engineer's Office, charged with reviewing building projects and determining that structures obeyed minimal design and right-of-way requirements. A major reorganization came in 1960, when the Regulation Plan Office replaced the municipal engineer. In 1968, the office became more powerful under the mayor as a consultative body ostensibly ruling on the plans made by other municipal agencies (but still basically a job for a single engineer-functionary and his staff). In 1975 the more complex Municipal Planning Office was established with broader functions as a Department of Planning—higher in status than other municipal secretariats. In 1978 the office was once again reformulated, this time as a secretariat under the mayor (that is, a centralized agency) with status equal to that of other centralized municipal agencies. Although this is a nominal drop in hierarchical position, one planner argued that in fact this enhances the Secretary's position since he is thus given "voice and vote" on the governing boards of the other municipal planning (operations) agencies.

[3]This is considered a sort of alcaldada, an arbitrary, near-bluff misuse of mayoral power to push through some measure which the municipal administration wants but has no legal means of acquiring, the Municipal Council being either out of session or intractable. Although this Resolution—No. 052 of 1976 (May 13, 1976)—is considered illegal, a number of property owners did comply with the ordinance.

[4]The Council meetings of December, 1979, promised to be too filled with stalled-off matters of budget and other urgent business, as well as an inevitable debate as to the legality of the municipal government's having canceled the stadium contract (see case study in Chapter IX), and it seemed unlikely that the Building Code would be considered for approval during the session.

[5]Need for such conservatism should not be overrated, however. It was observed that major changes in policy often either merely formalized already-established informal practice, or was made at a policy level remote from most actual office practice.

[6]Municipal Law 07 also prescribes individual functions for the divisions of Municipal Planning, which are not included in this table. Some of these loom more important in the context of what Municipal Planning really does than do the ten items listed for the entire organization, and are obliquely addressed in the following discussion of observed agency actions.

[7]Over time, changes in the city's rights-of-way along city streets appear capricious. On Calle 19, for example, older buildings once approved for right-of-way conformity now stand a meter or more out into the new right-of-way. This is unsightly since the building line is jagged; new widening of streets is impossible because the older buildings cannot be ordered demolished; and it places pressure on the owners of older structures to remodel or destroy otherwise viable buildings.

[8]Approval to build entails a long, complicated process of visiting a series of municipal agencies to get approvals. One must have certification from the national tax office that one is owner of the lot to be built; certification that no taxes are owed to Valorización, Municipal Tax Office, and Public Utilities; and proof of payment of building taxes figured on the construction budget, before presenting a formal request for permission to build (which request must be signed by the architect, builder, and calculating engineer). When this is done the Municipal Planning surveyor looks over the lot, and the head of Norms and Design approves or disapproves the plans, making suggestions for their improvement. Frequently, those seeking permission to build are frightened away by all this complication.

[9]This process seemed to me both subjective and arbitrary on the head planner's part. The mayor was sometimes consulted on more important matters of this sort, especially those which might prove politically sensitive or quite apparently politically motivated, such as allowing the poor to open fruit stands or kiosks for selling food or beverages in public areas. The mayor's decisions seemed equally subjective.

[10]Armenia's rough topography allows for no beltway around the city, which would be desirable in order to decongest the narrow streets. In 1979 an internal, downtown

traffic ring was being planned, which would widen certain streets and make them limited-access, forcing through-town traffic to hurry through Armenia on noncentral streets.

[11]Interestingly enough, this neighborhood is one which strongly supports the Cacique politically. The materials to be used in the remodeling likely were acquired through an auxilio (grant-in-aid) from the national government, distributed through Senate discretionary funds assigned for favorite home projects (a pork-barrel slush fund assigned each senator).

[12]But the councillors are "oriented" or led by just a handful of politicians. One informant stated that three key individuals could determine the voting of the entire Council.

[13]The flow of interaction depended upon the personnel involved at different times in the research year. There were two separate administrations in each office during 1979, with different executives, and, in the Lottery, major changes in personnel.

[14]He does not select the head of EDUA. That functionary is selected by other agencies—which nevertheless are influenced by the Cacique—and may weather various municipal administrations with impunity. Two of the three shareholder agencies of EDUA are the Municipality and the Centenary Lottery, both of whose votes are controlled by the mayor.

[15]The Liberal party he dominates was entitled to sixty percent of the spoils system-affected functionary positions, according an official formula resulting from the 1978 presidential election. He also influences the twenty percent of the positions apportioned to his (then) friend Jorge Zalamea's faction of the Conservatives and the additional twenty percent which fell to Zalamea's faction when Valla's faction of the same party refused to collaborate in the departmental government.

[16]The fact that the president can send orders down the hierarchy to the mayor does thwart the Cacique's power to a degree, at least potentially. This is another function of centralism, and it is the principal formal one. In 1979 an illustration of this principle was provided in a showdown between the Cacique and a governor of Quindío who had wavered from his commitment to the Cacique but held the President's support; the governor won the president's vote of confidence but Dr. César later forced his resignation through massive local pressure from entities whose support was necessary in order to govern.

It should be remembered that while the Cacique is a parasite on the formal political system he also is a broker who matches opportunities with candidates. In practice, much policy and implementation is done directly at the municipal level, where the president is neither present not directly interested. This is where the Cacique's power is directly consolidated.

CHAPTER X
CASE STUDIES

Four case studies are provided in this chapter, reflecting various types of situations in planning and development in Armenia. Case One, "Transition of the Center City," analyzes the rapid modernizing of downtown Armenia through an unusual confluence of interests between the property owners and the municipal administration. Case Two, "The Quindío Overlook." is a history of a fitful urban renewal program for a central area of Armenia; it illustrates utopian thinking about urban problems, and the sorts of interagency and interadministration rivalries which frustrate many urban programs. Political rivalries and vested private interests in Case Three, "The Centenary Stadium," come to bear on the matter of building a new sports stadium for Armenia. Veiled behind the issue of the stadium's site are interests which will determine the physical directions of urban development of Armenia in the coming years. Finally, Case Four, "Barrio Siete de Agosto," shows how the urban poor are taking the provision of low-cost housing into their own hands in a city where the housing market is devoted to a more lucrative clientele.

Case One: Transition of the Center City

During the past ten years Armenia has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis, from a traditional Old Caldas town style to that of a modernizing city.

For a person who viewed the city from vantage points as an "outsider" in 1969 and 1979, it is difficult to comprehend that downtown Armenia is the same place. Changes are apparent in the architectural styles, land use, population density, and apparent social class identity of its users.

In 1969, when I walked the central city's streets repeatedly with a young lady friend, seeking quiet and remote places to sit and visit, the city seemed a small and rather too intimate place despite its sizeable population. Although there were a few large, modern buildings, they were squeezed among other, older buildings (most of 1940s vintage or earlier), of which many were ramshackle and appeared to have too many people and too many functions crammed into them. It was a busy place whose narrow streets were congested with pedestrian and automobile traffic and whose numerous small shops, restaurants, and businesses coursed with customers, especially when people were off from work at early morning, noon, and evening hours. It was as though one had been transported to a provincial city of the 1930s.[1] But now Armenia is losing this rustic aspect as a massive demolition of these older structures takes place, and they are replaced with more modern buildings.

Armenia in 1979 is still full of commotion and disorder, but now this is due largely to the uncommon amount of new construction and renovation which is taking place. At the end of June, 1979, a total of 162 demolitions[2] were counted in an area of approximately 120 blocks in the area comprising the two most central land-use zones of the city. This is a most frenetic pace of city renewal at private expense!

The human inconvenience and visual disorder which is occasioned by this construction is ubiquitous. Piles of rubble or of construction materials block sidewalks and parts of streets; foundations being excavated for new buildings are blocked off with walls of bamboo matting; dust is heavy in the air as a result of streets being repeatedly torn up to place new sewer and water lines, electric cables, and so forth; trucks block traffic while they make deliveries of bricks and cement; workmen use sidewalks to hammer straight the iron reinforcing rods which will go into concrete uprights; older structures of bahareque hurriedly have their hollow side walls covered with unsightly zinc-coated iron sheeting to keep the rain from destroying the buildings after abutting buildings have been torn down; sidewalks widen in places where new buildings toe the new, recessed street rights-of-way called for by city planning regulations while the older buildings beside them stand further out, narrowing the sidewalk and precluding the widening of the street enough to allow modern automobile traffic to circulate

freely. At an increasing pace, bright new multistory buildings with modern facades are edging out the older buildings on the Plaza, on the main commercial street (Calle 21), and on the Avenida Bolívar where it leaves the downtown.

This movement constitutes an effective grass-roots urban renewal movement. It is one of the most striking features of city development in Armenia, and is analyzed here to show how Armenians and their planners occasionally collaborate in city development.

Case Study

Simply stated, the buildings of the founders are coming down: an architectural style peculiar to the Old Caldas region at the time of the Antioqueño colonial expansion. It was a "republican" style derived in rustic imitation of the European neoclassical styles being copied in Bogotá and Cali and Medellín—adapted to local materials in native interpretations by local craftsmen working in wood and bamboo and mud (Martínez, personal communication, 1979).[3]

People express several reasons for willingness to sacrifice this building tradition. One is that bahareque is extremely flammable; dry bahareque is like tinder and there are occasional disastrous fires in old neighborhoods. Another is that many people think the older structures are ugly. Armenians consider theirs a progressive city which should have modern architectural styles, and the wealthier Armenians are moving en masse to stylish and more functional

structures in new suburbs. Third, the old architectural style is dismissed as being not truly colonial, and thus not meriting the sort of conscientious preservation which is given to buildings of the colonial era in the older areas of Colombia—for example in Bogotá or Popayán. One official claimed that these buildings do not in fact belong to Armenia's "own" tradition, which is yet to be forged. The move toward a new, cement, brick, and glass city, then, is rooted in strongly embraced values for change and newness—values which are recognized emically by Armenians.

Other factors of cultural importance seem to be operative in the downtown transition. Although there has beea a tendency in many Latin American cities to break down the strong centralist tradition (with the highest prestige areas on and near the plaza and the social prestige of place increasing with distance from that site—see Amato, 1970, for the changes in this pattern), the fleeing of the central city seems to be stemming, if not reversing. A major factor in this reversal is the construction of new high-rise apartment buildings with luxury accommodations and prestigious connotations facilitated by the tendency to build these new structures in or close to the city. New buildings are adding chic to the old, formally deteriorating neighborhoods.

New multifamily buildings are not rerented to the occupants of the old structures which are demolished. The new units generally are sold individually by the owner, and

new rents are at least three or four times what the previous tenants had paid. They are forced to seek new accommodations more on the periphery of the city, in a shrinking market of inexpensive housing, which also is rising rapidly in cost. This has a net effect of aggravating poverty and creating a housing shortage in the name of providing increased housing.

What motivates Colombians of middle and upper class throughout the country to move into confining apartments which often cost the same or more than spacious houses with patios and gardens is the wave of kidnappings and other attacks upon their classes in recent years. Apartments, with full-time armed guards, locking main entrances, and watchful neighbors, are considered safer places to live.

Yet another—major—reason for transition in the central city is widely voiced by city functionaries and others knowledgeable in matters of Armenia's urban growth: speculation in land values. Owners seldom occupy their old bahareque houses, but rent them to one or more families. Because of rent fixation by the Colombian government, the rents generally are quite low and do not allow for adequate maintenance of the houses. When in 1978 the city administration decided to hold city limits tight and to force increased densification, property values soared. Urban property owners immediately perceived opportunities to (1) dislodge renters who they considered freeloaders paying too low rents, and (2) to replace the old structures with multistory

buildings or apartments, each of which might be sold for a handsome sum.

In the mid-1970s the local economy prospered from high coffee prices and considerable money became available for investment in real estate (which is one of the few financial "institutions" Colombian investors trust). Generous building loans from the savings and loan banks (UPACS) recently started by many Colombian banks made building feasible even for those who did not have personal fortunes available from growing coffee.

Although this massive urban change has come about through grass-roots processes (especially the cultural preference for the modern over the traditional and a complex of perceived economic opportunities), public agencies for urban development have been facilitating agents. For example, the dictum that the city should grow upward rather than outward, promulgated in the Development Plan of 1978, signaled investors and city landowners that the already built areas of Armenia would once again be a good area to invest in. Second, the zoning which is contained in the building code being prepared in 1979 (and simultaneously being applied to planning approvals for new structures) calls for a minimum height of four stories in the downtown core, or institutional zone, and of three stories in the much larger mixed commercial zone which surrounds it.[4] Third, a 1976 mayoral decree entitles builders to deduct substantial percentages of their

construction taxes on every floor over a minimum of four floors. Although these taxes are relatively low and thus seldom a serious factor in determining the height of buildings, their lowering clearly reflects official support for the building of higher buildings.

Fourth, the proposed building code requires that in all buildings the ground floor and a mezannine—to a minimum height of five meters above street level—be devoted to commercial locations. These locations are sold or rented to merchants.

Finally, in what was a limited contribution to the total urban transition of central Armenia, the mayor's office, acting through the Municipal Planning Office, condemned a four-block "red-light district" in 1979. This area, located between Carreras 18 and 19, and Calles 22 and 26, was considered by many Armenians to be an eyesore and a nest of theives; it was indicated by planners as a block to the movement of more respectable commerce and residents into the southern part of the city.

An ironic denouement to this massive move to urban transition in Armenia has taken place in 1979 and 1980. Early in 1979 the central government stopped institutional loans to builders for multifamily and most other construction. Many Armenians were left with their former structures destroyed and without anything but a fenced-in hole in their stead. The city has a somewhat gutted look, and Municipal

Planning was hurriedly approving petitions to build temporary structures on these lots so that the owners would not be without any income from the land, and the city without the use of much of its downtown land.

Actors

In this case study the principal actors are the landowners of downtown Armenia, who perceived economic opportunity and took substantial risks. Municipal Planning and the mayor's Office are the major institutions involved, in their attempts to perceive trends and influence the directions city development might take through the manipulation of city limits and issuance of permits to demolish and to build.

Analysis

Major motors of Armenia's downtown transition have been uncommon prosperity, easy credit, and new opportunities for lucrative investment. Public development policies—especially the freezing of city limits—have tended to favor city densification and, hence, speculation in land values. The transition has been sanctioned by positive values for "progress" at the expense of tradition and the speculative nature of Armenians.

In only ten years, major portions of downtown Armenia have changed from a traditional aspect to a modern one. Unfortunately a lull in easy credit for building has stymied

the process, and could leave the city with unsightly pock-marks of demolition sites, which may not be filled for years.

Case Two: The Quindío Overlook

The Quindío Overlook (El Mirador del Quindío) is a scenic area of south-central Armenia which is proposed for urban redevelopment. It consists of a block-wide strip along the north-south rim of the canyon of the Quindío River. This strip, about two kilometers long, affords a striking view of the central chain of the Andes, plus the green, coffee-covered slopes of the Quindío canyon in the foreground.

The Overlook is seen by development agencies as a bottle-neck to southerly growth of the downtown area, since it sits astride a narrow ridge where the only north-south arteries (Carreras 18 and 19) leave the downtown. The area houses no major institutions, no large commercial enterprises (except at the Tres Esquinas end were there are some coffee hulling mills), and has very little well-built housing. Planners and developers note its large area, ripe for redevelopment and close to the downtown. Motives for wanting to redevelop the area are functional, as in the case of planners wanting to optimize use of city lands; speculative, in the cases of landowners and construction interests; and moral, where upper- and middle-class elements are concerned about the vice centered there. Many Armenians are embarrassed that traffic entering the city from the south must pass through this run-down district.



Figure 13
Sites of Case Studies, Chapter X
Key: A Downtown transition area; B Quindío Overlook;
C Centenary Stadium; D Barrio Siete de Agosto

Carrera 18, the Overlook's backbone, was from the earliest days the principal exit route south from Armenia toward La Tebaida, Zarzal, and Cali. Line settlements grew up along the edges of this trail with little, if any, formal planning. It has always been inhabited by lower social classes; houses generally are built in the traditional wattle-and-daub materials, and with the passage of time much of the housing has decayed. There is a substantial number of newer brick structures, however, The resulting land use pattern is unintensive, compared to the densely built city center nearby.

Interest in redeveloping the Overlook area goes back to the 1940s, when, according to one informant, a mudslide swept away part of the eastern side of Carrera 18 along with the houses which crowded precariously onto the canyon rim and exposed a long-forgotten view of the mountains through the gap left by the missing houses. Journalists then began an informal campaign to promote the Overlook as a city landmark worth developing as a recreational area.

Interest waxed and waned according to the public administration in office. For over twenty years the champion of the Overlook redevelopment was a single public figure, whom we may call Luis Salazar Restrepo. As mayor in 1959 he promoted the idea of redeveloping the zone, and had it included in the 1960 Pilot Plan for city development. No concrete action was taken until 1967, when a freeze was placed on all new

construction and repairs to existing structures there. It was expected that housing allowed to deteriorate would force out residents, many of whom are renters, and weaken the positions of landowners who might more effectively resist the condemnation of their buildings if they were in good repair. The freeze lasted for nine years, but was ended in 1976 when nothing had been done to justify further holding of this land in reserve.

In 1970 a plan for redevelopment was contracted with Grupo Habitar, the same Medellín planning consultant firm which had done the 1960 city plan. The planners, under a $2 million peso contract, performed studies of such matters as traffic flows, economic and geographic relations with the rest of the city, and the socioeconomic makeup of the residents of the area.[5]

The resultant plan envisions a three-part development of the zone. First is the purchase and demolition of the housing along the eastern side of Carrera 18, the rebuilding of that street into an attractive boulevard, and the construction of a scenic promenade along the area where the houses had been torn down. Second, the municipality would purchase the large coffee farm which lay on the slope between the Overlook and the Quindío River, and develop it into a Regional Park—a multipurpose experimental farm and recreational park with pools, athletic courts, and other features tucked away in its slopes. This facility was to

serve as a tourist attraction and as a public relations facility for official visitors to the city, who could be whisked there by city dignitaries for a quick look at how a regional coffee farm is run. The third, perhaps most important, feature would be the replacement of most structures in the area defined by Carreras 18 and 19 on the east and west, and Calles 44 and 35 (reduced from other, more ambitious projects which aimed at the area between Calles 55 and 30)[6] with high-rise apartments for a middle-class target population.[7] Commerce oriented to higher socioeconomic groups was expected to enter the area.[8] The new residents would have a "healing" effect on the area, driving away the cantinas, houses of prostitution, and the lower-class neighbors.

The most concrete action taken on the matter was that Valorización did in fact purchase the coffee farm called La Secreta on the slopes of the Overlook. But because the other steps were not taken, Valorización was unable to assess neighbors for any value added to their properties, and has had serious financial difficulties ever since. One functionary commented ruefully that Armenia is the only municipality in Colombia actively engaged in coffee farming.

The project was too ambitious to be accomplished with only municipal funds, and the ICT intention to fund the rebuilding apparently was set aside for several years. It was refurbished starting in 1975 as a program where the municipality's investment would be smaller and more catalytic.

During 1978 and 1979 the issue of redevelopment was again an important issue for several public agencies—principally the local ICT, the Centenary Lottery, the EDUA, and the municipal administration at mayoral and advisory council levels. The Overlook project is of interest to this study because it has involved various configurations of agencies over time, and illustrates how alliances of interests are made and unmade, engaging various planning and development entities.

Case Study

Luis Salazar Restrepo got the Overlook program moving again in 1975, when he was named Vice-Minister and then Minister of Development (separated by a term as Mayor of Armenia). With his frustrated Overlook project in mind, and noting several similar opportunities for downtown redevelopment in other cities,[9] he promoted the idea which became the national EDU (Urban Development Enterprises) program. This program was designed to fit the "cities within the city" scheme of urban development devised for Colombia by the National Planning Office (DNP) under the López government. This program called for the subdivision of existing cities into segments around several nuclei, which become relatively self-sufficient units separated by green belts and freeways. It was argued that the Quindío Overlook project in Armenia was perfect for an

internal satellite. It would provide a nucleus of development which ultimately should be self-sufficient, containing elements of industry, commerce, and residence which should be adequate to keep many residents employed locally and obviating at least partially the need for transportation infrastructure to move them into and out of the city. Closeness to the center city was a factor also viewed as positive.

As a result of the formal establishment of national EDU and constant negotiations between the Ministry (Salazar Restrepo being situated there) and the Armenia city government (Salazar Restrepo also being situated there as mayor late in 1975), EDUA (Urban Development Enterprises of Armenia) was formally chartered on February 16, 1976, with ICT being the responsible agency representing the national government (it is a dependency of the Ministry of Development). EDUA was initiated with just three stockholder agencies—the Municipal Government, the ICT's Armenia office, and the Centenary Lottery. An initial capital of $4.5 million pesos was invested, with the Centenary Lottery pledging to donate the land for the redevelopment housing, and a line of credit through ICT and the Central Mortgage Bank (BCH) of $20 million pesos. By early 1979 the project had been scaled down: instead of building the whole massive project, EDUA would act as a catalyst by building a large apartment complex on the land contributed by the Lottery, a large block between Calles 43 and 44. This core of

apartments intended for middle-class residents was envisioned as a beachhead of respectability, as projected in the Grupo Habitar project. As of January, 1979, the project was scheduled to begin soon with the construction of the first apartments. Yet in the months following, the Overlook became a political and economic issue and was stymied once more.

The administration with which the agreements to redevelop the Overlook had been made left power in September, 1978, after the presidential elections. That former administration's head of the Centenary Lottery had neglected to formally deed the promised lot to EDUA to begin construction. The new mayor reportedly decided that there was no reason why the Lottery should deed the land to EDUA, and wondered why an agency which had been in business for two years and had not accomplished anything tangible should be a partner to a project (the Overlook) to which it could make no material contribution. (In fact, EDUA had commissioned an architectural design for the project which had been concluded at a cost of $200,000 pesos). The mayor then pulled the support of the Municipality and the Centenary Lottery—two of the three stockholders—from the Overlook project. Surprisingly, ICT also pulled its support, and the Municipality and ICT then decided to go ahead in partnership on the construction of the redevelopment, without EDUA. The EDUA was left alone, orphaned by its parent agencies, with no banner project after having fomented the Overlook, and with

a net loss from having commissioned the architectural plans.

The principal reason for this municipal move seems to be that the Centenary Lottery had lost its major centennial project, the Centenary Stadium. In need of another big project for the 1989 Centenary, and as a principal contributor to the Overlook project, the Centenary Lottery was "given" the Overlook redevelopment program by the mayor. The plans were altered: instead of several high apartment towers, more modest four-story structures totaling 200 units designed by the Lottery's architects (EDUA's plans were discarded) would be built upon Lottery lands, with probable ICT financing. (The Centenary Lottery has no cash to contribute to the project.) A late version of this project (November, 1979) was that the Lottery might cede the entire construction and financing of the Overlook apartments (truly, scaled down from initial schemes) to ICT, and merely contribute the land.[10]

Some fitful activity did take place during 1979 on the Overlook project. Late in the year the municipality sent several bulldozers to move earth on the construction site, but at year's end nothing had been constructed. About the same time some ballustrades were erected where the ornate promenade along the Overlook is supposed to be built; they were very few and were said to be test models for completion of the entire project at a later data.[11] By December, 1979, the new southern electrical substation was ready for

inauguration at a site on the Overlook originally reserved for recreation area; apparently somebody in municipal administration arbitrarily decided to save the city some money by permitting this facility to violate the Mirador plans. Similarly, a huge water tank was being designed for a site on the Overlook (directly in front of the planned apartment blocks) originally intended for a scenic restaurant. Lottery planners, however, preserved at least the spirit of the Overlook, by working into their designs a restaurant facility atop the water tank. The undeniable need for improved water and electric services in the southern and southwestern sectors of Armenia make it hard to fault the municipality completely for violating the Overlook sites with these structures.

Actors

This case study involves the interactions of numerous agencies and individuals. The principal agencies are EDUA, the ICT, the Centenary Lottery and the municipal administration (usually understood to mean the Mayor and his personally-appointed agency heads). The ICT here is represented by both its national- and Armenia-level organizations. The Ministry of Development is more a tool of local forces in this case than a prime mover. Grupo Habitar, a planning consulting agency, is an instrument of city design rather than a principal actor.

One individual is principal in this case study, a local Armenia figure who over time has used his positions in local, departmental, and national government offices to promote his pet project, the Quindío Overlook. Here we call him by a pseudonym, Luis Salazar Restrepo. (Reportedly bitter about the outcome, he has retired from political activity.) Several mayors are mentioned only as anonymous actors at various periods in the case. Behind them, although not mentioned in the case study, may be felt the influence of the Cacique, whose return to power coincided with the 1978 and 1979 decision to take the project from EDUA. Most local agency heads are aligned politically with him.

Analysis

What may be seen in the Quindío Overlook case is an ambitious redevelopment project which has had several false starts and is consumed by struggles among local agencies. It shares the weakness of redevelopment projects most places in that it attempts to resolve city problems by moving them out of view and replacing structures considered unsightly by dominant social groups, with something more palatable to them.

This expensive and ambitious program seemed viable. It had its origin in local sentiment, was sponsored by a powerful local man at national level, was carefully planned by a respected planning firm, had guarantees of generous financing from national agencies, and was in the hands of

local agencies with substantial autonomy. But because of agency infighting and jurisdictional jealousies (very possibly channeled by covert political interests), the best chance for the Quindío Overlook to become at least a partial reality was lost.[12]

Sadly, too, EDUA's potentially valuable service as an intermediating agency was sacrificed, and in the process it is quite likely that the widest possible scope of the Overlook project—including EDUA's brokering with national and local funding sources, unencumbered by most of the usual red tape—has been lost.[13]

Case Three: The Centenary Stadium

Given the wide range of institutional and infrastructural needs of the city of Armenia, a new soccer stadium should not be considered of importance. Nevertheless, proponents of building a new stadium are many, are found in all sectors of the society, and are extremely vocal. They cite several reasons why a new stadium is desirable. For example, many people feel that cities are judged by the outside world according to their monumental landmarks, of which football stadiums are one kind. While Armenia's San José Stadium is old and its curious structure precludes major remodeling, nearby Ibagué and Pereira have modern stadiums; by envidious comparison, Armenia appears second-rate. Second, with a suitable stadium, Armenia might be made

an official site for some of the many soccer games which will be played outside Bogotá during the 1986 World Cup Soccer Championship. Hosting these games would give Armenia national and world attention, and attract a certain amount of tourism.[14] Third, some who defend the admittedly high-cost new stadium point out that soccer is the sport of the people, and that this would be a long-term investment on their behalf.

During 1979 the issue of building a new stadium was constantly before the public. Radio stations and newspapers were the loudest and most insistent proponents of the need for a new stadium; they both reflected and channeled public annoyance at the mayoral administration which, as we shall note below, stopped construction of the Centenary Stadium and reversed the steps taken by the previous administration to have it built. Politicians capitalized on the public sentiment attendant upon the issue of a new stadium. This case study considers the Centenary Stadium as an issue of very high public sentiment around which planning, political, and economic interests skirmished, and in which the public sector generally served private interests.

Case Study

The Centenary Stadium was to be the new soccer stadium for Armenia. It was designed, land was purchased, and construction was begun[15] during the Botero mayoral administration of 1977-1978.

The idea for the amphitheater design came from a civil engineer who had become interested in building this style of structure for public spectacles. The ravines and rolling hills around Armenia make it especially suitable for use there. The use of hillsides obviates the need for costly structures in steel and concrete entailed in building free-standing stadiums, and the engineer Montoya believed that a modern stadium could be built at a low cost.[16] He suggested several sites around Armenia which would lend themselves to this style of construction.

Mayor Botero adopted the stadium idea as a banner project for his administration, and worked closely with Montoya on its development. The stadium had been Dr. César's pet project, which he had resuscitated in election years but never had succeeded in developing beyong the planning stage. In political currency, Botero was stealing Dr. César's program, although the stadium planned under Botero is considerably different than that favored by César in design, location, and scale. Botero is a "savvy" young political person in his own right, and the implications of taking Dr. César's project and attempting to change the design and implement it rapidly could not have been lost on him.

During late 1977 and the first two-thirds of 1978, the Botero administration developed the stadium plan. The design was contracted with Montoya. Two municipal agencies were principally responsible for helping develop the plan;

the Centenary Lottery would finance the project and Municipal Planning would aid in its development. (The name "Centenary Stadium" derives from the fact that the stadium would be the Lottery's gift to Armenia on its hundredth anniversary in 1989.) An architect was hired by the Centenary Lottery to develop architectural aspects of the stadium, and Municipal Planning's head of the Division of Norms and Design was assigned half-time to help with the project. These functionaries and Montoya traveled to other cities to study the system used to build the stadiums there.

The Society of Engineers was asked for a professional opinion in selecting the site for the stadium. The engineers who performed that study analyzed soil samples and topographical characteristics of each site, and assessed the impact such a structure and its support infrastructure might have on each one's environment and on the city. The site recommended was a large lot bisected by a shallow ravine in the newly opened north central sector alongside Avenida 19. The attractions of this site were several. It was a vacant lot which was available for sale; there was enough open land on the site and around it to permit the construction of access streets and parking areas; and it is in an area easily accessible by both public and private transportation (and on foot, from much of the city). In terms of city development, it was especially attractive, since it provided a fairly central growth pole which might channel new growth

into the northwest sector, widening and filling in the city to counteract the marked narrowness of Armenia along the northeast-southwest axis.[17]

Since the municipality did not have the money to buy the lot, Dr. César reportedly moved strings in Bogotá in order for ICT to make the purchase with its own funds. The ICT then swapped this and another property with the municipio, for the Olympio Village site, whose level lands lend themselves to ICT-style development.

On January 14, 1978, Mayor Botero formally initiated work on the stadium with a ground-breaking ceremony which was heavily attended by citizens and news media. A day-long cleanup took place on the site, with people volunteering their time and effort in symbolic support of the stadium—a sort of occurrence not common in Armenia. Earthmoving operations began shortly afterwards.

Dr. César had long championed another site for the stadium, a municipally-owned site south of the city, called the Olympic Village. About 1969 the site had been acquired by the municipio, and an architectural competition had been held for a stadium design. The winning project, by a locally prominent young architect, had been a free-standing stadium which was nationally hailed for its design, but which by 1979 prices would be exceedingly costly to build—much more than the Centenary Statium. The project had been shelved after the competition, but Dr. César began to promote it once more in 1979.

Dr. César returned to local power with the new Turbay government in August, 1978, and the demise of the Centenary Stadium project began. In September, 1978, Mayor Giraldo ordered Montoya's construction company to stop work on earth-moving for the stadium. The stadium project was debated heatedly in the Municipal Council in November, 1978; there, Municipal Planning defended its decision to suspend the project. All municipal functionaries were required by the Giraldo administration to testify that the stadium was ill-designed. At the same time the administration claimed that the previous (Botero) administration had misled the public and the Council into believing that the stadium could be completed at a fraction of its real long-range cost.[18]

Stadium developments entailed a number of legal actions in 1978 and 1979. The Giraldo administration's municipal comptroller sued the previous mayor Botero for fraud in handling of the Centenary Statium contract. Ex-Mayor Botero was threatened by telephone for pressing his Stadium project's legality. Botero sued Dr. César for inflammatory allegations made in a session of the Municipal Council, for defamation and affront. On December 23 the court found ex-Mayor Botero totally innocent of all charges. Engineer Montoya sued the Centenary Lottery for breach of contract and won, opening the door for a damages suit against the municipality, for about $12 million pesos. On May 12, 1979, the order to suspend the earthmoving (made in September,

1978) was also thrown out by the court. The local press and persons who had been affiliated with the Botero administration had no doubt that the entire move to destroy the Centenary Stadium was orchestrated by Dr. César.

During 1979 a series of events sealed the fate of the Centenary Stadium. First, the Giraldo administration put forward a plan for remodeling the San José Stadium in January, invoking a need for greater economy. Second, a binding contract was signed between Coldeportes—the national agency which normally contributes the major part of the budget for the construction of any major sports facility—and the municipality, which stated that Coldeportes promised not to fund any major sports facility in Armenia in the next twenty years which was not situated in the Olympic Village. Third, the Municipal Planning Office sued the former head of Municipal Planning for ostensibly destroying the original plans for the Olympic Village Stadium, which were not found in the office; the former head planner was acquitted and the case dismissed by the judge as "frivolous." Finally, an official swap of the Centenary Stadium site and other municipal properties was effected for the Olympic Village property (which ICT had received in exchange for the stadium site when it first was purchased). Together these events show a gradual move away from the Centenary Stadium back to the original Olympic Village scheme, accompanied by

legal transactions which irrevocably killed the Centenary Stadium project.

Related Developments

The Armenia press and many informed persons in Armenia attribute this action directly to Dr. César, and it is certain that he was the principal engineer of the new stadium's demise. But there was more at stake than the political and personal vanity of a cacique. There are many reasons to believe that "Association" members and others had economic interests in the situation of this sports facility. Although my data do not provide for an air-tight case proving a conscious linkage of the following events, presented together they suggest an interesting scenario wherein important social and economic interests in Armenia are striving to create the conditions in which a major new growth pole might be established to the south of Armenia:

1) The Olympic Village site is surrounded by rural properties belonging to members of the "Association" and political friends of Dr. César.

2) In February, 1979, several persons associated with the "Association" presented the Municipal Council with a project to convert their prosperous coffee hacienda, south of the Olympic Village site, into an industrial-residential park, requesting that the city, in exchange for this "favor" guarantee to deliver water and electric services to the entrance of the hacienda.

3) Early in 1979 a prominent local architect, associated with the "Association" made a tour of model industrial-residential parks in eastern Europe under the auspices of national ICT.

4) An Armenia expatriate who has acquired great wealth outside Colombia is designing an enormous upper-middle- and upper-class residential and commercial complex in the north of the city. Some people speculate that were he to build the 2,000 sumptuous residential units and 250 commercial localities he plans to build, he could undercut the highly profitable upper-middle- and upper-class housing market in Armenia, and pull much commerce away from the downtown and Avenida Bolívar areas. (It would seem that a new growth pole in the south, with its warmer climate and attractive scenery, might effectively counteract such a new development, and keep the wealthy interloper off balance in terms of growth trends.)

5) There is a chance that if Armenia were to improve its sports complex and touristic infrastructure it might be a host for some of the World Cup Soccer games which will be played in Colombia in 1986.

6) In 1979 the municipal administration finally opened a new electric substation in the south of the city, in the Quindío Overlook area. The Centenary Lottery was charged with designing a large water tank, also in the Quindío Overlook district, to serve the south and west of the city. Although these are logical sites for such works, this is the

first serious interest the city has shown in ameliorating the problems of the south and west of the city, which are the residential areas of lower-class and low-prestige inhabitants.

7) Late in 1979 Dr. César finally began talking publicly of Armenia's deserving to have the World Cup games played in its own—new—stadium.

8) Late in 1979, Dr. César announced that he had secured national funds to extend and illuminate Armenia's little-used airport, so that jets might land there, day or night. (The airport is sixteen kilometers south of Armenia, down the highway which passes the Olympic Village and residential-industrial park sites.)

9) Resolution 004 of 1979 was drafted by the Municipal Planning Board. This rather ludicrous piece of proposed legislation would have added a sixteen-kilometer corridor onto the south of the city, half a kilometer wide to either side of the highway to La Tebaida. The corridor would make the airport part of the city of Armenia. I was told by some informants that the head of Valorización wanted to make his principal project the improvement and widening of that highway, but that he could not do this if it were not within city limits. Were this corridor to be annexed, owners of this most valuable land (which is now becoming a recreational area and a suburban housing area for the very wealthy) would be entitled to municipal services; these service lines would need to be extended this great distance at municipal government cost.

10) There was talk at the end of 1979 of the feasibility of building a luxury tourist hotel in the vecinity of the Olympic Village.[19]

Actors

The actors in this case study range widely across the gamut of public institutions and private figures. At the institutional level, three mayors' administrations have been involved, working under two different presidents. Municipal Planning and the Centenary Lottery were actors, as were the nationally-controlled but locally-encumbered ICT and the Society of Engineers.

The Cacique's manipulation of government—both local and national—have been useful to the private interests represented in the "Association" as well as to serving his own political fortunes.

A variety of private individuals were involved in the matters of stadium design and site selection. Several architects were professionally involved in designing both stadium plans, and a number of engineers made the site selection. Engineer Montoya essentially staked his career and reputation on the design of the Centenary Stadium.[20] Several mayors and functionaries allowed themselves to be manipulated politically in this process.

Important persons in the community, generally working behind the scenes and occasionally in concert with the

political boss, appear to have achieved a mobilization of city plans, laws, and capital investments into areas which directly benefit them materially.

Analysis

We have reviewed a case history plus a series of circumstantially related events which reflect the way in which powerful interests manipulate city projects for their own purposes. First, a direct chain of sequential events in the short history of the Centenary Stadium showed the visible, ongoing process of building a sports facility. Second, elements of political vindictiveness were visible in the multiple lawsuits following the change of administration. Third, in a series of apparently unrelated pieces of information, future land-use possibilities are seen to play directly into the hands of members of the group known as the "Association." Fourth, the reversal of the northward thrust of Armenia's development would enhance the economic status of many influential Armenians and keep control of the housing market out of the hands of an upstart, new-rich developer. And building the new stadium at the Olympic Village site would be a political victory of major proportions for Dr. César; bringing a World-Cup soccer match to Armenia would win him a debt of gratitude, with many people, which would be politically negotiable for many years.

Beyond the apparent correlations between identifiable interests and the formal actions taken by various city administrations, informal connections between influential individuals and policy also generally are recognized by informed citizens, especially those connected with the building and land development professions.

Case Four: Barrio Siete de Agosto

Barrio Siete de Agosto ("Seventh of August") is an archetype of a new process of homebuilding in Colombia: called autoconstrucción, it is an organized program of "do-it-yourself" construction. This developmental process is significant because of its social, insitutional, and urbanistic implications for the future of the Colombian city.

In Armenia, where housing for all socioeconomic sectors is scarce, several factors have operated to limit the availability of housing to the lower classes (especially low-cost, private housing). First, although financing has been abundant during most of the 1970s through such mechanisms as UPACs (savings and loan programs) and covert investment of undeclared income, high interest have kept such financing out of the hands of the poor. A second factor is that, precisely because of the demand for high-cost, luxury housing (with its high profitability to builders, rumored to be about 120 percent in 1979), builders and contractors have focused their efforts on building for the upper-income sectors of Armenia's population.

A third factor is that the only agency which is specifically mandated to provide low-cost housing for Colombians, the ICT, has been building for the middle and lower-middle classes. Because ICT must recover its investment in housing, permanently employed individuals are better credit risks than the underemployed who constitute much of the market for housing. Of three projects under construction by ICT in 1979—Yulima, Brasília, and Pinares, only Pinares was intended for low-income people. When the distribution of forms for applicafor housing in any new ICT neighborhood is done, literally thousands of people queue up for forms—a number far in excess of the number of houses to be built.

In the face of scarce housing, some lower-class groups are devising their own solutions to the shortage. Early solutions included squatter settlements, which have been few in Armenia, and ICT-sponsored do-it-yourself construction projects. In the latter cases, ICT provides land, materials, and technical supervision of the construction, and finances these costs for beneficiaries over fifteen years; owner-residents do the actual building.

A notable antecedent of organized do-it-yourself-construction success in Armenia was Barrio La Unión, which began in 1971 as an invasion of a coffee farm within city limits. The leader of the La Unión invasion parlayed the settlement into a presidentially-sponsored program whereby ICT purchased the invaded farm and sponsored the construction

of 500 houses, which were completed by cooperative effort in less than one year's time.

It is likely that ICT will move substantially to this sort of building program in the future; one called Barrio Calima is now under construction.

Such ICT-sponsored barrios are fine examples of heavily subsidized self-help housing in Armenia. But more interesting is the phenomenon of similar barrios which are being built without the massive institutional backing that ICT can provide. Such barrios must depend upon determination, organization, and the imaginative use of scarce resources for success. The process is subject to several important constraints:

1) There must be an institutional patron. A wide range of institutions may serve: banks, political parties, political figures, the Church, or governmental agencies not normally responsible for housing.

2) A strong, vigorous, and trustworthy community leader must be available to head the operation; often he or she will be the one who conceives the projects initially.

3) The building committee must deal with both municipal and national bureaucracies, which at times may be—or appear to be—hostile to fledgling self-help movements. Such agencies often find themselves in the position of having to enforce unnecessarily strict ordinances which hamper the efforts of the would-be-builders.

4) Building committees must deal with politicians who may attempt to coopt the movements for political purposes, or thwart them in vengeance for political noncooperation.

5) Finally, the committees must find skilled professionals willing to work for little or no money at the tasks of perfecting the technical specifications of the plans, and then overseeing the building of the housing. Such involvement may be politically and professionally damaging for the professionals.

Case Study

Barrio Siete de Agosto is not typical in that it is exceptionally well organized, very large, and appears to be achieving its goal of providing over 500 housing units for low-income families—outside the normal channels for low-cost housing. The usefulness of its example is that it is an archetype of self-help housing programs that shows what can be done, and illustrates problems and types of opposition which may affect such programs.

Houses in Barrio Siete de Agosto will be of two stories.[21] The houses are designed well by low-cost standards, with a large living-dining room, a kitchen and a bedroom on the first floor, plus a small bath under the stairwell, and a laundry patio in back; one second floor consists of two bedrooms and a bathroom. Lots are quite small, about eight by ten meters; however, such homes are

palatial in size in comparison with the quarters many of the future residents have known.[22] What is more, these houses are large also by the standards of the ICT. Barrio Siete de Agosto houses are considered better designed and of better construction than higher priced, smaller ICT units; they are comparable with more costly ICT houses built for more prosperous clients.

Although the final cost of Siete de Agosto houses was not established because of the effect of inflation on building costs, the total price as of 1979 was anticipated at not more than $200,000 pesos—about $4,700 U.S. dollars at the 1979 exchange rate. This is comparable with the price for smaller houses in Barrio Pinares.

Savings derive from the omission of a contracting firm which normally would build an ICT unit, and would be allowed by ICT to make a profit. Siete de Agosto's costs are only for financing, purchase of materials, wages of some full-time expert construction workers who perform the skilled labor on the buildings, a few administrative salaries, and investment in certain basic equipment. (Barrio Siete de Agosto owns its own dump truck and a metalworking shop where it prefabricates the metal doors and windows used in building the houses.) Most of the menial labor is provided by the owner-builders. Each one, after making a down payment of several thousand pesos (needed to establish a working capital), is expected to work two days each weekend—until

the entire barrio is finished. Only at that time would any housing deeds be distributed.[23]

Barrio Siete de Agosto grew out of the success of the building La Unión. That project proved to be the training ground for a vigorous community leader whom we may call by the pseudonym of Alfredo Martínez. Martínez was the principal asset of La Unión's development process, for it was he who acted as a broker for the community and who inspired and pushed the people to work and to finish that barrio in record time. After the success of La Unión, Martínez became restless in his role of passive community leader, and Barrio Siete de Agosto became a personal challenge and, in a sense, a personal project.

Martínez' background is very broad and he is a very "cosmopolitan" popular leader. He has experimented with various social and political movements, and has worked in various parts of Colombia. He has a masterful knowledge of the system and uses its elements to the advantage of his causes.

Barrio Siete de Agosto began when Martínez was offered an opportunity to purchase and develop a farm across the road from La Unión. The owner, probably discouraged at the prospects of continuing coffee production on land surrounded by neighborhoods of urban poor, asked a fair price and offered terms for payment of the lot. It is told anecdotally that at the time of the purchase Martínez did not

have in his pocket even enough money to pay for official stamped paper upon which legal transactions must be written. Quickly he found a substantial following of persons eager to build their own housing. This was during the López Michelson presidential administration, which favored such housing movements. Martínez was a member of a loose, officially-santioned federation of leaders experienced in popular housing. At the outset, therefore, Martínez received official support, and even a small salary for his services. The project was promised a substantial loan from the Central Mortgage Bank; beyond that, Martínez sought no political or institutional patronage.

The building project ran into trouble early on. For one thing, the Central Mortgage Bank (BCH) changed its policies after the Turbay government assumed office in 1978; instead of lending to groups like Siete de Agosto, the BCH would make loans only to individuals, whom it considered more accountable. Second, due to the high inflation which affects Colombia, the initial payments and cost estimates had to be periodically raised; this excluded some participants in the project, and forced them to lose the effort they had put into the construction to that point, although some were able to sell their interests to qualified others. Because of these occasional increases in projected costs, some people inside and outside the program began to suspect the honesty of the leader, Martínez.

Third, a set of problems arose around the legality of the barrio's development procedures. By way of background, it should be stated that a political enmity exists between Martínez and Dr. César, stemming from the time when Martínez rejected the latter's attempts to establish himself as a political patron of La Unión.[24] Martínez considers politicians opportunists, and although he is not loathe to deal with them—and does it skillfully—he is very selective in choosing his political contacts. But enmity with Dr. César is not a good credential for dealing with municipal authorities during the Turbay presidency (which returned Dr. César to political power in Armenia).

Martínez' perception of his dealings with public authorities during two 1979 mayoral administrations was that Dr. César was using the municipal government to oppose and frustrate the building of Barrio Siete de Agosto. Municipal planning authorities who handled the matter in Municipal Planning say that this is not so, and that they actually aided Martínez with the barrio. Several facts are clear, however, and may help to establish the reality concerning municipal handling of the project.

1) Planning authorities demanded a permit from the Superintendency of Banking in order to legally receive monetary subscriptions from participants in the project.

2) Martínez was jailed for a few days for not having such a permit, for which he says he was unaware of the requirement.

3) The association finally established itself as an accredited housing development with the proper Superintendency permit.

4) Municipal Planning refused to consider plans for the project until a complete plan, signed by a competent professional architect, was submitted. Plans finally were secured.

5) Municipal Planning refused to grant permission to build until a responsible engineer was hired; an engineer was employed.

6) Municipal Planning refused to allow the construction to go ahead until such time as a full-time professional architect was available to oversee the construction. An architect was finally hired in October, 1978.

7) Municipal Planning refused to okay the plans for filling a ravine until a very costly process of channeling the stream through buried rocks was accomplished at barrio expense. The channeling was done.

8) Public Utilities refused to deliver water to this barrio of 500 new houses, and the building committee was required to secure right-of-way through other properties and build its own aqueduct from a city tank over a kilometer away.

9) Municipal Planning required that a vast area of the filled land be set aside for a wide access to a superhighway which was planned at the western outskirts of the city, to be built at some undisclosed future date. (It is interesting

that the planning administration which enforced this super-highway access through the barrio was actively making plans for an alternate, more practical internal by-pass, and tacitly opposing the western beltway by leaving it in limbo.

10) The head of Planning did cooperate with the barrio by arranging for the loan of a bulldozer to aid in preparing the land for building, and for filling in the ravine.

11) Public Works refused the committee's offer to help construct a bridge across the ravine to the next ridge. The offer was to have the city provide large culverts, over which the 7 de Agosto people would bulldoze the fill, and thus provide a base for a road to Barrio Quindío on the facing ridge, a piece of infrastructure of a sort which the city sorely lacks.

During 1979 no active opposition to the Barrio Siete de Agosto was reported or observed. Trouble in that year was primarily with the Central Mortgage Bank, which was viewed by project leaders as stubbornly blocking the progress of the development by holding up credit.

One incident in particular jeopardized the project. While making a landfill, a landslide carried a number of men down into a ravine and killed two of them. When police and municipal authorities appeared on the scene, an angry crowd squared off with the police. Only the calm voice of Martínez, speaking through a megaphone from atop an automobile, was able to prevent a dangerous incident. Afterwards,

politically motivated individuals reportedly agitated among the bereaved families, in hopes that a lawsuit might be brought against the barrio.

As of December, 1979, the Barrio Siete de Agosto had made important strides toward fulfilling its promise to its clients. Several rows of the two-story houses were completed or nearing completion. This physical manifestation of promise fulfillment seemed to inspire the people working on their houses. The entire plot had been surveyed and laid out into streets and lots. There had been some problems with people keeping their pledges to work two days each weekend, but on Saturdays one still would see hundreds of persons, both men and women, milling like ants all over the site.[25] There still were difficulties in persuading the Central Mortgage Bank to honor the original agreement to lend 55 million pesos to the committee. The leader Martínez had been seriously ill, leaving committee members to worry about a leadership vacuum in his absence.[26] The organization had a staff of building professionals—architects and engineers—who worked more for the ideals of social improvement than for the very nominal salaries the association was able to pay them.

Of all the self-help housing projects in Armenia at that time, Barrio Siete de Agosto was furthest along toward completion, and the best organized.

Actors

Institutions involved in the Siete de Agosto project include the association of individuals which is building the development, Municipal Planning, Public Works, Public Utilities, ICT, and the Central Mortgage Bank. The principal individual is Señor Martínez, who is the definite key to the entire project and its success to date; he is the broker who has known how to put together people and resources and institutions. Also involved are several architects and engineers working privately or with the association, in order to help the community establish all the required building qualities for official permission. Finally, a group of lower-class Armenians is involved, who have come together to resolve their personal needs for decent housing at a reasonable cost.

Analysis

Barrio Siete de Agosto is archetypal of self-construction barrios in Armenia. A grass-roots movement patronized at one time by the Central Mortgage Bank, the barrio seemed well on its way to becoming a reality in 1979: 500 houses built to high standards at low cost outside normal institutional channels.

The major issue of the case study is that the developers of the barrio believe that they have been harassed and blocked at every juncture where they needed to deal with

public administrators. On balance, the following observations may be made. First, municipal authorities in many cases merely were enforcing city regulations regarding procedures and standards for building. A major problem for the association was that none of the members had ever planned or administered a major project before (even Martínez had had all the administrative details of La Unión managed by ICT). The developers had made missteps and oversights. It is doubtful, however, that one of the more powerful and better connected developers in the city would have been jailed or had a project blocked for similar mistakes.[27] Likewise, behind the official rules for building housing developments, which were apparently only accidentally violated by the self-help developers (at least at first), there appears to have been a high degree of intransigence on the part of the municipal authorities who are observably forgiving of transgressions by other builders. Through 1978 and into 1979, official regulations were vigorously enforced where Municipal Planning might have taken a more sympathetic view of the barrio project and helped them to meet requirements speedily. Conscious harassment may well have been involved, but this is hard to prove and I was in no position to observe it.

Whereas there have been few successful large-scale squatter invasions of city land in Armenia in recent years, the self-help housing movement is growing. This trend does

not seem to be officially recognized by the municipal authorities or the construction industry for the groundswell that it is. (Despite limiting factors on the process, there were at least eleven such projects being promoted in 1979.)

Notes

[1]A retrospective look from 1979 leads me to suspect that in 1969 Armenia had been a rather typical Old Caldas city. Today one still may have this feeling in such cities as Calaracá, Caicedonia, Santa Rose de Cabal, and parts of Pereira. Narrow streets and old-style, two-story buildings of bahareque construction (a type of wattle and daub) with wooden trim and high ceilings imparts this sense of antiquity.

[2]This figure consists of buildings actively being destroyed; holes on sites where buildings are known to have existed; new construction rising on sites known to have been demolition sites; and vacant lots, parking lots, mechanics' lots, and others which by their situation, scars on surrounding walls, and direct memory of one key informant are known to have once been building sites.

[3]Remarkably, nobody wants to save these buildings, nor even a vestige of them. In their finest expression they offer a visual continuity, a harmony enhanced by the fact that front and rear facades have multiple windows and doors which open wide to facilitate communication with neighbors and passers-by in the street.

[4]One former planning functionary worried that if the city were to be built to the specified heights, the ground—much of it filled loosely in the early years of the city's history—could not support the weight. He also believed that the number of (obviously costly) apartments which could be built in this area of more than one hundred blocks might never find buyers.

[5]It seems ironic that the consulting firm spent a major part of its time and budget studying the vary groups which are to be displaced by the redevelopment plan. Housing aspirations and socioeconomic profiles seem useless when people are going to be disenfranchized and moved out. The city has no plan to resettle most of them either in the

redeveloped area or elsewhere in town. The Grupo Habitar plan does make allowance for some small homeowners in the Overlook zone to be provided with modest new houses in the project area in exchange for their property.

[6]The area for redevelopment also includes the slopes down to the Quindío River. See Figure 13 for the exact size and location of this area vis-à-vis the city. An ICT document on the scope of the EDUA program to be described below includes a zone of influence to the west of Carrera 19 which was expected to benefit indirectly from the project.

[7]It was supposed that a middle-class population would be enticed to move into an area considered undesirable by most Armenians by the attractive view and the availability of good aparment housing at reasonable cost.

[8]This project, of course, shares the deficiencies generally associated with urban renewal in other countries, especially where the ongoing community is not studied or consulted, and renewal is won at the cost of suffering and inconvenience of the displaced poor (see, for example, Gans, 1968; Castells, 1976).

[9]Notably, an abandoned airport in downtown Bucaramanga was available for urbanizing, as was a large tract of parkland in central Bogotá. These became the Ciudad Real de Minas—a planned central city node in advanced state of construction in 1979, and clearly the most successful program under EDU—and the Parque El Salitre, which in 1979 was still on the drawing boards due to various difficulties.

[10]This vision is entailed in a rethinking of the role of the Centenary Lottery as a catalyst in promoting various development projects in Armenia, rather than individually seeing any major project through to the finish with total Lottery financing. In keeping with this line of thinking, the Lottery was financing studies of a new by-pass route to the east of Armenia. It is common practice for the municipality to use the Lottery, with its funds from the National Christmas Lottery, as a sort of slush fund for sundry municipal projects.

[11]In June, 1980, most of the Overlook did indeed have these railings, although the corresponding sidewalks and fountains had not yet appeared.

[12]If, indeed, national ICT decides to provide the substantial amount of financing necessary to build the first apartment blocks, all will not be lost. But at mid-1980,

ICT had not totally recovered from its 1979 bankruptcy, and was not about to provide such large amounts of money for a project not specifically their own.

[13]The EDUA quickly moved on to several smaller, speculative building programs of multifamily structures which incorporate commercial sites and professional offices, and by the selling of which EDUA hopes to build a larger working capital. None of these, unfortunately, uses the brokering possibilities of EDUA for truly significant urban programs like the Overlook might have become.

[14]Cost of the needed tourism infrastructure—new hotels, stadium, restaurants—would undoubtedly exceed the value of any tourist income from World Cup games which might be played in Armenia.

[15]The only work accomplished was the bulldozing of the slopes into which the amphitheater-style seating was to be constructed. Work was stopped shortly after it had begun.

[16]The project was budgeted at about $200 million pesos in three stages, to be completed over twenty years. The first stage, consisting primarily of a playing field and bleacher facilities, was expected to cost about $54 million pesos.

[17]The newspaper El Quindiano reported some irregularities surrounding this purchase by ICT. The owner of the land in question is a prosperous local developer, linked with the "Association," who was at the time involved in municipal government. Since it would have been a conflict of interest for the city to purchase from one of its functionaries, the land was sold by this person to a second, who then resold it to the Municipality. The middleman paid a sum of about $800,000 pesos for the land, and resold the land two weeks later for more than $6 million pesos.

Although it is likely that the middleman made a profit on the transaction, the original owner is a shrewd businessman and not likely to allow himself to lose that much money on a bad land deal. Furthermore, no legal action seemed to take place after the newspaper reported the irregularity. A possible explanation of the discrepancy in price is that the original sale was reported at a much lower value than it really was sold for, for purposes of evading both patrimony and income taxes, whereas the second seller had to declare the value of his sale to the municipality since official purchases are encumbered with ample legal and tax documentation, and the municipal books must reflect what was actually paid.

[18]Botero supporters claim that this was not so; they had envisioned the stadium's completion in three stages and

had quoted costs for each stage; the Giraldo administration was claiming that the first installment had been given as the total cost.

[19]In 1980 a semipublic agency was formed to promote the development of the Olympic Village area. It was headed by a man who has significant ties with the "Association" and with Dr. César.

[20]By suing the Municipality for damages, some say that Montoya ruined his chances to continue practicing his profession in Armenia, since this probably assures that he will receive no further municipal contracts, which are the "daily bread" of many architects and engineers.

[21]Two-story houses are more costly than single-story units to build, but the owner-builders insisted on the second story, with its costly slab of concrete for the second floor, with an eye to turning these houses into duplexes and renting half the house to outsiders, thus supplementing their incomes.

[22]In Armenia it is not uncommon for a poor family of five or six to rent a dwelling consisting of only one or two rooms. This was dramatized for me when I visited an unfinished house in Siete de Agosto which a poor family, desperate for shelter, was occupying temporarily. Of the entire house, only the living room was occupied—with four beds. Apparently the kitchen and bathroom were being used, but the rest of the house stood empty.

[23]Some needy families were permitted temporary occupancy of a house prior to the formal deeding.

By May, 1980 the policy had been changed, and finished houses had been assigned to permanent occupants. Such tangible evidence of success was deemed a high motivation for others to continue working diligently toward the completion of the project.

[24]It is reported that builders of La Unión literally ran Dr. César off the construction site.

[25]A source of special pride to leaders was an all-woman brick-laying brigade noted for its competent work.

[26]A possible problem for the future of the barrio lies in the fact that Martínez is the key to the success of the whole venture. Should anything happen to him, he does not appear to have prepared adequately trained lieutenants, or a strong organization, to carry through with the project. An interregnum of mistakes and reorganization would possibly

be a jolt too hard for the fragile structure of the building committee to withstand.

[27]For example, the earthquake of November 23, 1979, destroyed all or part of three major high-rise buildings being built in the north of the city. Informal assessments of the causes of this damage attributed all the mishaps to miscalculations, use of substandard materials, or smaller quantities of iron reinforcing, for example, than the original plans had been approved for. However, no official inquiry by the Municipal Planning Office or other municipal planning agency was forthcoming, as of December 24, 1979, nor was any form of official censure—much less a term in jail!

CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS

In this study of urban planning and development in the Colombian city of Armenia, we have moved from the general to the specific, from a study of the sociocultural matrix within which planning is performed to the study of the actual planning process. We have followed the premise that city development is a cultural process—determined by the ambience within which it is performed. We have also proceeded on the axiom that city planning is an aspect of urban development; the supposedly rational process whereby development is defined and channeled. In this chapter it is our task to assess the findings of this study of Armenia, in terms of the original theoretical framework and of the meaning that we what discovered about planning in Armenia may have for the future. First, however, it should prove useful to summarize our findings to this point.

Colombia is a nation of many cities, with a distribution of cities of all sizes across much of its territory. Colombia has avoided the problem of urban primacy—that is, of having a single dominant city—but the individual cities themselves suffer from grave social and infrastructural problems. This study of planning in Armenia springs from a question concerning the nature of urban planning in

medium-sized Colombian cities in which so much of the national urban population lives.

In the perspective of research which has been performed by anthropologists and others on similar urban problems, this study is an attempt to view a city's sociocultural configuration through a focus on city planning as an important process in this context. A secondary focus was taken on the elites and professionals of Armenia, a traditionally hard-to-study segment of an urban population but the sector which disproportionately influences city development.

Armenia is a new city which has developed a distinctive ethos: Armenians are proud, positive, and paisa. The city is situated in a lush high valley which is intensively farmed in coffee; the city forms part of a chain of vigorously growing new cities in a recently colonized area, in the central Andes. The city functions as a transport center, as a center of coffee agriculture, and as the capitol of Colombia's tiniest department, Quindío.

The idea that people of different cultures pattern and use physical space differently is a guiding analytical concept. Armenia is built astride a system of high ridges which physically limits growth in terms of the traditional colonial Latin American grid pattern. That pattern has further eroded as an imported style of urbanization—"controlled suburban sprawl"—has defeated the old centralism. Armenia is now surrounded by large residential areas

of relatively low density. Its "belt of misery" or transitional area is around the downtown, instead of around the city's periphery. Armenians use the city's public areas intensively, giving the city "life," or a degree of activity which one might not expect from a city of only 250,000 inhabitants.

Armenia's founding by a few colonists who desired an urban center in their midst was discussed anecdotally, as part of the massive Antioqueño migrations of the nineteenth century. The key function of coffee production in the regional and city economies was stressed: Armenia depends almost entirely on prodigious production of coffee for its prosperity. This may prove a precarious economic base in the future, however, as changes in production techniques and land tenure complicate the traditional labor-intensive process, and drive production costs up to a par with market value. Armenia's dependency is thus tightly related to fluctuating external markets. In this setting, however, Armenia has grown rapidly. Armenia's exact population is not known—a frustration to planners' projections. The Antioqueño subcultural tradition dominates in Armenia, highlighted by values entrepreneurial vigor, a strong work ethic, a Catholic conservatism, and regionalism. The class structure is relatively open, with fairly large upper and middle classes, and much social mobility in a society where wealth lubricates ascent of the social scale. Most

Armenians maintain some ties to the countryside and the production of coffee.

The importance of centralist politics to Armenia and its planning realm is illustrated through an analysis of the Cacique, a political leader who manipulates the centralist political system in such a way as to control a major portion of city government and its decisions. By selecting many of the appointed functionaries, he is extremely influential with such agencies as Municipal Planning. The Cacique is a major constraint on our considerations of development and planning in Armenia, and under present conditions no planning can be done without his assent.

Nevertheless, many personages and institutions remain important to the Armenian development process. A virtual "catalogue" of official planning agents, de facto planning agents, and development interests in Armenia amply illustrates that planning and development are diffuse processes in which many entities from several levels of government and the private sector figure. Actual city planners are drawn periodically from a pool of available talent (not specifically trained in planning) which is drawn upon for short periods of employment; each administration brings its own staff into office. This pool of planning talent is indicated as a likely resource for better planning in the future.

The planning format is informal. There is a legal charter for the Office of Municipal Planning, and the agency has a few limited legal powers. But a modern comprehensive urban plan is lacking. It was found that the planning functionaries normally perform very routine duties, in accordance with long tradition on one hand (for example, close regulation of building), and with the established priorities of each individual administration on the other. Several informal formats for interaction related to planning were found: including the Municipal Planning Board, the effective clearinghouse function of the centralist mayor (and Cacique, behind him), and the "floating crap game"—an informal cabinet, wherein the same few municipal functionaries control the boards of directors of all significant municipal agencies.

The four case studies provide illustration of the range of typical urban development and planning conditions in the broad cultural context.

First, Downtown Armenia is experiencing a remarkable transition from a traditional architectural style employing native materials to modern high-rises of concrete and steel. This has been possible because of a period of special coffee prosperity, and also because municipal urban policy called for greater density of building, and because Armenians are willing to see their traditional city demolished to make way for "progress."

Second, despite a massing of extraordinary resources for urban renewal and the creation of a special agency to facilitate normally cumbersome municipal actions, the Quindío Overlook program has not been successful. Over time, it has been championed and dropped by alternating administrations, and in the recent period discussed in the text it became a political "plum" over which municipal and national agencies wrangled until it was effectively stymied.

Third, the Centenary Stadium is another example of administrative discontinuity and political jealousies. This stadium probably is not even a serious need among all the lacks in Armenia's infrastructural systems, such as water and electricity, but it is associated with strong popular sentiment, and its construction would likely produce political support. An actual building program, however, was dismantled for ill-disguised political motives, and any future for the stadium remains in limbo. The return of the stadium project to its original site, however, brings to light a series of vested interests (by wealthy land owners and city leaders) in the Olympic Village area, and indicates both motive and likely direction of future growth of Armenia.

Fourth, the case of the Barrio Siete de Agosto illustrates a new phenomenon in urban development in Armenia. A group of low-income individuals is building its own housing, using national agencies selectively for financing, and thus bypassing most local agencies and obstacles to this

sort of development. It appears that local authorities do not know how to respond to this development, since it is not illegal as spontaneous settlements are. Despite some attempts to frustrate this barrio by municipal agencies, its legality is firmly established, and many such new neighborhoods are now forming in Armenia.

Analysis

In light of this information we may return to the initial ideas with which we began.

1) There is some form of urban planning taking place in Armenia, which may or may not follow international patterns of "rational" planning.

Clearly, there is a planning process occurring in Armenia. There is a formal agency of Municipal Planning, with a charter and assigned duties for each of its divisions. There is a permanent staff of lower-level employees which is not directly subject to the changes which the spoils system effects in personnel at each administrative turnover; this staff provides the principal continuity of the planning agency. The people who head the office and its divisions are by and large competent professionals who give the function of planning their best efforts—subject, of course, to their perceptions of planning, the city's needs, and the nature of the compromises they maintain with the political and administrative systems.

Planning here emerges as a political process, conducted by people in agencies of government but within political, social, cultural, and economic contexts. When one considers that the issues with which city planners deal are of vital interest to many people of Armenia, it should be no surprise that a wide field of factors—both agencies and private interests—was found to influence the practice of both planning and urban development. Planning was found to be a diffuse process, in which many entities participate informally.

The quality of planning fluctuates. There have been remarkable insights into the city's needs and capacities to handle urban growth, for example. The decision to zone for higher density and hold city limits at their relatively small perimeters reflects an understanding of the limits of the infrastructural systems of the city and the sorts of urban usage patterns Armenians enjoy and value. On the other hand, there have been seriously maladroit planning actions, such as the failure to use the capacities of EDUA better, or the attempt to extend the city to the airport, in planning Resolución 004—making an absurdly long and narrow city. On balance, the performance of Armenia's planners seems neither more reasonable nor more unreasonable than that of planners in countries which affect tenets of "rational" planning.

2) The system of city planning can be effectively discerned and described through ethnographic techniques.

This is a decision which will be made by those who read this dissertation, and I would be presumptious to applaud the effort, foolish to denigrate it. In fairness, it may be said that the ethnographic approach taken to city planning is one not commonly employed. By focusing on ethnographic aspects of the city's population and through seeking cultural process in the city planning process, I believe that important new variables may figure in the understanding of the planning process per se, and help to identify some idiocyncratic points about the way a city is planned and develops.

I brought to this endeavor only a minimal knowledge of the practices and processes of city planning, but my feeling was that an anthropologist could, by employing ethnographic field techniques, observe and record enough of planning practice that a satisfactory description of planning might be written, unencumbered of the professionally colored expectations a city planner might bring to such a study. That is, lack of an extensive planning frame of reference was viewed in this case as an asset, instead of an a handicap.

Armenia does not seem so very different from many cities in its planning and development. Land and economic interests are very important in channeling the directions of decisions taken about growth and its regulation. Planning takes place in a very political context. Many of these statements might

have been made about Gainesville, Florida, for example. Armenia was studied alone—not comparing its planning to that for any other city. Were I to repeat this study, I would find it most valuable to study two cities in comparison, perhaps cross-culturally. Such a study would require a larger budget of time and money— and maybe personnel— but would aid in pinpointing subtle differences between ways people of different cultures order their urban environments.

3) If a planning system is found as expected, it will likely be a culturally patterned process, evolved over time in adaptation to social, cultural, economic, and political realities peculiar to the city, and thus part of the urban culture of a place like Armenia.

A planning system was indeed found. It was established that it is related to, and responsive to, the mentioned social, cultural, economic, and political realities of Armenia. Not surprisingly, the planning system is dominated by, and plans principally for, the upper portion of the social structure. Planners generally make allowance for the kinds of spatial and cultural needs of their clients—although the development system seems to automatically respond to these needs, without even formally rationalizing the process. The development and growth interests particularly seem to respond well to the coffee-determined economic realities of Armenia, and to the differential distribution of this wealth across the society. Within this context, the political

realities seemed in 1979 to respond particularly to the aspirations and fortunes of the Cacique, Dr. César.

Because the physical city—its uses, its ownership, its meanings for the people in each society—is what ultimately is being managed in urban planning, planning and development systems are indeed part of Armenia's urban culture. Planners regulate and rationalize (to some degree) the allocation of land and physical resources according to different value perceptions and beliefs.

Significance of the Findings

Beyond answering the essentially heuristic questions which oriented the research, beyond providing considerable information about city planning in Armenia, this dissertation may have additional significance.

The study holds up an anthropological mirror to the process of planning and development in Armenia, and attempts to establish the concept that city planning is a form of planned cultural change. For planning takes place in a series of contexts—social, political, economic, cultural—which anthropologists subsume together under the rubric of "culture." And while urban planning is the process by which people consciously attempt to shape their urban environment, urban development is the more "organic" process by which a broader segment of the population actually does form that environment. (As I learned in the course of the research, the two are best studied together.) The essential relatedness of culture and

planning seldom is stressed, but this simple concept might well aid in reconceptualizing matters of planning, especially in places where, as in Armenia, planning theory and prescribed practice are found to be out of touch with the limitations and possibilities of culture.

Seen another way, the strong forces of the development process over time force planning back into the track of cultural reality. Planning is not possible without culture. Societies will not program their living environemnts with alien concepts. And in Armenia much of planning is imported: ideas of zoning land for exclusive functions; cost-benefit analysis of policy; and even the very idea of a rational governmental-administrative process in which ideas and ideals prevail over personalities, interests, and friendships.

For the case of a society whose planning office is observed to be without power, without a budget, and with insufficient personnel—and where planning finds itself limited to advisory functions and to gently policing the building industry—one may ask fairly if the planning agency is not superfluous. May not the sociocultural body be rejecting a foreign organism? Perhaps the planning agency should disappear from such an ambience.

I believe not. There is a clear need for rational comprehensive planning so that all Armenians may participate in and benefit from urban development. However, there are powerful elements of the society which would not be well

served by more rational planning. Cities like Armenia need the planning skills of agencies and individuals not tied to the selfish interests of those who run the city and its economy for themselves. In the course of the dissertation we have identified a body of individuals who might fill this requirement: the informal pool of professionals who perform sporadic planning tasks. Perhaps this body of professionals looking within their city's culturally determined organic development process may identify the resources which exist there natively and make use of them.

These professionals will recognize that the system is not open, and they would be unwise to confront vested economic and political interests frontally. Rather, I believe, their way may lie in the formation of a widely based group to pressure for good urban policy. Despite personal and political differences which may exist, a common purpose regarding the city development would give these individuals a chance to influence urban policy decisions.

The entrenched political system, for example, must be used as a resource for its access to power. Planners could strive to supply leading political figures with the best possible planning information available, so that politically motivated decisions will be informed ones. A man like Dr. César is especially well served when an action can both serve him personally and the population generally.

Similarly, the public may be educated as to the city's needs and options through news media, speeches, school programs,

and by word of mouth. An informed public can place the proper kinds of demands upon the entrenched system.

Among the upper classes and politically oriented functionaries there has been a publicly expressed felt need for a new comprehensive plan based on properly identified local needs and demands. Planners should seize upon this opportunity to provide the city a formal planning code which would offer a legal basis for planning.

Planners should work with agile and potentially useful organizations like EDUA and CAMACOL—bodies encumbered by few official limitations and dedicated by charter to the facilitation of urban development. Strong private interests and professional organizations should be incorporated with planning efforts in more direct ways. And neighborhood-level groups such as the organizing committee of the Barrio Siete de Agosto and Acción Comunal juntas might prove politically significant allies in pressing for better urban policy.

In an environment where developmental needs are understood and pressure exists for the practice of good urban policy, Armenia might share urban development more equitably among social classes. Hopefully Armenia's leaders will be wise enough to heed and use local cultural and urban traditions which have informed development to this point, and one way or another will continue to do so in the future.

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APPENDIX I
GLOSSARY

Acción Comunal—a community action program found in many Colombian urban and rural neighborhoods. It is organized under the auspices of the Colombian government.

aguardiente—a liquor made from sugarcane.

alcaldada—a jesting slang term which indicates an arbitrary use of power by a mayor to achieve a desired end.

alcaldía—mayor's office.

arepa—corn biscuit, the most common bread eaten traditionally in Antioquia.

arquitecto urbanista— an architect who has had training in urban planning.

auxilios—grants-in-aid.

bahareque—a wattle-and-daub style of construction, common to much of the Americas. A house frame is made of logs or firm poles; then a basket-work weave of smaller sticks is made, or splayed bamboo is nailed or tied to the frame; this is then chinked and plastered over.

barrio—a neighborhood.

boleto—a ticket. In popular usage during the Violencia, a boleto was a threatening note for purposes of extortion; if a determined sum were not paid by a deadline, the recipient would be murdered.

cacique—literally, "chief." A political boss, akin to a ward boss or boss of a large political machine.

bonanza cafetera—the coffee boom; here used in reference to the years of high coffee prices and ample production during the mid-1970s.

casa propia—own house; a key term in Colombia's solutions to housing needs, since everybody wants to own his or her own house.

caturra—a new variety of coffee which is grown without shade trees overhead; it produces an abundant crop, but conversion of a farm to its production is very expensive.

camellón—Colombian slang: a hard task, hard work.

coloca—literally, "he places": used as a noun meaning "job," with some connotations of being a sinecure.

colonos—colonists; pioneers doing agricultural work.

campañía—a contract to perform share-cropping.

Concejo Municipal—municipal council.

convite—a communal work party, as in a roof-raising; usually for building a public project.

cordillera—a mountain range.

cuyabro—a type of squash; nickname for an Armenian.

destapado—uncorked.

ficha—a pawn, usually a political client who is placed in an official job to perform services for the patron.

finca—a small farm; in Quindío, usually a coffee farm.

fonda—an inn.

gamonal—a ward boss or ward heeler.

Gobernación—the department capitol building or governor's office.

garra—fatty pork-rind, commonly cooked with beans in Antioquia.

guadua—a variety of very thick bamboo, used for construction in Colombia.

quaquero—a treasure hunter of pre-Colombian artifacts, especially of gold; commonly <u>quaqueros</u> sack Indian burial vaults in Quindío.

hacienda—a large ranch or farm.

junta—a board or committee.

junta pobladora—a settlement committee.

La Violencia—a period of bloody civil strife between Liberals and Conservatives between 1948 and about 1963.

ley-decreto—law-decree, a common form of legislating by mayors.

libertador—literally, liberator. Used commonly in reference to Simón Bolívar.

maestro de obra—a master builder.

mayordomo—an overseer or foreman on a farm.

minifundio—a minifundium, or very small landholding.

municipio—municipality; usually coincides with city government, although, as in Armenia, it may contain a large amount of rural land; similar to a county.

multifamiliar—an apartment house or condominium with dwelling units for many familes.

nevado—a permanently snow-covered volcanic peak.

oficialista—the branch of a political party oriented by the official party line; that sector aligned with the Turbay government in 1979.

paisa—a popular nickname for Antioqueños and persons of Antioqueño origin.

pasaje—literally, "passage" or "passageway." Used to mean a commercial center built along a tunnel through a building or along an alley which bifurcates a city block.

plusvalía—excess or added value which accrues to an item in manufacture; used specifically, here, to indicate value added to real estate because of the placement of important items of infrastructure nearby.

polideportivo—a sports complex which is adaptable for the playing of various sports.

portón—the principal entranceway to a building; also may mean a heavy front door of a house.

primera necesidad—basic need; is used in reference to items of basic, daily use.

quebrada—a creek, which usually has the context of being in the mountains and fast-flowing.

reglamento-— a regulation.

resolución—a determination which, although it does not have the force of law is used to guide actions in matters of policy.

sancocho—a typical Colombian soup of plantains, potatoes, yucca, and some kind of meat—usually chicken.

típica—literally, "typical"; the name of a traditional variety of coffee cultivated under a shade canopy of tall trees.

trilladora—a hulling mill—for coffee, in the context of this dissertation.

turco—a person of Turkish, Lebanese, or other Middle Eastern origin.

visto bueno—approval.

viva—a shout of support or approval, comparable to "hear!" in English.

APPENDIX II
AGENCY ACRONYMS

BCH—Banco Central Hipotecario: Central Mortgage Bank.

COLDEPORTES—Instituto Colombiano de Deportes—Colombian (National) Sports Institute.

CAMACOL—Cámara Colombiana de Constructores—Colombian Builders Association.

CENAC—Centro Nacional de Estudios de la Construcción—National Center for Studies of Building.

CHEC—Corporación Hidroeléctrica de Caldas—Caldas Hydroelectric Corporation.

CRQ—Corporación Autónoma Regional del Quindío—roughly, the Quindío Regional Development Authority.

DANE—Departamento Administrative Nacional de Estadística--National Bureau of Statistics.

DNP—Departamento Nacional de Planeación—National Department of Planning.

EDUA—Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano de Armenia—the Urban Development Enterprises of Armenia.

EPA—Empresas Públicas de Armenia—Public Utilities Agency of Armenia.

ICBF—Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar—the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare.

ICA—Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario—the Colombian Agricultural Institute.

ICT/INSCREDIAL—Instituto de Crédito Territorial—the National Urban Housing Institute.

INSFOPAL—Instituto de Fomento Municipal—Institute of Municipal Finance.

IPC—Integración Popular Colombiana—Colombian Popular Integration (a neighborhood development program of the president's office).

PHIZSU—Programa Habitacional Integral de Zonas Subnormales Urbanos—Integral Housing Improvement Plan for Substandard Urban Areas.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Curtis R. Glick was born in Sarasota, Florida, in 1945. He received a B.A. in Spanish from Haverford College in 1967 and subsequently worked in the Peace Corps, in Colombia, from 1967 to 1969. From 1969 to 1973 he served in the U.S. Air Force. In 1975 Mr. Glick received a M.A. in Latin American studies from the University of Florida. He has done anthropological field work in Brazil, Guatemala, and Colombia. Mr. Glick is married to Libia Arbeláez Giraldo; they have two children, André Miguel and Marcia Johanna, both born at moments of ritual crisis in their father's graduate studies. Upon completion of the doctorate, Mr. Glick anticipates an additional short period of study in the field of urban planning, and a subsequent career in urban planning and teaching. His special interest is urban planning for Third World countries.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Paul L. Doughty, Chairman
Professor of Anthropology

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Paul J. Magnarella
Professor of Anthropology

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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Anthropology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December, 1980

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